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ABSTRACT
This dissertation argues that moral and religious authorities of the Elizabethan and
Jacobean periods adapted rules for emotional governance from Senecan philosophy. These
Senecan rules helped institute a performance-based approach to managing emotion, which relied
on programmatic meditation, rhetoric, and behavior to change one’s emotional state. This
approach ostensibly offered more personal control over affective inclination, which according to
the period’s Galenic paradigms, was heavily influenced by environmental and physiological
factors. My project examines revenge tragedy to highlight Senecan-inspired affect management
as practiced by aspiring avengers. Because revenging hopefuls must amplify and then mobilize
their feelings in order to achieve violent retribution, they use performative routines to curate an
emotional disposition conducive to revenge. I examine this process in Hamlet, The Rape of
Lucrece, Titus Andronicus, The Spanish Tragedy, and Henry Chettle’s understudied Hoffman.
Characters from these texts show that performative routines allowed greater control over
feeling, despite humoral theory’s determinism. Such autonomy also undermined humoralism’s
core tenets, contributing to an epistemic shift that replaced it with more accurate notions of
internal physiology. This ambivalence appears most vividly through strong female revengers, as
they reject the Galenic view that colder female bodies could only barely manage extreme
feelings. Women who successfully use performance to manage emotion therefore best illustrate
the way that such routines concurrently strengthened and weakened Galenic paradigms.
Performative routines could create or justify an aberration in humoral theory (such as a
competent female revenger), making humoralism more hospitable to individuals seeking control.
But at the same time, they produced counterexamples that would help contribute to humoralism’s
demise.
v

INTRODUCTION
In his Anatomy of Melancholy, Robert Burton invokes the central question of early
modern affect1. In early modern medicine, which was influenced greatly by Hippocrates and
Galen, it was assumed that one’s emotional disposition was strongly determined by the level and
quantity of four fluids, called humors. Because each humor predisposed the body to a
corresponding set of feelings, Burton and other early modern thinkers wondered whether
individuals really held agency over their affective states. Could the conscious mind intervene in
the production of feeling, even though that production was theorized to be heavily physiological?
Burton poses the question thus:
“Manners do follow the temperature of the body,” as Galen proves in his book of that
subject . . . We see this in old men, children, Europeans, Asians, hot and cold climes;
sanguine are merry, melancholy sad, phlegmatic dull, by reason of abundance of those
humors, and they cannot resist such passions which are inflicted by them . . . How
should a man choose but be choleric and angry, that hath his body so clogged with
abundance of gross humors? Or melancholy, that is so inwardly disposed? (1.2.374-75).
Here, Burton asks if one might feel anything besides the default condition created by the body’s
“abundance of those humors.” If one is “so inwardly disposed” to merriment, sadness, or
dullness because of their physiological makeup, then could they successfully choose to be
anything else? Because it assumed that one’s feelings were the product of physiological
hydraulics rather than choice, humoral theory posed huge complications for thinkers concerned
with religious and moral ethics. Could one be held liable for feelings that appeared independent
of morality or rationality? Burton and other period authorities would answer these pressing
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queries by adapting the Roman philosopher Seneca’s strategies for affective governance. By
adapting these rules, Burton would disprove or at least complicate the humoral truism he offers
at the beginning: “Manners do follow the temperature of the body.” Instead, taking inspiration
from Seneca, Burton and others would show that manners engendered through the body’s
physiological baseline could be actually be altered through programmatic meditation, rhetoric, or
behavior.
By examining the way early modern affect theorists adapted Senecan ideas and used
them to guide affect, this dissertation participates in a wider scholarly project to investigate
affect beyond physiological determinism. In The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect
in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries, Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan argue that scholars of
affect have mainly focused on “the physiological determinism of emotion in early modern texts,
arguing that feeling was something that happened to the body of the passive, receptive subject,
who either gave way to these material impulses or attempted to resist them through Stoical selfcontrol” (3). Although the first wave of affect scholars do acknowledge that individuals could
consciously influence their physiology and emotional disposition2 , the current wave of humoral
scholarship nonetheless seeks narrower investigation of how “other intellectual and creative
frameworks, such as religious and philosophical belief, political performance, or rhetorical or
dramaturgical style also shaped cultural beliefs about emotional experience” (5). Meek and
Sullivan contend that because early modern theories of emotion were constructed through
insights from “philosophical, spiritual, psychological, and creative engagements,” scholars must
“give more attention to the other systems of knowledge and representation that people used to
conceptualize and articulate emotional experience” (6). My focus on the Senecan affect
management principles imported into humoralism counterbalances an emphasis on physiological
2

determinism, as it shows that humoral subjects possessed powerful strategies for manipulating
their affective states to achieve desired results. These Senecan strategies were systematized,
recorded in emotional taxonomies like Burton’s, and then accepted and practiced by a public
who understood them as tools for creating and shaping individual affective disposition. The
cumulative effect of Senecan philosophy on humoral theory was ambivalent. On one hand, the
flexibility it provided made humoral theory more palpable to individual subjects, since it gave
them a high degree of autonomy in a system perceived as mechanical and morally neutral. But at
the same time, this flexibility also undermined the determinism at the core of humoral theory and
thus highlighted instances of its falseness.
The pioneering studies on early modern humor help establish the problematic
determinism of humoral theory. Michael Schoenfeldt explains how the humoral system assumed
that each body’s physiological makeup contributed to an individual’s baseline physical
constitution and personality traits:
Physical health and mental disposition were determined by the balance within the body of
the four humoral fluids produced by the various stages of digestion – blood, phlegm,
yellow bile, and black bile. These fluids are then dispersed throughout the body by
spirits, mediators between soul and body . . . Under this regime, illness is not the product
of an infection from without but rather is the result of an imbalance of humoral fluid (2).
Although bodily composition provided one with a default constitution and affective register,
early moderns nonetheless viewed the humoral bodily as porous, vulnerable, and continually in
motion. They assumed that exterior forces or environmental factors could cause shifts in humoral
balance, which would cause a corresponding change to one’s health and temperament. Factors
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such as climate and temperature, food and drink intake, and exposure to vapor were all potential
disruptors of physiological balance. The strong influence exerted by these external factors
seemed to further minimize the subject’s ability to govern their feelings in a deliberate way.
Given that factors outside individual control caused humoral fluctuation, one might be
involuntarily conditioned to feel or behave in a way that clashes with one’s sense of identity,
personal values, or dearly-held moral or religious ethics. And in cases when external factors were
thought to have altered one’s disposition and compelled them to bad behavior, how should God
or society justly account for the individual’s lack of control over their actions? Quandaries like
these highlight the intervention that needed to be made within humoral theory. Ultimately,
because early modernity’s highly physiological account of emotion seemed insufficiently
positioned to accommodate issues of moral, ethical, or spiritual complexity, thinkers like Robert
Burton worked to modify their understanding of affect and make it more hospitable to these
concerns.
Through a process of appropriation, the early modern affective taxonomists successfully
added elements of rational and moral agency that were missing from the otherwise mechanical
humoral paradigm. They turned to Seneca’s philosophical treatise De Ira, taking its strategies for
affect management and establishing them as early modern best practices for manipulating one’s
default affective disposition. In De Ira, which gives practical advice for diffusing anger, Seneca
articulates a regime for controlling emotion so that one might live according to the precepts of
Stoic morality, which was to govern the inner self so that one might remain unbowed by the
vicissitudes of life. According to Colin Burrow, the Stoics believed that:
The passions should be mastered so that man . . . can avoid unnecessarily subjecting
himself to fortune. A ‘vir virtutis’ (a man of virtue) stands constant, is firm and secure in
4

himself, and controls passions within him so that he can avoid subjection to the world
around him . . . If the man of virtue, or the ideal figure of the ‘sage’, was finally
overwhelmed by Fortune and rendered unable to control his passions, he would rationally
choose to kill himself in order to avoid subjecting himself to external events, achieving
sovereignty over his own being even when he had lost control of his body and his fate”
(167).
Burrow identifies that Stoic practitioners seek to master internal strategies for subjugating
provocations to destructive feelings that would clash with disciplined self-governance. One must
“control passions within him so that he can avoid subjection to the world around him.” In other
words, the Stoic must ensure that their personal reasoning or volition, rather than any influences
from the outside world, authorize and control their feelings. In order to achieve this state of selfmastery, Seneca proposes two methods of affect management in De Ira. First, Seneca tells his
readers to avoid anger or other negative emotions through delay, which means to avoid acting on
negative impressions until reason comes to a proper judgment of them. Second, when in danger
of succumbing to anger or another vice, one should meditate on or perform a different type of
feeling. Seneca proposes that by deliberately changing an external countenance or gesture, by
outwardly departing from unwanted or unethical interior impulses, one can resist the descent into
the full, potentially ruinous embrace of destructive affect. This strategy, which I term
displacement, would become the early modern period’s most valued tool for managing humoral
disposition. It instituted a performative model of affect management, one where the individual
consciously mediated on or acted out desired emotions.
Senecan rules for affect management were adaptable to early modern humoral theory
because both systems presuppose innate interconnectivities between different types of matter.
5

Both systems feature reciprocities between matter that reduces or even, in some cases, eliminates
boundaries between corporeal and incorporeal objects. After identifying that Seneca’s version of
Stoic cosmology was inspired by the earlier philosopher Chrysippus, Burrow explains how
Seneca would have understood the interconnected universe:
According to Stoic physics, all aspects of the universe, from man to beast through waves
and stars, are animated by a single pneuma or spirit, which made the cosmos a unity akin
to that of an animate being . . . The unity of the Stoic cosmos meant that for many Stoics
when one element in the universe stretches or deforms, the rest of the world connectedly
deforms. As a result, a personal passion might cause a reverberation in the cosmos. The
interconnectedness of objects and beings in Stoic thought extends through time as well as
space, through a complex system of causes (Burrow 180-81).
When Burrow explains that “a personal passion might cause a reverberation in the cosmos,” he
alludes to the way that Stoic pneuma unified the corporeal and the incorporeal. Tom Rosenmeyer
elaborates on this Stoic synthesis of matter, explaining the connectedness of the universe means
that “all that exists is corporeal . . . justice, passion, reason, truth, vices, judgments, the soul . . .
Events are corporeal, and so are their causes” (94-95). If events and their causes are corporeal,
then an individual’s actions are not merely mechanical; they are instead imbued with the moral
energy of their motivating causes. In other words, Stoic thought presupposed that impulses,
feelings, and judgments were embedded within the actions they motivated. Such a synthesis gave
these intangible elements a physical substance that yoked them to other elements in the corporeal
universe. Because they explained ways in which ethics were tangibly expressed through physical
objects or observable events, Stoic tenets would prove useful in rectifying pure humoral theory’s
lack of attention to moral complexities.
6

Like the Stoic cosmos, humoral theory also maintained that disparate objects were linked
together by powerful connectivities. In her pioneering monograph Humoring the Body: Emotions
and the Shakespearian Stage, Gail Kern Paster uses the term “humoral ecology” to discuss the
reciprocities inherent in the humoral system. For her, this term encapsulates the way “the
passions and the body” must be understood “in ecological terms – that is, in terms of that body’s
reciprocal relation to the world” (18). Humoral theory asserted that all matter in the universe was
powered by energy from the four elements: air, fire, water, and earth. These elemental energies
not only animated the world’s tangible, external matter, but they also charged a corresponding
humor within the body. Because internal and external matter share the same energy source, the
humoral system lashes together “the mind, the body, and the world . . . through what philosopher
Andy Clark describes as a network of ‘mutually modulatory influences’ in a dynamic action of
‘continual reciprocal causation’” (Paster 10). In simpler terms, because internal bodily matter
and external objects were interconnected and could influence each other, changes to one might
result in changes to the other. Paster examines “self report by characters in the throes of strong
feeling” to establish this “demonstrable psychophysiological reciprocity between the
experiencing subject and his or her relation to the world” (19). Wary of external forces that
might suddenly and unexpectedly manipulate humors, early moderns conceived of selfhood as “a
fragile and unstable edifice, eternally under construction, and assailed on all sides (including the
insides) by insurgent passions” (Schoenfeldt 73). However, on the other hand, this ecological
embeddedness also gave early moderns a powerful capacity for self-determination. Katherine
Craik and Tanya Pollard illustrate this capacity by citing the physician Thomas Fienus, who
details “the power of the imagination to bring about physiological change” (5). Inspired by
Senecan displacement, Fineus argues that one can change their affective disposition by
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meditating on a particular feeling through the help of books, art, or plays. This act alters the
humors and “transform[s] the body” in a material way, potentially making it more conducive to a
desired affective state (Craik and Pollard 5). The reciprocal quality of the humoral universe,
then, could alternatively bring uplift or degradation. But because it was indeed reciprocal in
nature, humoral theory could easily appropriate Stoic conceits designed for application in a
similar context.
Given that early modern epistemology compressed a variety of disciplines – including
medicine and philosophy – under the auspice of religious authority, humoral theory needed to be
assimilated into Christianity in order to fit into early modern culture. Because Seneca’s rules
posited that feelings and actions could be suffused with moral energy, they helped make humoral
theory attractive and adaptable to early modern Christians seeking to understand how perceived
physiological realities might be accommodated to a spiritual regime concerned with piety and
salvation. The moral agency provided by delay and displacement thus made humoral theory
eminently hospitable to a Christian cosmos. These strategies served as a way to condition pious
affect and good behavior, through which one could triumph over body mechanics that might
motivate impious feelings and immoral behavior. Christian authorities used this concept to
fashion a narrative about salvation: in order to achieve salvation, destructive impulses produced
by the unruly body needed to be quelled. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary FloydWilson explain that this narrative imported as its foundation the classical understanding of affect,
which depicted the “passions as perturbations, or perilous forces that acted on the suffering
body” (12). Senecan displacement eventually became the key strategy for mitigating these
perturbations. Catholic and Protestant thinkers sanctioned and elevated displacement by asserting
that it was modeled by Christ himself. Because his sacrifice on the cross “combat[ed] anger and
8

revenge with love,” his manner of death illustrates how one might perform a desired emotion and
allow it to supercede a negative or unwanted one (12). By associating displacement with Christ’s
example, religious authorities positioned it as a strategy that one must emulate to follow Christ,
thus endorsing it to the Christian corpus of believers. Thanks in large part to this classical
understanding of affect management, the early moderns were able to systematize performative
affect management and integrate it into a Christian framework.
The proceeding chapters investigate the myriad ways in which Senecan affect
management rules were incorporated into early modern religious, medical, and socio-political
systems of knowledge. The chapters exclusively analyze revenge narrative because they bear a
special relationship to affective politics. Because the call to revenge requires that the aspiring
avenger assess their feelings and then mobilize them to work towards retaliation, revenge
narratives feature copious examples of characters who choose to implement affect management
routines. Chapter 1 outlines the affect management rules found in Seneca’s De Ira, and then
explains how they were appropriated by Robert Burton and other early modern taxonomists. I
show these rules as they appear in Hamlet, while arguing that Hamlet, as a student of the theatre,
understands performative affective management through the lens of drama. Hamlet’s theatrical
understanding of affect management would have held special appeal to nobles and courtiers, as
they would have understood displacement as essential to survival and success in courtly life. In a
tightly policed social structure where adopting the wrong exterior affective posture might offend
the monarch and bring ruin, the ability to emote according to the monarch’s pleasure was
paramount to advancement.
Chapter 2 examines the main characters in the narrative poem The Rape of Lucrece to
explain that affect management routines took varied shapes based on individual subject
9

positions. Gender, class, familial status, religion, and socio-cultural attributes all converged to
modify the affective program that an individual revenger might set in motion. Lucrece, Brutus,
and Collatine all illustrate this particularity, as they implement different affect management
routines to make their versions of revenge fit with the demands of their gendered and political
statuses. My analysis maintains tight focus on how the physiological understanding of gender
created different expectations for male and female revengers. It was thought that hotter male
bodies were better conductors of the blood and choler necessary for revenge, while colder female
bodies were less effective at processing or managing these humors. I examine Tarquin, Lucrece,
and Brutus and Collatine to show how these gendered physiological paradigms condoned or even
sanctioned male revenge while circumscribing female revenge. Lucrece illustrates that females
called to revenge were oppressed by two interlocking types of patriarchal conceits: medical ideas
that assumed an inherent weakness afflicted women’s bodies and degraded their capacity for
affect management, and cultural ideas that discouraged women from acting boldly or
participating in the political arenas dominated by males.
Chapter 3 continues to investigate the burden placed on female revengers. It first
compiles classical representations of angry or revenging women as bombastic or vindictive
Furies, which offered a default narrative suggesting that female anger and revenge were
monstrous. These classical depictions gave precedent and corroboration to humoral theories
suggesting that women could be easily made irrational or hysterical by grief or rage
(notwithstanding that male revengers often exhibit these exact qualities), and were thus unfit to
accomplish a revenge that required careful planning or deliberation. I examine three female
revenge protagonists to investigate their level of conformity or resistance to this stereotype. Titus
Andronicus’s Tamora mostly adheres to the stereotype, while Bel-Imperia from The Spanish
10

Tragedy begins to depart from it. Bel-Imperia resists the grotesque image of the Furies through
her graceful bearing, but because of the ambiguity of her death within the play-within-a-play, it
is too difficult to tell whether or not she refutes medical notions of female bodily weakness.
Instead of Bel-Imperia, I find a stronger demonstration of female affective agency and
competence in the Duchess Martha from Henry Chettle’s underappreciated and understudied
Hoffman or A Revenge for a Father. Martha repudiates both the image of the Furies and the
humoral notions of feminine weakness, as she uses displacement to excise her grief, maintain
composure and rationality, and assume a resolute affective posture more associated with men.
Martha then devises a way to eliminate her son’s murderer without deviating from her society’s
standards of feminine conduct. Martha’s admirable self-governance and efficient revenge
demonstrates that Senecan affect management tools were presumed powerful enough to elevate
the individual above physiological determinism. In this dissertation’s conclusion, I use Martha to
contend that humoral theory was destabilized in part by real-life and artistic examples of
feminine affective competency. Women who surpass the low bar set by humoralism, whether it
be Martha or Queen Elizabeth I, called into question the veracity of a medical schema that
accounted for human personalities via physiological and environmental determinism. Because
Senecan rules for affect management relied on a mental power that was less affected by the
gendered body, they offered a pathway by which women could ostensibly transcend
determinism. The figure of the competent female revenger, then, speaks to the thrust of this
project’s broader argument: at the same time Senecan affect management made humoral theory
palpable to many by providing greater agency, it concurrently enabled the production of
counternarratives that would help other, more rigorously scientific discourses displace humoral
theory as the dominant medical paradigm.

11

Chapter 1: Senecan Influence on Early Modern Emotional Phenomenology

Introduction: How Melancholy is Hamlet, Really?
Within both the Shakespeare canon and in popular culture at large, there are few more
synonymous pairings of character and emotional disposition than Hamlet and melancholy. The
Danish prince’s most enduring lines – those which have arrested imaginations and been adapted,
altered, and reproduced across artistic mediums for centuries – all seem to convey a self-critical
man who responds to misfortune with indecision and frustration3. Hamlet’s (and Shakespeare’s)
most widely-reused quotation contributes powerfully to this image, as it depicts metaphysical
indecisiveness with poetic grandeur. When wondering if it is better “to be, or not to be” (3.1.55),
Hamlet never makes a conclusion because he doesn’t know whether some aspect of death or
non-existence might be worse than the “heart-ache, and the thousand natural shocks / That flesh
is heir to” (3.1.61-62). He can only comment on the problem’s complexity, declaring that “to
die” is “the rub” because “in that sleep of death, what dreams may come, / When we have
shuffled off this mortal coil, / Must give us pause” (3.1.63-67). In addition to this touchstone
speech, Hamlet’s extended self-critique in Act II also contributes to his association with
melancholy and indecisiveness. He delivers over forty lines of rhetorical self-flagellation,
decrying what he names as an inability to exhibit the audacious and purposeful disposition
necessary to revenge his father. By his own admission, Hamlet is “a rogue and peasant slave”
(2.2.550), a “dull and muddy-mettled rascal” who lacks the mental energy necessary to
adequately overcome a crisis (2.2.565).
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Hamlet’s most famous words reinforce his association with melancholy, but the
connection is unfair and inaccurate. First, the “to be or not to be” speech appears in a context
where Hamlet deliberately feigns confusion for strategic purposes, so that he may mask his
vengeful intent and mislead his enemies. Instead of acknowledging his desire for vengeance, he
expresses a false bewilderment overhead by Ophelia, who speaks with him in person, and by the
hidden Polonius and Claudius, who are spying on him. In an ironic twist, this performance has
come to define Hamlet because of its re-appropriation and citation throughout popular culture. In
this chapter, I argue that Hamlet’s melancholy and indecisiveness is not a fixed identity or even a
dominant character trait, as we might expect based on a cursory understanding of the play or a
look at its cultural resonance. Instead, Hamlet’s caution is only a temporary emotional position
within the ever-shifting matrix of humoral ecology. This argument seems especially tenable in
light of the early modern period’s Galenic worldview, which assumed that affective disposition
might be altered by physiological changes facilitated by a wide variety of factors. The character
changes that Hamlet exhibits in Acts IV and V further suggest that his reluctance and hesitancy
are impermanent traits that may be modified and reconditioned. Hamlet’s shift from fracturing
uncertainty to imperturbable resolve occurs not because of natural fluctuations in his humoral
body, but because he uses deliberate mental and behavioral performance to alter his physiology,
correspondingly alter his feelings, and thus maintain control over emotional disposition. By
consciously working to govern his feelings and emote in a desired way, Hamlet demonstrates a
level of mental autonomy and psychological complexity that contradicts the view that early
modern subjects considered themselves wholly Galenic bodies. Instead, Hamlet’s use of
performative affect management demonstrates that deliberate mental and physical activity played
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just as strong a role in early modern humoral ecology as physiological and environmental
factors.
In the pages that follow, I argue that the performative approach modeled by Hamlet was
introduced to the early modern period by way of Senecan philosophy. To make this claim, I first
present Seneca’s philosophy of affect management by reading his treatise on anger: De Ira. This
text provides two major protocols for governing affect, which I refer to as delay and
displacement. De Ira tells readers to delay acting out while under the influence of any sudden,
impulsive bursts of feeling. To practice delay, one must wait out the initial force of mental or
emotional shock, allowing that impact to dissipate so that reason may return and properly assess
the situation. Delay helps enable displacement, which proposes that one may replace an
unwanted feeling by thinking on – and thus summoning into being – an opposite feeling. After
presenting Seneca’s emotional phenomenology, I argue that displacement became the
cornerstone practice of early modern affective management routines. It appears in the period’s
most widely republished emotional taxonomies: Thomas Wright’s Passions of the Mind in
General (1601) and Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1620). Like De Ira, these texts
encourage readers to use meditation and performance to determine their affective states. But in
an evolution from De Ira, they accommodate Senecan notions of delay and displacement to the
early modern period’s Galenic paradigms. Specifically, they combine a Senecan
phenomenology, where the mind alone determines emotional state, with an early modern
humoral ecology where conscious desires about what to feel compete with other determinants of
feeling, including the body’s physiological baseline and external influences. I use this chapter’s
concluding section to return to Hamlet and argue that his full affective trajectory illustrates this
early modern update to Senecan philosophies of affect. Hamlet’s change demonstrates how
14

Senecan ideas gave the early modern subject a radical potential for self-transformation, even in
spite of the many influences thought to afflict the porous humoral body and potentially
destabilize its delicate affective balance.
Hamlet’s efforts to transform affect also illustrate an idea also explored in Chapter 2 of
this work, which is that revenge narratives have special relevance to studies of affective politics.
The provocation to revenge forces characters to engage with their own affective states and the
broader humoral ecology influencing their feelings. Mobilizing oneself toward revenge requires
accounting for the multiple layers of feeling engendered by the situation: grief at injury or loss,
disdain for the injurer, outrage at the cosmic or political injustice of the injury, and even
considerations of what makes an appropriate or effective revenge. These questions prompt
varying answers from avengers based on their differences in gender, class, and socio-cultural
differences. And because of the Galenic worldview reflected in early modern drama, avengers
also plot retaliatory actions based their understanding of their personal bodily and affective
dispositions. Hamlet and Bel-Imperia offer an instructive contrast in how humoral differences
require that each avenger adopt an individualized affect management routine. Hamlet perceives
himself as not prone to the sanguinity and choler that inspires revenge, so his affective trajectory
is to build toward this disposition throughout the course of the play. Bel-Imperia understands that
she already possesses these humoral traits, so her affective trajectory is to subdue these impulses
and wait until the right moment to unleash them. Despite their differences in gender, class, and
humor, Hamlet and Bel-Imperia both reckon with their affective states after being prompted by
the call to revenge. Furthermore, each character’s reckoning results in their use of Senecan
principles to cultivate the best temperament for an effective revenge. These principles might be
used differently according to the revenger’s personal agenda, but using them reveals that early
15

modern subjects had a powerful ability to transform their physiological and emotional
dispositions to better achieve a desired outcome.

Part I: De Ira and Senecan Affect
Seneca articulates his affective philosophy and his protocols for affect management in his
examination of anger: De Ira. This text appeared in the first century AD, before Galen’s birth in
129 AD. It therefore predates Galen’s emphasis on the humoral subject. Instead, Seneca offers a
paradigm where one’s interior decision-making exerts singular control over affective disposition.
In Seneca’s view, the subject has a moral obligation to use this mental power to prevent or
banish deleterious or harmful feelings. He adopts this view because of his Stoic prescriptions,
which mandate that one must strive to reject feelings and actions that cause harm. De Ira
clarifies that individuals must repudiate anger because “man’s nature is not . . . desirous of
inflicting punishment; neither, therefore, is anger in accordance with man’s nature, because that
is desirous of inflicting punishment” (1.6). Seneca thus disagrees with Aristotle’s contention that
anger provides occasional benefits, namely its assistance in what Aristotle would call a justified
conflict. In contrast to Aristotle who maintains that anger “is necessary, nor can any fight be won
without it,” Seneca argues that “anger has nothing useful in itself, and does not rouse up the
mind to warlike deeds . . . a virtue, being self-sufficient, never needs the assistance of a vice”
(1.9). This dispute with Aristotle, then, helps clarify that Senecan affect management protocols
are designed to condition the mind to reject all incitements to negative feelings. Because Seneca
does not believe that vices offer any redeeming utility or value, his standards for proper affective
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governance demand that one construct interior bulwarks that can resist any and all movements
toward deleterious affective states which may facilitate immoral conduct.
The major conflict in Senecan emotional phenomenology, then, is the mind’s battle
against provocations to feelings that motivate bad behavior. Modern scholars understand these
provocations as shocks or impressions that work to move one into a harmful affective state,
referring to them as “pre-passions.” Seneca describes the pre-passions as involuntary movements
toward a particular feeling, which are then either accepted or rejected by the mind. According to
Seneca, one might observe pre-passions when “men’s hair rises up at bad news, their faces blush
at indecent words, and they are seized with dizziness when looking down a precipice; and as it is
not in our power to prevent any of these things, no reasoning can prevent their taking place”
(2.2). Instead of being emotions unto themselves, these sensations are “rudiments which may
grow into passions” (2.2). Instead, only mental acceptance of the impression presented by the
pre-passion constitutes a genuine feeling. Pre-passions that threaten to incite one to fear, grief, or
anger might strike an individual “unexpectedly and against their will” (Graver 306). But Seneca
asserts that the ideal Stoic sage holds the mental wherewithal to resist capitulating to the prepassion. The sage would instead be guided by “the preeminence of reason, which judges
correctly that no real misfortune has taken place” (Graver 307). In other words, the Stoic sage
might feel provocation toward an unwanted feeling, but mental rejection of that provocation
prevents the feeling from occurring. Seneca clarifies this position by explaining that though the
wise man might “feel certain hints and semblances of passions . . . he will be free from the
passions themselves” (2.16). He therefore positions the mind as the supreme governor of affect,
able to maintain emotional equilibrium in spite of contrary influences. “The mind can carry out
whatever orders it gives itself,” he contends, “some have succeeded in never smiling: some have
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forbidden themselves wine, sexual intercourse, or even drink of all kinds” (2.12). Seneca sees
these remarkable feats of mental governance as evidence that the mind retains exclusive control
over feeling. His emphasis on mental strength would be an important addition to early modern
humoral ecology, as humoral subjects would need methods for resisting the outside influences on
their bodies and affective charges.
Because Seneca positions the mind as the exclusive determinant of feeling, Senecan
emotional phenomenology maintains that there can be only one cause of affective mutability or
instability: a misguided judgment or compromised mind. In a passage from De Ira that scholars
have identified as crucial to his philosophy of emotion, Seneca illustrates the way mental assent
precedes acts motivated by negative emotions:
Our [the Stoics’] opinion is, that anger can venture upon nothing by itself, without the
approval of mind: for to conceive the idea of a wrong having been done, to long to
avenge it, and to join . . . that we ought not to have been injured and that it is our duty to
avenge our injuries, cannot belong to a mere impulse which is excited without our
consent. That impulse is a simple act; this is a complex one, and composed of several
parts. The man understands something to have happened: he becomes indignant thereat:
he condemns the deed; and he avenges it. All these things cannot be done without his
mind agreeing to those matters which touched him (2.1).
Close reading of this passage helps us map the process by which mental weakness or error
prefigures and authorizes negative or destructive feelings. The passage identifies that the subject
first encounters a “mere impulse” of indignation. By itself, this impulse toward indignation is
morally neutral and “can venture upon nothing.” However, if paired with “the approval of mind,”
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this pre-passion may grow into genuine anger that may motivate harmful behavior. In this case,
the mind authorizes revenge by justifying the indignant sentiment embedded in the pre-passion.
By judging “that we ought not to have been injured and that it is our duty to avenge our injuries,”
the thinker provides a rationale that first validates the move toward indignation and then
condones a redress for injury. This rationale motivates behavior undertaken to achieve that
redress, which may include outbursts that Seneca terms “passions.”
While early moderns use “passions” to denote external or humoral forces that
involuntarily afflict the vulnerable body, the Senecan definition refers to a fit of illogical,
harmful, or immoral behavior motivated by a bad value judgment. De Ira explains that “a
passion . . . consists not in being affected by the sights which are presented to us, but in giving
way to our feelings and following up these chance promptings” (2.3). Once the subject assents to
the “chance promptings” of a pre-passion, they may engage in histrionic or hostile activity that
“goes beyond reason and carries her away with it” (2.3). During this episode, the “excited and
shaken” mind “goes whither the passions drive it . . . when it has abandoned itself to anger, love,
or any other passion, [the mind] is unable to check itself: its own weight and the downward
tendency of vices must carry the man off and hurl him into the lowest depth” (2.7). This
emotional frenzy can last for an indeterminate amount of time, ending only when one’s feelings
exhaust themselves. Seneca accounts for this variable duration by reminding readers that “once
passion has been admitted to the mind, and has by our own free will been given a certain
authority, it will for the future do as much as it chooses” (2.8). Given the difficulty of stopping
passions once activated, it was an imperative of Senecan moral and emotional philosophy to
stymie pre-passions at the start. In an explanation that emphasizes preventative discipline,
Seneca counsels that the “best plan is to reject straightway the first incentives to anger, to resist
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its very beginnings, and to take care not to be betrayed into it” (2.8). One must implement this
pre-emptive maintenance because “the mind does not stand apart and view its passions from
without . . . but it is itself changed into a passion, and is therefore unable to check what was once
useful and wholesome strength, now that it has become degenerate and misapplied” (2.8).
Seneca’s contention that the mind can be “changed into a passion” reveals that he understands a
passion as a state of intoxication, a frenzied spell in which a primal impulse is allowed to usurp
the higher functioning rationalities that normally maintain emotional equilibrium. Because of the
destructive potential of this state, routines to strengthen one’s resolve against pre-passions were
of the utmost importance.
De Ira offers specific strategies to neutralize pre-passions, but more importantly, it also
explains that there is some recourse to mollify passions even if they grow to concerning levels.
The text’s third book offers practical instruction for diffusing anger, but this guidance comes in a
general form that can be applied to other negative affects as well. In this section, Seneca explains
that in order to “drive anger from our minds, or at least curb and restrain its impulses,” one must
recognize “how great and fresh its strength may be, and whether it may be driven forcibly back
and suppressed, or whether we must give way to it until its first storm blow over” (3.1). Here,
Seneca obliquely refers to delay and displacement, suggesting that readers have a choice to delay
passion’s impact until reason returns or to resist passion by meditating on or performing alternate
feelings. He first outlines delay, explaining that mitigating the impact of passion’s “first storm”
requires one to refrain from acting while under influences that might otherwise facilitate
destructive conduct:
[Delay] . . . gives time for the cloud which darkens the mind either to disperse or at any
rate to become less dense. Of these wrongs which drive you frantic, some will grow
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lighter after an interval, not of a day, but even of an hour: some will vanish altogether . . .
nothing can be accurately discerned at a time of disturbance . . . While you are angry, you
ought not to be allowed to do anything “Why?” do you ask? Because when you are angry
there is nothing that you do not wish to be allowed to do (3.12).
This definition of delay suggests that while presented with a pre-passion or afflicted by a
passion, the mind fixates on – and perhaps even acts on – immoral fantasies that might be
injurious, lustful, or envious. In this state, one disregards moral reasoning to the point where
“there is nothing that you do not wish to be allowed to do.” But one can stop these temptations
by refraining from any action for even a brief period of time, perhaps a day or “even an hour.”
This time of inactivity allows reason to return and supersede any destabilizing impulses that
might negatively influence decision-making. In other words, waiting out your anger allows the
mind to “form a right judgment about it: if it delays, it will come to an end” (2.29).
In addition to serving as its own method of affect management, Senecan delay enables
the even stronger strategy of displacement. While discussing delay, Seneca offers a rationale
explaining why it is effective. In doing so, he explains how an unwanted affect might be excised
through a deliberately summoned, contrary affect:
Fight hard with yourself and if you cannot conquer anger, do not let it conquer you . . .
Let us conceal its symptoms, and as far as possible keep it secret and hidden. It will give
us great trouble to do this, for it is eager to burst forth, to kindle our eyes and to transform
our face; but if we allow it to show itself in our outward appearance, it is our master. Let
it rather be locked in the innermost recesses of our breast, and be borne by us, not bear
us: nay, let us replace all its symptoms by their opposites; let us make our countenance
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more composed than usual, our voice milder, our step slower. Our inward thoughts
gradually become influenced by our outward demeanour (3.13).
Here, Seneca explains that one should try to delay anger because external appearance and
activity can corrupt internal reasoning; a dangerous affect like anger can “become our master” if
the mind allows it to find expression through the body. To guard against impulses that tyrannize
reason and compel behavior, Seneca introduces a regime in which one can temper these impulses
through their opposites: “Let us replace all symptoms by their opposites,” he proposes. This
regime operates on the premise that working to express the new emotion can help engender it in
an authentic way. Seneca provides an example of this strategy in action by discussing Socrates,
who preserved his composure during fits of anger through acts of physical performance.
Whenever Socrates “lowered his voice and became sparing of speech,” his closest friends knew
that he was “exercising restraint over himself.” When these acquaintances, who were “used to
detect[ing] him acting thus,” accused Socrates of being angry, Socrates was not “displeased at
being charged with concealment of anger; indeed, how could he help being glad that many men
should perceive his anger, yet that none should feel it” (3.13). This anecdote sees Socrates
demonstrate a laudable mental and physical mastery over affect, one that requires him to use a
performative “outward demeanor” to mitigate, alter, or eliminate an interior impulse. Though
Socrates feels an internal incitement to anger, he performs taciturnity to mollify this feeling and
helps his mind retain control of his affective disposition. This strategy of displacement set a
powerful precedent that would be picked up by the early moderns and made into the essential
practice of their affective management routines.
Senecan displacement would later appeal to the most elite audiences of early modern
plays. In displacement, nobles and courtiers may have seen a set of guidelines conducive to
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successful navigation of the court system. Based in and around the monarch’s living spaces, the
“court was at the center of a matrix of relations, political and economic, religious and artistic . . .
it was the centre of patronage and a forum for politics; thus, gaining a position at court and
maintaining it was vital in order for early modern political and cultural actors to succeed”
(Constantinidou 598). In this system, “the golden key to political power . . . was access to the
monarch. Personal contact with the king or queen provided the opportunity to seek grants or
influence policy” (Shephard 723). In order to get noticed and acquire political or cultural capital,
courtiers worked tirelessly to construct and maintain a self-image that pleased the ruler and
curried his or her favor. These individuals worked to gain a favored position not only through
their own performances, but also by outdoing a rival in flattery, loyalty, knowledge and
usefulness, political prowess, or artistic ability. Since a bad performance would cost favor and
influence, courtiers needed to avoid provocations to any destabilizing feelings and subsequent
outbursts that could upend their carefully maintained images. Courtiers also might need to
opportunistically adopt different affective postures in order to ascend the hierarchical ladder, or
to avoid a ruinous descent. Since displacement could engender affective states conducive to selfpreserving or self-advancing objectives, courtiers might have understood it as a crucial tool to
ensure survival or success. Shakespeare’s plays offer copious examples illustrating these two
uses for displacement. In King Lear, Goneril and Regan ascend the courtly ladder because they
perform an inauthentic filial piety that garners favor with their father King Lear, which in turn
facilitates their ouster of Cordelia and subsequent consolidation of political power. In Hamlet,
Hamlet fails to exhibit proper deference to King Claudius and his mother Queen Gertrude, which
results in his loss of courtly favor because it marks his discontent and arouses suspicion at his
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behavior. Examples such as these likely appeared to courtiers as evidence illustrating the
usefulness of the Senecan-inspired approach to performative affect management.

Part II: Humoral Theory and Senecan Affect Management
Senecan delay and displacement changed very little in the early modern period, as
evidenced by how Thomas Wright and Robert Burton adopt them as they appear in De Ira. But
though these concepts remained unchanged, the influence of Galenic theory drastically altered
the ontological understanding of emotion to which they were applied. Before moving on to
discuss the way Senecan affect management tools reappear in Wright and Burton, we should
review Galen’s influence on early modern humoral theory and thus chart the differences between
Senecan and early modern affective phenomenologies. First, the prevalent model of affect in
early modern medicine was a worldview called humoral theory. This paradigm was popularized
by the Greek doctor Hippocrates and his Roman commentator Galen, and it stipulated that one’s
bodily temperament and overall health was determined by a balance of four internal fluids called
humors. These humors were blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. Each of the four humors
was associated with one of the four elements (air, water, fire, earth) and a certain internal status
(hot, cold, wet, dry). Because humors held elemental charges, it was thought they were
influenced by temperature and other elementally charged objects from the outside world. Galen’s
treatise The Best Constitution Of Our Bodies explains that “external influences” such as stimuli
causing one to be “heated, cooled, moistened, or dried beyond the appropriate level” (292) can
produce “ill-humored bodies” which are prone to “domination by the causes of disease” (293). In
addition to temperature, intake also manipulated humoral balance. After penetrating or being
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imbibed by the body, elementally charged objects, including food, liquids, and vapors, would be
“converted . . . into humors . . . substances that constitute organic beings and retain the properties
of the elements that give rise to them. In a living body, fire yields yellow bile; air becomes
blood; earth becomes black bile; and water yields phlegm” (Greenwood 30). These
correspondences between external elemental affiliation and internal substance meant that the
Galenic body was conceived as a malleable object prone to changes incurred from external
forces.
Ultimately, the idea of the porous body inspired Galen to take an approach to medicine
that emphasized an individual’s responsibility to manage the humoral fluids circulating through
their bodies. In The Art of Medicine, Galen contends that bodies are “subject to change, loss, and
reversal . . . if the body were not subject to influence and change, the best constitution would
endure forever, and there would be no need of an art to watch over it” (374). His program of
health emphasized one’s responsibility to monitor the changing status of the body and take steps
to maintain an appropriate humoral balance. Bodies enervated by humoral inconsistencies would
be prescribed regimens assumed to return the humors to a proper state. These curative measures
included “change and voiding”: “change” refers to an internal manipulation of the humors “by
certain faculties of drugs,” while “voiding” occurs though “purgations, enemas, sweats, and
vomiting” (392). Galen theorized that such modifications to humoral balance influenced not only
health and sickness, but also physical and personality traits. His two-book taxonomy Mixtures
begins a codification of personality types based on humor, a schema of identity suggesting that
material interiority influenced appearance and personality traits. In “Another Look at Chaucer
and the Physiognomists,” JB Friedman explains that Galen’s ideas about personality types would
extend outward from their origin point in modern-day Turkey and become more complex over
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time. He explains that as time passed, evolutions of Galenic theory would cause individuals to
understand that “bodily state, understood as the balance or imbalance of the four humors . .
.would cause a person to look and behave in certain ways, tend towards certain occupations, and
flourish or languish in certain seasons, when certain planets dominated” (141). Eventually, the
early moderns would come to conceive that “the predominance of yellow bile (fire, hot and dry)
leads to choleric behavior. The prevalence of blood (air, hot and moist) yields militancy and
courage. When phlegm controls (water, moist and cold), passivity prevails; and the dominance of
black bile (earth, cold and dry) causes melancholy” (Greenwood 30-32). And since the humoral
body was conceived as porous and subject to influence from the outside world, the personality
traits and emotional dispositions associated with each type might change or be manipulated in
accord with or in spite of one’s will.
By depicting interplay between the body and the world and articulating humoral
personality types, Galen set the foundation for an early modern emotional economy predicated
on a continuous exchange of shared matter between the self and the world. In the early modern
period, philosophers and religious authorities would complicate Galen’s primarily physiological
model by factoring in a powerful emphasis on Christian morality, accounting for religious
doctrine’s influence on feeling. This addition thus overlaid a metaphysical element to the more
material Galenic regime. It ultimately shaped the early modern emotional ecology into a
structure consisting of multiple intersecting elements: a conscious self informed by intellect
reason operating from, in many cases, a Christian perspective; a material self that continually
responded to humoral fluctuation; and the outside world which caused humoral fluctuation
through its myriad external stimuli. Because this model synthesizes the conscious self, the bodily
self, and the external world, it means that movements in one beget corresponding movements in
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the others. Such a model often pits the material and conscious selves against each other. Since
the material self could be altered by external influences, it commonly produced unwanted urges
or dispositions that conflicted with familial, cultural, moral, or religious obligations. The rational
self was thus preoccupied with maintaining emotional equilibrium, as it was often forced to
govern or reconcile a “disordered, undisciplined self subject to a variety of internal and external
forces” (Schoenfeldt 12). In this model, the rational self may view the material self as a “site of
subjugation” and potentially a “subject of horror” that had to be resisted and subdued (12). The
desire to correct tension between the rational self and the humoral self, then, was a powerful
force motivating the early modern subject’s constant attention to issues of emotional
management.
Wright, Burton, and other early modern intellectual authorities found that tools from
Seneca could help negotiate the tension between the humoral self and the rational. In their
original Senecan form, delay and displacement were mental protocols that leveraged the mind’s
ultimate control over affect. But in the early modern period, delay and displacement became
crucial guidelines for performative behavior that conditioned the Galenic body away from an
unwanted or dangerous affective state. Adapted to humoral theory, delay and displacement
offered an opportunity to produce feelings not based on automatic physiological activity, but
through actions predicated on individual reasoning or ethical considerations. Wright and Burton
were likely exposed to the Senecan principles of delay and displacement through opposite
programs of study. The Jesuit priest Wright seems to have encountered Senecan affective
management not through sustained engagement with Seneca’s moral treatises themselves, but
through the powerful residual impact that these works exerted on two of the Catholic Church’s
two most important theologians: St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. Having read and agreed
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with Stoic and Senecan accounts of the pre-passions, these two church fathers accommodated
them to Christian moral philosophy. Because the Stoics understood the pre-passions through the
context of their own non-theistic, materialist cosmology, Augustine and Aquinas integrated the
pre-passions into Christian dogma by determining how Christians might be “held responsible for
this unpredictable and uncontrollable affective reaction” (Wu 476). Aquinas read Senecan moral
treatises while working through this issue4. Along the way, he discovered an ethical system that
emphasized “self-improvement and mental shaping” and resulted in a “moral compass . . . of
near total self-determination” (Parvini 97). These Senecan discussions of moral vigilance would
inform Aquinas’s conclusion about the pre-passions. In Aquinas’s view, Christians were indeed
morally culpable for involuntary movements toward feeling because they had recourse to fortify
their minds against affective impulses that could provoke temptation. In other words, Christians
needed to invest in preventative maintenance against pre-passions, since pious meditation and
religious practice could disincline one to negative affects and sinful thoughts5. However, like
Seneca, Aquinas advocates for a system of preventative maintenance that would give the self
some ability to forestall or prevent negative affect6. Combined with increasing attention to the
complexity of the humoral economy, these influences from Seneca and Aquinas would take hold
during the early modern period to engender a “psychological notion of a struggle within the self,
of the will battling with a passion such as anger” (Parvini 96). Partly through his Jesuit scholastic
training and partly as a participant in the contemporary discourse on emotion, Thomas Wright
understood Senecan affect management and incorporated it into Passions of the Mind in
General7.
Unlike Wright, Burton consumed Seneca more directly, thanks to a university curriculum
that deployed classical texts to train students in logic and philosophy8. Burton took degrees from
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the Oxford system in 1602 (BA) and 1605 (MA), and remained at the school as a librarian until
his death in 1640. His training in classical texts must have imparted a special esteem for Seneca,
as he cites Seneca by name over fifty times in The Antatomy of Melancholy, always in a praising
manner. The preface to The Anatomy of Melancholy, told from the perspective of the
philosopher-narrator character Democritus Junior, betrays this unwavering appreciation for
Seneca and his contributions to intellectual culture. Though Democritus acknowledges that a few
critics censured Seneca, he calls the Stoic philosopher a “superintendent of wit, learning,
judgment . . . the best of Greek and Latin writers in Plutarch’s opinion” (“Democritus Junior to
the Reader, 29). Other places in the text offer the same consistent praise for Seneca’s intellect
and appeals to Senecan logic. The text’s admiration for Seneca makes sense, given that The
Anatomy of Melancholy appears after a nationwide revival and reassessment of Seneca enshrined
Senecan texts at the highest levels of intellectual and artistic culture. This movement began in the
mid-sixteenth century, when scholastic circles expressed “intense interest in [Seneca], especially
at the universities and inns of court, where members translated most of the drama and performed
a series of Neo-Senecan plays” (Winston 150). Many of the scholars who reappraised and
elevated Seneca also doubled as magistrates and political councilors, injecting Senecan ideas into
Elizabethan intellectual and political consciousness9. The student cohorts trained during and after
this widespread appreciation of Seneca took hold – in the 1560s, 70s, and 80s – would have
occupied teaching positions in the Oxford university system in 1593, when Robert Burton
enrolled in the undergraduate curriculum at Brasenose College. Burton’s esteem for Seneca was
likely inherited from the intellectual authorities who shaped his university education.
Championed by the Catholic Wright, the Anglican Burton, and other intellectual
authorities of the day, strategies first articulated by Seneca formed the core of early modern
29

affect management. A close analysis of Passions of the Mind in General and The Anatomy of
Melancholy reveals Seneca’s vast influence over early modern regimens for humoral
governance; these texts define delay and displacement almost verbatim to De Ira, and then apply
them to a Galenic paradigm. Seneca’s understanding of delay appears in Passions of the Mind in
General, which also claims that one afflicted by passion should forestall action, lest they act out
impetuously and ruinously. Wright acknowledges delay by asserting that in cases of extreme
perturbation, “it were not good to make any resolution or determination of change, for some I
have seen so vehement in their passions that whatsoever was suggested to them . . . they
presently put into execution” (Wright 155). To convey the importance of avoiding rash action,
Wright explains how the philosopher Athenodorus counseled Augustus Caesar to avoid anger by
abstaining from “anything before he had recited the four and twenty letters of the Greek
alphabet” (156). Like Seneca before him, Wright maintains that such dilatory tactics will cause
unwanted affective impulses to “in short time . . . vanish away . . . either because the humor
which was moved returneth to its former seat, or the impression made in the imagination
diminisheth, or the attention of the soul distracted with other matters faileth” (158). Wright’s
understanding of delay’s effectiveness differs from Seneca’s because of the epistemological
context in which it appears. While Seneca believes that delay works because it allows the mind
time to recover its right reason, Wright finds delay effective because it allows the body time to
correct a humoral imbalance. Wright’s definition of delay reflects the way that Senecan
principles were adapted to a humoral paradigm where mental governance wielded less power
over affect than Seneca had previously conceptualized.
Of the two Senecan-inspired strategies for affect management, displacement was more
widely discussed as the early modern subject’s strongest recourse against errant and destabilizing
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humors. Delay often acts as the first step towards displacement, as it provides a window in which
the conscious self has time to institute a performative regimen conducive to a desired affective
state. Though delay offers this foundation for displacement, Wright and Burton focus more
intently on displacement because it better emphasizes an individual’s autonomy through their
choice to adopt alternate feelings. Wright and Burton therefore position displacement as the most
effective method for curbing untoward, disorderly affect. Wright tells readers that “if thou
perceive a vehement inclination to the one extreme, procure to bend thyself as far to the other,
for thou shalt come to the midst . . . by the example of a crooked staff, the which to make straight
we bend to the other side” (Wright 150). He calls this strategy for manipulating affect “one of the
most forcible and important remedies that men can use” (152). Given that “contrary acts” imbue
the soul with “certain habits, helps, stays, or inclinations most opposite unto our passions,”
Wright suggests that continually practicing displacement can eliminate one’s susceptibility to
negative affects while instilling positive ones (152). In other words, daily prayerful or behavioral
implementation of humility, temperance, and chastity can help reduce occasions to dangerous
feelings such as pride, anger, and lust. Wright lists some specific meditative and performative
acts capable of displacing negative affects with positive ones, including: “fly[ing] occasions
which may incense the passions whereunto we are inclined” (150-51); “divert[ing] the thoughts
to some other object” (153); “bridl[ing] the body . . . fasting, praying, laying hard, coarse shirts”
(153); and as a last resort for when “thy passions are most vehement . . . seek for succor for
Heaven, fly under the wings of Christ” (154). These instructions reflect how early modern
subjects came to see meditation and activity as methodologies for determining their affective
dispositions. Like Seneca, who advises readers to attain self-mastery through conscious thought
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and behavior, Wright similarly advocates for a behavioral regimen that disciplines inward feeling
to make it compatible with moral or religious reasoning.
Like Seneca and Wright before him, Burton also champions displacement as an important
remedy against unwanted affect. He asserts that when dealing with “passions so headstrong that
no reason, art, counsel, or persuasion . . . may shake them off,” one must “oppose, fortify, or
prepare himself against them by premeditation, reason, or as we do a crooked staff, bend himself
another way . . . recreate the mind by some contrary object.” (2.2.105). In addition to borrowing
Wright’s staff comparison10, Burton quotes De Ira 2.12 to further define displacement: “As he
that useth an upright shoe may correct the obliquity or crookedness by wearing it on the other
side, we may overcome passions if we will. Quicquid sibi imperavit animus obtinuit (as Seneca
saith): nulli tam feri affectus, ut non disciplina perdomentur” (2.2.106). Here, Burton translates
Seneca’s Latin as “whatsoever the will desires, she may command: no such cruel affections, but
by disciplining they may be tamed” (2.2.106). This translation reflects a unique nuance of the
humoral system. In contrast to the Senecan affective model where mental discipline alone
manipulates affect, Burton’s use of “disciplining” implies his understanding of how affect must
be changed through a cooperative effort between mind and body. He gives examples of this
cooperation, explaining how “in an ague the appetite would drink; sore eyes that itch would be
rubbed; but reason saith no, and therefore the moving faculty will not do it . . . ‘Imagination
enforceth spirits, which . . . compel the nerves to obey, and they our several limbs” (2.2.107).
Here, Burton identifies that “disciplining” begins with a mental decision that directs the body,
compelling it to perform or abstain from a particular activity. The body’s behavior then causes
physiological effects that reinforce the original decision on a material level. In other words,
Burton’s translation indentifies how implementing a physical regimen can orient the early
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modern body toward desired affective outcomes. In this way, the mind can recruit the body to
help it accomplish moral objectives. This recruitment involves commanding the body to perform
a particular action, one which in turn changes the body on a physiological level to encourage the
desired results.
In addition to clarifying how delay and displacement can help one manage individual
affective inclinations, Wright and Burton also claim that subjects can use these methods to
transfer an affective charge onto another body or out into the larger environment. De Ira
provides a foundation for this idea. Though he counts it “a blessing . . . to escape from anger, that
chief of evils,” Seneca recognizes that performing anger or another negative feeling may serve as
the catalyst to a positive affective outcome (2.12). He argues that “we may sometimes affect to
be angry when we wish to rouse the dull minds of those whom we address, just as we rouse up
horses who are slow at starting with goads and firebrands. We must sometimes apply fear to
persons upon whom reason makes no impression” (2.14). While Seneca believes that the
appearance of anger might occasionally help a skilled rhetorician push “the dull minds of those
whom we address” toward a proper decision, Wright and Burton embrace performative affect
because they believe it produces humor that situates the body toward a corresponding affective
state. For example, Wright praises the anecdotal example of a certain “Christian orator” with
intimate understanding of “the natures and properties of men’s passions” (Wright 90). Because
this orator is “himself . . . extremely passionate” and knows “the Art of moving the affections of .
. . auditors,” he can make his listeners “shed an abundance of tears” or “turn their sorrows into
laughter” (90). In this instance, Wright extols the “godly preacher” who uses passions as “a
means to help us” (89-90). Burton concurs that a “good orator alone . . . can alter the affections
by power of his eloquence . . . ‘comfort such that are afflicted, erect such as are depressed, expel
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and mitigate fear, lust, anger, ect.’” (2.2.113) Like Wright, Burton gives these individuals a pass
if they use affective manipulation for the greater good, specifically condoning physicians who
cure madmen though “some feigned lie, strange news, witty device, artificial invention. It is not
amiss to deceive them” (2.2.114). These examples illustrate that according to humoral theory,
performative affect management not only allows the individual to counteract their own unwanted
feelings, but to make positive changes in others through affective transmission. By modeling or
even simply discoursing on virtuous behavior, the morally-minded early modern subject could
spread an appropriate affective mood and therefore exercise powerful agency over the
environment.
Taken together, delay, displacement, and affective transmissibility answer the
aforementioned question posed by Robert Burton: How might anyone resist the affective
inclinations to which they are “so inwardly disposed” because of their physiology? Affect
management tools taken from Senecan philosophy gave early modern subjects the ability to
resist and even change those humoral baselines often perceived as the dominant influence on
period affect. Specifically, the routines adapted from Seneca’s ideas of delay and displacement
gave mentally-disciplined individuals a means to condition their bodies toward any alternative
they might choose. These routines exploit the humoral body’s malleability to suit the mind’s
purposes; they allow the mind to commence meditations or activities that begin altering body’s
humoral state in a desired way. Such routines, as recorded by Wright and Burton, meant the
humoral body was not always a site of vulnerability and potential horror, as sometimes described
by the first wave of scholars studying early modern affect11. Instead, practitioners of
performative affect management likely understood their humoral bodies in a dialectical way,
given that they could also serve as conduits for self-determination. If governed by a strong mind,
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the humoral body could be manipulated into an affective state that would facilitate one’s
intellectual, moral, or religious objectives.

Part III: Senecan Affect Management and Hamlet
Shakespeare himself understood the performative affect management routines inspired by
Seneca and recorded by Wright and Burton. Additionally, because of his status as an eminent
artist, he also would have had opportunities to read Latin editions of the Senecan philosophical
texts which inspired Wright and Burton, including De Ira. At the start of Shakespeare’s career in
the late 1580s and early 1590s, scholars, playwrights, and other educated parties facilitated a
Neo-Stoic revival by reading and discussing Latin-language versions of Seneca’s moral treatises.
Curtis Perry notes that De Ira’s first English translation was completed by Thomas Lodge in
1614, but maintains that “there is no reason to assume that this would have prevented a curious
writer from accessing it in Latin earlier” (422). In fact, Perry discusses key points of evidence
suggesting “something of a vogue for Seneca’s philosophical works” around 1600 (422). He
points to John Marston’s Antonio’s Revenge, published and performed at the turn of the century,
as indicative of intellectual exchange between early modern dramatists and Senecan moral
treatises. This revenge play “makes sustained and overt use of both Senecan tragedy and Senecan
philosophical works” (416), including a Latin quotation from De Prouidentia “about the
importance of fortitude” (417). Marston’s interest in Sencan moral philosophy might reflect a
broader interest among other playwrights given the competitive and collaborative nature of the
dramatic scene12. The stationer Edward Blount, an important publisher of native drama and
literature in translation, secured the right to print “a complete translation of Seneca’s
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philosophical works” in April 1600 (422). Blount had a sense of “drama as an emergent literary
form” and had published luminaries such as “Marlowe, Montaigne, Cervantas, and Shakespeare”
(Kastan 62). Though Lodge was the first individual to publish an English version of De Ira,
Blount’s earlier interest suggests that Latin versions of Senecan philosophy made rounds among
scholars and artists years before they first appeared in English language editions. Since these
Senecan texts were essential to early modern scholastic curricula and theatrical fashion, it
remains plausible that Shakespeare could have directly encountered Senecan treatises including
De Ira through his activity in intellectual and dramatic circles of exchange.
It can’t be directly proven that Shakespeare read De Ira¸ but Hamlet reflects that he at the
very least had internalized Senecan-inspired rules for performative affect management.
Specifically, I argue that Hamlet serves to illustrate displacement; it reads as a fictionalized
portrayal of a humoral subject who implements Wright and Burton’s advice to remake one’s
default affective state by performing a desired opposite. Understanding that Hamlet deliberately
practices this style of affect management helps demystify the longstanding scholarly and popular
controversies surrounding his mental clarity and consistency. Phoebe Spinrad offers a broad
synopsis of these debates, explaining that the body of Hamlet criticism “seems unable to decide”
what Hamlet’s “state of mind may be, variously describing Hamlet as consistently religious,
consistently secular in his humanism, consistently rational, consistently mad and thus not
responsible for anything he says by the end of the play, or so consistently inconsistent as to be a
protopostmodernist in his own right” (453). Reading Hamlet as a practitioner of displacement
helps resolve notions of affective inconsistency on his part. At certain points of the play, Hamlet
seems to concurrently embody contradictory states of feeling. Because the humoral body might
be led in opposite directions by internal or external stimuli, such affective ambivalence is not
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totally abnormal. But more importantly, Hamlet resolves this ambivalence though the consistent
desire to will himself into a bolder mentality that can displace his initial circumspection. He
achieves this change through deliberate, performative choices that work to supplant hesitancy
with boldness and militancy. These performative choices rely on the humoral body’s
malleability, as Hamlet conditions his humor into sanguinity by forcing himself to think about
and act like other figures who – in his mind – best model the avenging agency he wishes to
emulate. He chooses two specific figures as models: Pyrrhus, a classical example of regicidal
wrath, and his male rivals Fortinbras and Laertes, both of whom demonstrate the type of
masculine agency necessary to avenge a father. By using these figures as guides that help him
perform a desired affective state, Hamlet demonstrates the mind’s ability to set a regimen that
can determine feeling by reconditioning the humoral body.
Hamlet’s behavior during the plays first and second acts do not reflect a wholly sanguine
or choleric humoral state. Acts I and I see Hamlet building toward the anger associated with
these humors, but a level of caution prevents his intellect from fully committing to vengeful
thoughts and violent reprisal against the “smiling, damned villain” currently occupying
Denmark’s royal seat (1.5.106). After encountering the Ghost and contemplating the apparition’s
command to “remember me” (1.5.91), Hamlet concludes that “time is out of joint – O cursed
spite, / That I was ever born to set it right” (1.5.188-89). At this point in the play, Hamlet’s desire
for revenge struggles against unresolved doubts and religious scruples that prevent him from
fully trusting the specter. Because the devil “hath power / T’ assume a pleasing shape, yea, and
perhaps . . . abuses to damn me” (2.2.599-603), Hamlet delays full commitment to a revenging
disposition until he first uses “The Murther of Gonzago” to “catch the conscience of a king”
(2.2.605). The play-within-a-play and the aborted trip to England thus mark a change in
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Hamlet’s relationship to his own affect. While the Hamlet of Acts I and II seems melancholy
because he delays acting out of anger due to circumspection and religious sentiments, the Hamlet
of Acts III, IV, and V acts with choler and sanguinity. Despite not killing Claudius at the
confessional in Act III, Hamlet nonetheless exhibits an impressive amount of choleric
impetuosity and sanguine courage: he kills Polonius behind the arras, escapes from pirates and
dupes his would-be assassins, jumps into Ophelia’s grave with Laertes, and participates in the
final duel. These actions show that in Acts IV and V, Hamlet has become the audacious avenger
he openly wishes to become in Acts I and II. Once his doubts about the Ghost’s truthfulness are
removed and Claudius’s evil comes to light – notably through the attempt on his life – Hamlet
fully embraces affect management strategies that strengthen his resolve and enable feats of
daring. Most prominent among these strategies is Hamlet’s engagement with theatrical models of
choleric and sanguine affect, which begins before he fully commits to revenge.
In conversation with the First Player, Hamlet demonstrates a mental agency that
conditions his body toward a desired affective state. Namely, he begins reciting and then asks the
First Player to finish a speech romanticizing the brutal Trojan War exploits of Pyrrhus, the son of
Achilles who executed King Priam during the sacking of Troy. Hamlet’s investment in Pyrrhus
reflects a conscious desire to guide his affective state toward vengeful ire. By giddily retelling
and then eagerly listening to this tale of murderous rage, Hamlet uses performative thought and
action to nurture a reservoir of anger that may help achieve revenge despite obstacles to the
contrary. His investment in the story reflects the way early modern authorities understood the
affective resonance of plays, books, and other artistic objects. Authorities including Wright and
Burton maintained that “books and plays were among the external agents capable of profoundly
altering humoral balance, implicating readers and theatergoers in complex processes of
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transaction or exchange” (Craik and Pollard 7). Wright argues that “corrupted books” possess a
“silent persuasion” that “insinuate[s] their matter unto the chief affectation and highest part of
the Soul” (326-27). In a special address to “‘passion movers,’ such as poets and orators, Wright
advises them to bear in mind the potentially hazardous impact of their words, and to ‘imitate
herein the common practice of prudent physicians, who apply their medicine to the same
maladies with particular . . . consideration of the patient’s temper” (Craik and Pollard 17).
Hamlet behaves like Wright’s physician, as he assesses his humoral state, determines that he
wants to eliminate melancholy, and then prescribes a physiological cure for the melancholy
humors contributing to the inactivity he displays up to this point. Hamlet’s cure consists of
participating in recitative and theatrical exercises depicting anger. Given that “‘anger stirs choler,
heats the blood and the vital spirits’” (Burton 2.2.103), performing Pyrrhus’s anger alongside the
First Player allows Hamlet to generate a strong resolve that displaces melancholy.
While inviting the First Player to speak on Pyrrhus, Hamlet uses language that seems to
represent the intensity of his yet-unrealized, violent inclinations against Claudius. He directs the
First Player to begin Aeneas’ tale to Dido right at “Priam’s slaughter” (2.2.448), as “o’er-sized
with coagulate gore . . . the hellish Pyrrhus / Old grandsire Priam seeks” (2.2.462-64). Hamlet’s
description of Pyrrhus incorporates blood to emphasize the Greek warrior’s terrifying capacity
for violent action. In Hamlet’s mind, Pyrrhus appears with “sable arms” that are “black as his
purpose” (2.2.452-53); his whole body exudes a “black complexion smear’d” by the “blood of
fathers, mothers, daughters, sons” (2.2.458). Especially given his elite education at Wittenberg,
Hamlet likely understands that Galenic medicine positioned blood as a palliative for melancholy
and a catalyst for action. Paster notes that early modern medicine recommended “drinking
animal or human blood . . . as a curative for states like sorrow, which cooled and dried the body .
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. . the heat of the new blood would contain courage . . . transmitted to the drinker when ingested”
(56). Hamlet’s rhetorical and performative exercise seems designed to build toward the
heightened courage bestowed by the consumption of blood. By rendering Pyrrhus in such gory
terms, Hamlet approximates this period cure for sorrow; he drinks in the imagery of blood spilled
by Pyrrhus, rather than drinking any actual blood. This performance reflects the principles of
Senecan displacement, since it works to replace sadness with an increased appetite for symbolic
and real blood. In the next act, Hamlet demonstrates this increased appetite by exclaiming that he
“could drink hot blood, / And do such [bitter business] as the day / Would quake to look on”
(3.2.390-91). Hamlet’s declaration here indicates what Paster calls the “burgeoning of a desire to
be ready physiologically and psychologically for an outburst of rage against his mother and for
sudden physical action (like stabbing through an arras)” (58). Because Hamlet creates this desire
through conscious strategies of affect management, it reflects his level of agentic participation in
humoral ecology.
In a reflection of the complexity of affective ecology, Hamlet’s deliberate movements
toward anger in 2.2 and 3.2 are not enough to compel him to take immediate revenge when he
has the opportunity at Claudius’s confessional. His desire for reprisal competes with other
elements informing his affective disposition. These elements include his uncertainty about the
Ghost and its claims, a desire to interrogate his mother before plotting a course of action, and the
Christian cosmological views that influence his understanding of how and when to best revenge
upon Claudius. The tension between these competing motivators manifests fully in 3.3, when
Hamlet rationalizes his decision to leave Claudius undisturbed while praying. As he overhears
the unwitting Claudius admit to “a brother’s murther” (3.3.37), Hamlet acknowledges that “I
might do it, now’a is a-praying; / And now I’ll do’t” (3.3.73-74). Hearing this admission of guilt
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alleviates Hamlet’s concerns about the Ghost’s authenticity, but his other two concerns remain.
He still wishes to verbally chastise Gertrude for acquiescing to Claudius’s suit, and then use her
reaction to decide how he might treat her as the revenge plot moves forward. In the best case
scenario – as ends up happening – contrition from Gertrude will help Hamlet follow the Ghost’s
command to “Taint not thy mind, nor let thy soul contrive / Against thy mother” (1.5.85-86). In
addition to his preoccupation with his mother, religious sentiments also stop Hamlet from an
impetuous revenge. Even though Claudius admits that his sins are not forgiven because he still
possesses “those effects for which I did the murther: / My crown, mine own ambition, and my
queen” (3.3.54-55), Hamlet assumes that killing Claudius “in the purging of his soul, / When he
is fit and season’d for his passage” would send him to heaven (3.3.85-86). To Hamlet, the more
appropriately brutal revenge would be murdering the King in a more explicitly sinful state,
perhaps “when he is drunk asleep, or in his rage, / Or in th’ incestuous pleasure of his bed . . .
about some act / That has no relish of salvation in it” (3.3.89-92). Achieving a revenge that
guarantees Claudius a ticket to hell seems more aligned to the type of ruthless reprisal that arrests
Hamlet’s imagination. However, in a paradox created by his religious convictions, Hamlet
believes that he can only properly punish Claudius when aided by the right moment, which
reduces his efficacy as a revenger.
The religious concerns that stay Hamlet’s hand totally disappear in Act V, after he
survives Claudius’s assassination plot. But even before this point, Hamlet’s begins to work past
the mental blocks slowing his revenge. His rhetoric in Acts IV and V begins to focus less on
reasons against revenge, and more on meditations encouraging readiness. Before departing for
England, Hamlet passes the Norwegian prince Fortinbras marching south with a host of troops.
Observing this march to war inspires Hamlet to compare himself to Fortinbras, which elicits the
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reaction against the First Player in 2.2. In Hamlet’s mind, Fortinbras and the First Player both
share a quality that he lacks: the ability to quickly and easily adopt a desired affective condition.
Hamlet seethes in 2.2 because he cannot mimic the way the First Player “force[s] his soul so to
his own conceit . . . all for nothing, / For Hecuba! What’s Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba, / That
he should weep for her?” (2.2.553-60). And Hamlet again feels inferior in 4.4 because he
watches Fortinbras march with “divine ambition puff’d” and make “mouths at the invisible event
. . . How stand I then / That have a father kill’d, a mother stain’d, / Excitements of my reason and
my blood, / And let all sleep” (4.4.49-59). Emboldened by the certainty of Claudius’s guilt and
the example set by Fortinbras, Hamlet declares that “from this time forth, / My thoughts be
bloody, or be nothing worth” (4.4.65-66). In declaring that his “thoughts” rather than “actions”
will be bloody, Hamlet suggests the possibility that his streak of inactivity may continue. But in
Act 5, while telling Horatio the story of surviving Claudius’s assassination plot, Hamlet offers a
new governing intent that supercedes his old religious concerns. He declares that Claudius must
be killed quickly because he:
Hath kill’d my king and whor’d my mother,
Popp’d in between th’ election and my hopes,
Thrown out his angle for my proper life,
And with such coz’nage - is’t not perfect conscience
To quit him with his arm? And is’t not to be damn’d,
To let this canker of our nature come / In further evil?
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This speech sees Hamlet add a new item to his list of grievances against Claudius: the plot that
took aim at “my proper life.” When Hamlet acknowledges that “perfect conscience” might
require him to speedily dispatch Claudius “with this arm,” he acknowledges that his own
physical and spiritual safety depends on being the first to achieve revenge. His assertion that
leaving Claudius alive is “to be damned” sounds like a hyperbolic moral declaration. But it also
refers to Hamlet’s new awareness that he might still be suddenly killed by his enemy, in a way
that does not allow for him to control his soul’s condition before death. This drive for selfpreservation likely takes precedent over his desire to orchestrate revenge in a specific way,
ultimately pushing Hamlet past his previous arguments against revenge.
Upon his return to court, Hamlet’s affective trajectory shifts toward a stronger embrace of
sanguinity and choler. By consciously nurturing his ire, Hamlet illustrates a pattern common to
early modern avengers, many of whom also deploy meditative meditative and performative
methods to strengthen their ire and compel their humoral bodies toward revenge. Hamlet’s
fellow avengers often use physical objects or tokens that remind them of the injuries they’ve
suffered: Hieronimo in The Spanish Tragedy keeps Horatio’s bloody handkerchief as a reminder
of his revenge mission against Lorenzo and Balthazar; Vindice in The Revenger’s Tragedy keeps
the skull of his slain lover Gloriana and mediates on it before murdering the Duke who killed
her. These objects are kept to stir the revenger’s mind to thoughts of enmity and retaliation,
which in turn would condition the body to produce choler and blood. Hamlet keeps no such
physical token, but likewise employs deliberate methods to maintain a physiological state
conducive to bold action. He specifically chooses to imitate the closest model of courageous
male agency, his prospective brother-in-law Laertes. In imitating Laertes, Hamlet illustrates how,
in Evelyn Tribble’s words, “early modern playwrights and players were keenly aware of the
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susceptibility of audiences to the affective states of others” (Tribble 95). Tribble explains this
susceptibility by quoting the anti-theatricalist Stephen Gosson, who opines against the morally
destructive potentiality of theatre-going. Gosson feels particularly threatened by the group setting
of the theatre, arguing that the playgoing audience “mindlessly melds into one body, as laughter
and shouting spread like a pathogen, stirring up ‘affectations,’ which are naturally planted in that
part of the minde that is common to us with brute beasts’” (197). As an admirer and student of
the theatre, Hamlet likely understands this relationship and uses it to his advantage. He seizes the
opportunity to observe and imitate Laertes, thus using spectatorship and performance to
condition his body towards his desired affective state.
Hamlet’s choice to imitate Laertes seems natural, given that the two young noblemen
share similar circumstances that inspire similar affective responses. Richard Strier explains that
Hamlet perceives Laertes not as a foil or rival, but “as a kind of double. He says this explicitly
with regard to their situations; they have both lost their fathers unexpectedly, and Hamlet can
easily, by reflection, project himself into Laertes: ‘By the image of my cause I see / The
portraiture of his’ (5.2.76)” (29). Because he mirrors Hamlet’s position as an aspiring avenger,
Laertes also mirrors the affective state that Hamlet wishes to adopt. Laertes exhibits the
revenger’s anger and grief at Ophelia’s grave, belittling the priest who abstains from singing a
requiem for the departed and cursing the offender whose “wicked deed thy most ingenious sense
/ Deprived thee of!” (5.1.248). While watching Laertes, Hamlet remembers that he must perform
these same feelings in his own quest for revenge and the psychic satisfaction it ostensibly brings.
As he audaciously bursts in upon the mourning party, Hamlet immediately establishes that he
wishes to engage with Laertes in a competition of performative affect. He asks: “What is he
whose grief . . . Conjures the wand’ring stars and makes them stand / Like wonder-wounded
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hearers?” (5.1.254-57) Answering his own question, Hamlet declares that it is not Laertes but “I,
Hamlet the Dane!” who emotes the most impactful grief (5.1.259). During their struggle, Hamlet
continues to emphasize his willingness to outdo Laertes in terms of magnitude of affect.
Determined to “fight with him upon this theme / Until my eyelids no longer wag” (5.1.267),
Hamlet declares that he’s ready to weep, fight, or even eat a crocodile to prove that he can “rant
as well as thou” (5.1.284). Hamlet’s readiness to elevate the intensity of his performance
illustrates that he understands affect through a theatrical lens. By observing, imitating, and
outdoing another performer, Hamlet can act his feelings into being. Reflecting on the incident
with Horatio, Hamlet admits that inspiration from and emulation of Laertes amplifies his
feelings: “The bravery of his grief did put me / Into a tow’ring passion” (5.2.79-80). When
Hamlet explains that Laertes’s grief put him “into a tow’ring passion,” he suggests that
proximity to Laertes’s performance stirred up similar affective charges in his humoral body. But
by following up on these impulses by jumping into the grave, Hamlet begins a performance that
ultimately serves the same purpose as his engagement with Pyrrhus. Both his imitation of Laertes
and his exchange with the First Player are behavioral acts designed to condition the body toward
a revenging disposition.

Conclusion: Not so Melancholy
The Hamlet of Acts IV and V seems a different person than the Hamlet of Acts I, II, and
III. Instead of frantically querying his affective conditions and excoriating himself for not
exhibiting the appropriate feelings, Hamlet in Acts IV and V demonstrates a subdued but
determined resolve. He exudes a calm and quiet comfort with his decision to eliminate the
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usurper Claudius. Hamlet expresses this steady clarity and constant affective state through
spiritual language, declaring that there’s a “divinity that shapes our ends, / Rough-hew them how
we will” (5.2.9-11) and that there is “a special providence in the fall of a sparrow” (5.2.9-11).
But despite Hamlet’s focus on the spiritual in these lines, the new confidence he exhibits comes
in significant part from his understanding of the material and the physiological. Because Hamlet
understands how meditation and behavior can set the impressionable humoral body toward a
desired affective state, he can easily maintain faith in the performative regimen he sets for
himself. Hamlet’s appreciation of theatre informs his knowledge of performative affect
management, as it predisposes him to implement the meditative and behavioral practices first
discussed by Seneca and later adapted to early modern humoral paradigms by authorities such as
Thomas Wright and Robert Burton. Hamlet’s implementation of performative affect
management means that he is not melancholy by nature. Instead, we observe Hamlet as he works
to interrogate and determine his feelings, despite the multiplicity of external factors influencing
his affective state by default.
Because he works through a theatrical lens, Hamlet aptly illustrates that early modern
affect management was understood though the language of performance. Wright and Burton
implicitly acknowledge that theatrical metaphors were eminently appropriate for discussions of
affect management, as they often refer to actors and orators in their adaptations of Senecan delay
and displacement. Like these example figures presented by Wright and Burton, Hamlet also
manages his affect with a judicious eye towards its reception by others. By his own admission,
Hamlet is “essentially not in madness, / But mad in craft” (3.4.187-88) because he wishes to
confuse enemies “who would bring him on to some confession / Of his true state” (3.1.9-10).
This reasoning would have especially resonated with the courtiers, who understood that adopting
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an affective posture could serve either as necessary means of survival or a common method of
advancement. In a broader sense, Hamlet’s focus on court survival illustrates that class
represents one narrow element in a collection of subject positions that combine to determine a
revenger’s affective program. In order to achieve the type of revenge he wants, Hamlet must
manage his feelings in a way that befits his noble standing and the court rituals that come along
with it. The next chapters will continue to focus on these varied elements that give shape to the
revenger’s individual affective program, which include family status, class, gender, religious
beliefs, and socio-cultural expectations. In managing these elements to construct their own affect
management regimens, revengers offer powerful evidence of the way a subject might use
performative tools to intervene in the ecology of affect.
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Chapter 2: Gendered Performances of Revenge
Part I: Introduction
Revenge narratives complicate the way that textual authorities like Wright and Burton
orient their discussions of affect management toward Christian purposes. In contrast to the
instructive treatises which extort readers to mollify dangerous affect in order to achieve better
behavior and salvation, revenge texts paint a more robust picture of the ideological and
individual concerns that influenced the early modern subject. A provocation to revenge forces
the would-be avenger to take inventory of their various subjective positions, be it familial,
gendered, religious, or socio-economic. Then, the avenging hopeful must assess whether or not
they exhibit feelings and behavior befitting their statuses. If not, the avenger must do something
– implementing an affect management routine, as Hamlet does – to feel and act in the
appropriate way. Revenge plays, then, offer a site where we can observe Senecan affect
management principles implemented for diverse applications. These applications show how a
subject should emote not necessarily as a Christian seeking salvation, but as a distraught family
member seeking redress for an injured loved one, an aggrieved noble seeking to maintain
aristocratic pride and social position, or a man or woman seeking to behave according to the
paradigms of gender. These concerns give a larger view of the distinct yet interrelated
ideological layers motivating the revenger, thus helping to further John Kerrigan’s important
analysis of revengers as “questers after psychic balance as well as ethical equivalence . . . The
poise of a revenge action can bear intricately asymmetrical relations to the psychic needs and
personalities of A and B, or their agents” (10-11). The revenger’s “psychic needs and
personalities” are obviously reflected in the way they choose to mobilize affect in order to meet
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the expectations put upon them as a gendered, familial, and socio-cultural, as well as religious,
subject.
The texts written by Wright and Burton clearly outline the rules for performative affect
management: wait out feelings that weaken your reason and might cause you to act out in a
harmful way, and then control your emotional state by evicting unwanted feelings through other,
more appropriate or useful feelings. However, these texts often make a morally correct but
reductive assumption about their reading audiences: they assume readers want to learn
performative affect management to aspire to perfect Christian morality. Burton argues that
original sin afflicts humanity with “weakness” and “want of government,” which makes humans
prone to “several lusts . . . if we give the reigns to lust, anger ambition, pride, and follow our
ways, we degenerate into beasts, transform ourselves, overthrow our constitution, provoke God
to anger, and heap upon us . . . melancholy, and all kinds of incurable diseases, as a just and
deserved punishment of our sins” (1.1.136-37). In this assessment, one who neglects to manage
affect according to Christian morality incurs God’s anger, which incurs further spiritual and
physical punishment. Instead, proper affect management helps the Christian to a pious
disposition that incurs better behavior and heavenly rewards. Wright depicts displacement as the
key to unlock these rewards, positioning it as the first movement of an arc to salvation: “fear
expelleth sin, sadness brings repentance, delight pricketh forward to keep God’s commandments
. . . passions are spurs that stir up sluggish and idle souls from slothfulness to diligence, from
carelessness to consideration” (102). Here, Wright argues that a healthy fear of God removes the
temptation to act out inordinate desires that motivate sin, and then delight at pleasing God then
keeps these temptations away.
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Although Wright and Burton explicitly oriented their texts to Christian morality, their
works contain examples illustrating how performative affect management might be employed to
accomplish secular objectives. One might condition the body toward an affective state that
facilitates an appropriate gender performance, one’s desired occupational results, or perhaps a
social or financial achievement. In a discussion explaining how music pushes the body toward a
corresponding affective state, Wright provides several examples of performative affect
management being used for reasons other than spiritual salvation. He explains that “music and
instruments in one kind causeth soldiers’ blood to rise and thirst after the shedding of the blood
of their enemies, so contrawise another sort of music pacifieth the minds of men, and rendereth
them quiet and peaceable” (207). When Wright explains that music causes “blood to rise,” he
points to the automatic effect that an external stimuli – music – exerts on the impressionable
humoral body. But if purposefully inserted into a context that calls for increased blood and vigor,
such as a march into battle, music represents a deliberate stimulation of the body to better serve
occupational and political purposes. In this case, the soldiers listening to the music are driven
toward a physiological state conducive to bravery and bloodlust, which increases their fighting
performance and boosts their chances of survival. This improvement also benefits the political
actors commanding the soldiers, since they improve the efficacy of their human tools and thus
increase the chance of accomplishing their political objectives. In another example of music’s
effects on physiology and feeling, Wright discusses the tactics used by beggars. He explains that
because “passions . . . are moved by music, such as mercy and compassion . . . many beggars
with songs demand their alms; and specifically the Germans, where the man, the wife, and their
children make a full begging choir” (207). By emphasizing the elaborately staged nature of the
German “begging choir,” Wright again illustrates that a deliberate performance can successfully
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influence affect to the benefit of a specific goal. In this case, the beggars accomplish their
financial objectives by using song to put others in a pitying, generous mood.
Revenge narratives more robustly emphasize the varied applications of performative
affect management, as they fully explore the gendered, familial, and socio-cultural priorities that
also motivate affect management routines. Many revenge texts illustrate how these subject
positions converge to create gender-specific affective scripts for revenge, which were
significantly influenced by the intersection of Galenic medicine and hegemonic gender norms.
The male revenge script demanded that men participate in retaliatory action in order to maintain
their gendered and hierarchical positions, while the female script used humoral and cultural
conceits to relegate women to inactive, ineffectual, or self-destructive roles in revenge. Lesel
Dawson writes that “revenge narratives represent manliness as a highly prized commodity that
individuals acquire through retaliatory acts of violence” (3). These acts of violence reify male
selfhood and relation to the community, given that they offer opportunity to demonstrate loyalty
to a family group or social faction through opposition to a rival group. Linda Woodbridge quotes
Edward Muir’s sweeping study of vendetta in early modern Italy to remind us that revenge
“provided ‘the crucial means by which individuals, especially males, formed their identities in
imitation of heroic predecessors and in opposition to hereditary enemies’ (Muir xxvii – xxviii).
Grudge hatches history” (Woodbridge 50). Galenic medicine seemed to corroborate this active
role for men by elevating male ability to act on sanguinity and choler over female ability to act
on these same humors. Muir reviews the emotional phenomenology of the period to explain that:
When sufficiently angered or provoked, a man’s mad blood stirred, producing an
irresistible flare of choler and anger, that emotion biologically induced by what we would
call the fight response. Renaissance society greatly valued the fight over flight response;
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whereas fighting always produced risks, a failure to resist perceived antagonisms
guaranteed shame, a social calamity perhaps more disastrous than any other for man’s
relations with his fellows, as shameful for him as impurity for a woman. Whatever the
encouragements of Christian morality, a man best avoided shame and preserved honor by
answering anger with anger, insult with insult, injury with injury, death with death (Muir
xxiv).
Because a man’s heated blood was thought to facilitate militant and confrontational attitudes,
male physiology seemed to be an important tool that enabled and validated a man’s social
prerogative to defend honor. In revenge plays, notably Hamlet, male revengers often wrestle with
their affective dispositions as they attempt to measure up to their punitive obligations. Such
obligations may frustrate a man who, like Charlemont, the good Christian protagonist of The
Atheist’s Tragedy, wishes to reject retaliatory anger for religious or ethical reasons.
Hamlet provides a strong example of the way gendered and political motivations inspire
one to implement an affect management routine. When discussing Fortinbras in Act IV, Hamlet
identifies that he aspires to demonstrate specific levels of royal authority and masculine courage.
These qualities are on display through Fortinbras’s military maneuvers, which Hamlet describes
as a visual signifier of the might and aggression one would expect to see from a powerful prince
with a grievance:
Witness this army of such mass and charge,
Led by a delicate and tender prince,
Whose spirit with divine ambition puff’d
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Makes mouths at the invisible event,
Exposing what is mortal and unsure
To all that fortune, death, and danger dare,
Even for an egg-shell. Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw,
When honor’s at the stake (4.4.47-56).
When Hamlet mentions that to “be great” means being able to “find quarrel in a straw” in
matters of honor, he refers to a masculine code of conduct which demands that men be quick to
participate in contests for hegemony. To be masculine – according to this gendered paradigm, at
least – is to be ready and eager to fight another man over “an eggshell.” This examination
inspires Hamlet to question his own affective state, to ask if his emotional disposition enables
him to meet the royal male standard set by Fortinbras. He asks: “How stand I then / That have a
father kill’d, a mother stain’d, / Excitements of my reason and my blood, / And let all sleep,
while to my shame I see, / The imminent deaths of twenty thousand men” (4.4.56-60). In his own
self-assessment, Hamlet contrasts from Fortinbras because not even the most pressing reasons
stir him to emote in the aggressive and retaliatory manner expected of males who are born with
power and expected to keep it. This seeming inadequacy leads Hamlet to declare that “from this
time forth, / My thoughts be bloody, or nothing worth!” (4.4.65-66). In this example, gendered
rather than religious paradigms cause Hamlet to implement an affect management objective.
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Additionally, the understanding of male physiology as more conducive to sanguine and choleric
action also inspires Hamlet to renegotiate his feelings.
Like many other revenge plays, The Atheist’s Tragedy interrogates the tension between
religious morality and individual desires for satisfaction. However, it contrasts with Hamlet
because its reverent Christian protagonist Charlemont makes the opposite choice. Unlike Hamlet,
Charlemont resists the temptation to revenge, ultimately prioritizing his religious values over his
cultural prerogative to enact violent masculinity. At the beginning of the play, while Charlemont
is away fighting a war, his amoral, atheist uncle D’Amville murders his father and steals his
inheritance. In a scene echoing Hamlet’s visitation on the battlement, Charlemont encounters
father’s ghost, who instructs him to return home to regain his estate, but to also remember that
revenge is reserved for God. Later, Charlemont has the opportunity to revenge kill D’Amville’s
son, but the ghost appears to remind Charlemont of his Christian duties. Paraphrasing the edict in
Romans 12:19, the ghost tells Charlemont to let “Him revenge my murder and thy wrongs / To
whom the justice of revenge belongs” (3.2.32). Charlemont then abstains from violence and
allows himself to be captured by his uncle, even though such restraint “torture[s] me between the
passion of / My blood and the religion of my soul” (3.2.34-35). Charlemont justifies this choice
to subordinate anger by prioritizing his Christian duty to manage affect in a way that facilitates
heavenly rewards. He extols the spiritual virtue granted by mastery over physiological anger,
explaining that his heart is “above . . . violent maliciousness” because “passions are / My
subjects, and I can command them” (3.3.34-46). This choice to subordinate physiological anger
reflects religious values aligned with those presented by Wright and Burton. The play’s Christian
universe rewards Charlemont’s piety by granting him a deus ex machina. After being sentenced
to death and led to D’Amville’s chopping block, Charlemont escapes unscathed when D’Amville
54

fatally falls on the execution weapon. Charlemont maintains that God effects this rescue,
declaring that “to Heav’n I attribute the work, / Whose gracious motives made me still forbear /
To be mine own revenger. Now I see / That patience is the honest man’s revenge” (5.2.273-76).
Charlemont’s affective trajectory throughout the play, in which he uses religious meditation to
subordinate humoral inclinations to violent choler and sanguinity, shows performative affect
used for the opposite of Hamlet’s purpose. Whereas Hamlet eventually discovers a way to
accommodate revenge to his religious beliefs, Charlemont refuses this accomodation. Instead,
the call to revenge prompts Charlemont to reprioritize Christian ethics over physiological,
gendered, and socio-political incitements to revenge.
Just as they do for males like Hamlet and Charlemont, gendered paradigms and humoral
theories combine to give shape to early modern expectations for female anger and vengeance.
The feminine revenge script differed sharply from the male script due to perceived physiological
gender differences. Galenic medicine argued that a woman’s heated blood was reserved for
generative purposes and then expelled on a monthly basis during menstruation. These theories,
which will be treated in more detail in the next chapter, positioned women as less effective
sanguine and choleric actors. This perceived weakness helped justify the cultural idea that
revenge action was an exclusively male realm. Janet Clare explains that women’s roles in
revenge action were passive and ancillary, describing how patriarchal structure equated a
woman’s reputation almost exclusively with chastity. Although females themselves were
subordinated, their sexuality could act to mobilize vendettas because it was deemed “property of
the male . . . if honor was damaged, this was an insult to male kin and avenged in the name of her
father or husband . . . When women . . . are raped, they kill themselves or are killed by next of
kin, and this is seen, for the violated female, as the proper course of action” (Clare 115). Women
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in revenge narratives may therefore “incite revenge, act as accomplices or be the initial cause of
vendetta, but they rarely wield the knife. The combinations of physical weakness and
conventional notions of female passivity disempowered the would-be female avenger” (116).
This precedent, however, does not mean that women simply did not negotiate the same type of
feelings that justified masculine violence. Women were instead encouraged to channel their grief
and anger into other avenues, such as cursing the offender and motivating their male allies to
action. Many female figures, such as Lavinia in Titus Andronicus, adhere to his pattern by
serving as a symbol of a not-yet-redressed wrong, a walking inciter of anger and grief that
propels their male relatives toward revenge. Fewer female figures, such as Bel-Imperia of The
Spanish Tragedy, resist this formula by taking active and violent part in a revenge plot.
The gendered cultural scripts for male and female revenge served to circumscribe
individuals of both genders in a tightly constrained patriarchal structure. In this structure, gender
performances offered one the opportunity to maintain or ascend the hierarchical ladder, although
the ladder presents different ceilings for men and women. Men could participate in revenge
action to ascend the ladder at another man’s expense, but women most often ascended through
relationships with male figures, be they fathers, brothers, husbands, or lovers. While revenge
might have offered most men and few women opportunities for advancement with the system, it
more often serves to “replicate conservative cultural scripts and gender roles . . . Revenge
narratives frequently repeat and reinforce such oppressive gender norms, often with women
acting as the guardians of a conservative ideal of manliness aligned with violent reprisal.
Revenge, from this perspective, is not a liberating form of empowerment, but a repressive
cultural script” (Dawson 3).
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If the expectations surrounding revenge conform to hegemonic rules of gendered,
cultural, and political conduct, then a potential revenger’s affective choices represent their
relationship to these hegemonic patterns. A would-be avenger’s feelings about retaliation
indicate conformity with or resistance to the dominant expectations of their gender, class, and
familial statuses. A wronged nobleman who, like Hamlet, initiates an affect management routine
conducive to revenging action accepts the gendered and socio-political expectations foisted upon
him and seeks to conform to them. A wronged nobleman who, like Charlemont, tempers his
affective disposition and rejects a vengeful attitude defies these expectations and replaces them
with a different set of values. Women had an even more complex set of pressures to navigate
when negotiating the call to revenge, given how patriarchy and chastity influenced their social
status. But regardless of subject position or individual value set, the incitement to revenge always
offers a provocation that shows us how characters choose to feel. Examining these individual
choices offers allows us to explore a figure’s relationship to dominant cultural ideologies.
Additionally, their behaviors provide additional insight into the individual affective management
routines of the time, including performative activity, delay, and displacement.

Part 2: Tarquin
Shakespeare’s narrative poem The Rape of Lucrece offers a case study illustrating how
the call to revenge sets in motion affect management choices which reveal insight into character
interiority and the ideologies influencing this interiority. The poem exhibits strong influence
from Senecan drama, which may also indicate proximity to the theories of affect found in the
philosophical texts13. Since the poem takes place in a pagan Roman milieu, its principal
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characters do not strive to perform the Christian morality so crucial to Wright and Burton.
Instead, Tarquin, Lucrece, and Brutus and Collatine all strive to embody an individual vision of
conduct shaped by their relationship to the cultural and gendered ideologies of their time. These
characters also understand delay and displacement as highly effective methods for governing the
body’s humoral impulses, as ways to redirect their baseline feelings toward other ones more
compatible with their desired affective or ethical states. Empowered by reminders of his royal
authority, the Roman prince Tarquin rejects feelings aligned with conventional morality and
instead conditions his body toward impulses encouraging his most base and narcissistic desires.
He embraces immorality through an understanding of his powerful social position, which might
allow him to get away with rape. He uses delay and displacement to reject suggestions from his
ethical conscience, thus motivating himself toward a despotic identity that prioritizes
accumulating hegemonic power and achieving sensory satisfaction. In this way he resembles the
powerful and narcissistic tyrants populating Senecan drama, who consistently invoke their kingly
privileges to justify their immoralities.
If Tarquin’s perch atop patriarchal hegemony makes him bolder and allows him to
indulge in depraved urges, then Lucrece’s position towards the bottom of patriarchal structure
restricts the acceptable ways in which she can manage her affective impulses. Because Lucrece
lives in a cultural context that subjugates women and stamps their bodies as male property, she
must operate according to a gendered code of ethics14. This code renders Lucrece less willing or
able to fully act out a suite of feelings more tightly associated with masculinity, including ire,
wrath, and indignation. Instead, Lucrece uses delay and displacement to encourage feelings and
behaviors that remain more or less circumscribed within an acceptable range of feminine
emotions. Despite the limitations placed on her, Lucrece makes good use of delay to ensure that
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her trauma and grief serve a constructive purpose. Like a Senecan sage, she resists an initial
inclination toward fracturing lament and instead uses her wits to devise a sacrificial performance
that will inspire Brutus and Collatine to take revenge on her behalf. Brutus and Collatine
illustrate displacement because Lucrece’s death first inflicts upon them a debilitating sorrow, but
they then employ theatrical rhetoric and gesture to replace sorrow with righteous anger. Their act
of displacement introduces the types of masculine feelings and behavior denied to Lucrece –
boldness and audacity – and suffuses them with her moral valence. Brutus and Collatine thus
paint the poem’s clearest picture of displacement, illustrating how the mind can reorganize the
body’s affective current through behaviors which modify humoral dynamics or infuse them with
moral energy.
My interpretation of Tarquin complicates the accepted reading that he rapes Lucrece
simply because accumulating choleric lust compels him physiologically. Catherine Belling
succinctly encapsulates this reading, explaining that “Shakespeare presents Tarquin’s sexual
desire for Lucrece as an uprising of excessive and overheated blood against the restraints of
reason and morality” (Belling 115). Tarquin indeed experiences a fluid imbalance that causes
“overexcitement of the body, an arousal of humors that could hinder mental faculties temporarily
and make the will inoperative” (Antonucci 151). However, narrow focus on Tarquin’s humoral
mechanics obfuscates the agency he retains as a moral actor. I wish to draw attention to how
Tarquin aspires to a particular – albeit depraved – identity through acts of meditation, rhetoric,
and behavior designed to engender a physiological state congruent with his debauched, selfserving desires. Tarquin deliberately conditions his humor to produce a lusty and violent
disposition by using delay and displacement for immoral purposes, using them to reject
unwanted influence from his good judgment and instead replace it with flawed and malicious
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reasoning that authorizes his gross desires. Tarquin’s perverse reasoning seems inspired by the
logic of his literary predecessors, the Senecan tyrants who justify their misdeeds through sheer
hegemonic force. Warped by unchecked power, these figures exhibit “minds rendered arrogant
by prosperity, they hate those whom they have injured” (23). They denigrate values such as
“decency, respect for the law, sanctity, piety, fidelity,” calling these traits “the common man’s
virtues” and instead maintaining that “kings may do as they please” (Thyestes 208). Tarquin falls
back on this logic in a key moment of pause where he debates internally with his conscience, an
important schism which shows that he possesses the capacity to act morally despite his humoral
state. But by choosing to embrace the tyrant’s logic and implementing a meditative regimen that
catapults his lusty choler to the forefront, Tarquin demonstrates that he is not merely a
physiological body. He instead retains some moral agency, demonstrated by deliberate means he
uses to synergize his lascivious intent and physiological state.
The poem’s exposition suggests that a mix of conscious desires and unconscious
physiological influences construct Tarquin’s affective state and motivate his behavior. He begins
the poem as a lustful body governed by choler; he remains this way partly because of pernicious
logic and willful behaviors that maintain and intensify this humoral disposition. We first meet
“lust-breathed Tarquin” as he “leaves the Roman host” (Lucrece 3), speeding towards an
unsolicited and socially-taboo meeting with “Collatine’s fair love, Lucrece the chaste” (7). The
narrator attributes Tarquin’s quick departure to inflamed humors sparked by Collatine’s blazon
of Lucrece’s beauty and chastity. He claims Tarquin departs “with swift intent . . . to quench the
coal in which his liver goes” (46-47). These lines suggest that Tarquin experiences physiological
tumult caused by an imbalanced liver, which is “the blood forming organ, the . . . source of anger
and sexual desire that made the body swell and overheat” (Antonucci 151). Yet the narrator also
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suggests that an act of reasoning, predicated on Tarquin’s aggrandized self-conception, also
helps construct the prince’s affective and ethical states. After Collatine proclaims that “no king
possesses such a peerless dame” as his wife Lucrece (Lucrece 20-21), the narrator notes that
Tarquin dwells on “high-pitched thoughts, that meaner men should vaunt / The golden lap which
their superiors want” (41-42). These lines show Tarquin becoming animated not through
humoral desire alone, but also through his ideas of masculine hegemony. He takes offense
because the “meaner” Collatine tantalizes him with a desirable object that remains inaccessible
despite imperial privilege. Such narcissism, undoubtedly exacerbated by his hegemonic power
and bloated self-worth, provides Tarquin a reason – albeit a bad one – to stroke the choler that
generates his lust. For Tarquin, violating Lucrece not only satiates the demands of his material
body, but also offers psychological satisfaction that repairs his wounded pride.
Tarquin returns to this interior reasoning at important scene in the poem, a moment where
his humoral desires cool after a spontaneous bit of careful judgment reminds him that raping
Lucrece will have severe consequences. After Tarquin meets Lucrece, receives her hospitality,
and retires to his guest chambers, he lays awake and spends approximately seventy-five lines
pondering moral, civic, and even self-serving arguments against rape15. The narrator relays that
Tarquin considers these arguments while softly striking “his falchion on a flint . . . from the cold
stone sparks of fire do fly” (176-77). This image foreshadows the affect management move that
comes next, in which Tarquin reignites “the cold stone” of his humoral body back to fiery
arousal. Instead of embracing the reasons why he shouldn’t rape Lucrece, Tarquin rejects their
influence by forcing himself to remember the pleasurable sensation of holding Lucrece’s hand.
He recalls “how her hand, in my hand being locked, / Forced it to tremble with her loyal fear!”
(260-61). Dwelling on the subordinate nature of Lucrece’s “loyal fear” titillates Tarquin, reminds
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him that kings can take what they please, and compels him to reject an ethical posture: “What
hunt I then for color or excuses? / All orators are dumb when beauty pleadeth, / Poor wretches
have remorse in poor abuses” (267-69).16 Tarquin here declares that he is not a “poor wretch”
who commits a misdeed and must exhibit remorse by compulsion; he is instead a sovereign king
who needs no “color or excuses” to enjoy Lucrece’s beauty. Invigorated by this reminder of his
political power, Tarquin dismisses his moment of good judgment: “Childish fear, avaunt,
debating die! / Respect and reason wait on wrinkled age . . . Who fears sinking where such
treasure lies?” (274-80). By employing mental images of pleasure and domination to banish the
“heedful fear” that briefly extinguished his humoral desires (281), Tarquin uses displacement to
match his body’s affective state to his nefarious lack of ethics.
After deciding to rape Lucrece, Tarquin references his brain, heart, and eye to suggest
that wicked but deliberate reason tightly controls his affective state and resultant behavior. His
language reverses the way many humoral discourses used sensory organs to highlight the body’s
porous and inconstant nature. In general, humoral commentators associated the heart and brain
with good judgment, and the eye with usurping or chaotic urges. As an example, early modern
love poems feature dazzling lights or bewitching scents that enter the body through the eyes or
nose to cause a destabilizing reaction that alters humor and thwarts reason. These reactions were
thought to disturb the brain and prevent it from properly directing the repository and distributor
of humors: the heart. Burton describes the adverse effects of a brain compromised by sensation,
explaining that a “disordered imagination, which misinforming the heart, causeth all these
distemperatures, alteration, and confusion of the spirits and humors” (Burton 1.2.252). He
acknowledges that ocular stimuli threatens the brain’s good judgment and may cause humoral
instability, specifically claiming that the eye often “betrays the soul” (3.2.76). Burton draws from
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classical literature to show the eye’s treachery, including a lover’s complaint “in Apuleius . . .
‘Thou art the cause of my grief; thy eyes, piercing through mine eyes to my inner parts, have set
my bowels on fire, and therefore pity me that I am now ready to die for thy sake’” (3.2.86). This
lover’s speech illustrates the eye’s penchant for destabilization, as a rapturous picture of beauty
enters the lover’s sight, transmits a sensation to the brain, and then prevents the brain from
adequately disbursing correct instructions to the heart. The resulting humoral chaos afflicts the
lover’s “inner parts,” including his bowels. The eye thus causes an unsettling psychosomatic
chaos that afflicts the speaker’s higher and lower functions. The passage also reinforces the
broader pattern of humoral symbolism alluded to throughout Burton’s work and early modern
culture at large: the brain and heart are associated with good humoral governance, while the eye
symbolizes destabilizing sensual impulses.
Understanding the symbolism attached to the eye, heart, and brain helps make sense of
Tarquin’s declaration that “my heart will never countermand mine eye” (Lucrece 276). In these
lines, Tarquin deliberately inverts the humoral body’s normal hierarchy of organs, willingly
elevating the eye’s demands over the heart’s mandate to properly manage humor. He ultimately
chooses to condone and strengthen his body’s intensifying choleric charge. The narrator
illustrates this prioritization of humoral urges by placing Tarquin’s eye in a position of
grammatical agency throughout the passage. First, the narrator notes that Tarquin “wickedly . . .
stalks” into Lucrece’s room and “gazeth on her yet unstained bed . . . Rolling his greedy eyeballs
in his head. / By their high treason is his heart mislead” (365-69). The narrator then reveals how
the eye dominates the heart to redouble Tarquin’s desires, explaining that the prince’s eye into “a
greater uproar tempts his veins / And they like straggling slaves for pillage fighting . . . Swell in
their pride” (427-32). These lines, partly because of the way they give the eye grammatical
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agency, seem to depict Tarquin as a humoral body acting out of physiological compulsion. But
the narrator also alludes to the bad reasoning and willful choices which support and intensify
Tarquin’s humor. When relating how Tarquin’s eye directs his hand toward Lucrece’s breast, the
narrator describes the hand as “proud of . . . dignity” and “smoking with pride” (437-38).
Referencing pride incarnate reminds us that Tarquin’s hand embodies his ethos as a tyrant. This
tyrannical ethos includes Tarquin’s unchecked sense of imperial privilege, his narcissism, and his
moral bankruptcy. These elements undergird the malevolent reasoning that Tarquin uses to
maintain his physiological lust, particularly when he rekindles his cooled desire by meditating on
power and pleasure just before entering Lucrece’s chamber. Tarquin broadly illustrates how the
mind might work toward a desired affective outcome by leveraging the humoral body’s
connection to other elements in an affective ecology: internal reasoning, performative behavior,
and the most oft-discussed element of this ecology, external or environmental influences. Given
that his hand embodies his pride and villainy, Tarquin also illustrates how mental energy imbues
bodies and actions with ethical significance.

Part 2: Lucrece and the Feminine Script
Like Tarquin, who uses displacement to maintain choleric humor and desire, Lucrece also
demonstrates agentic participation in the humoral system through use of Senecan affect
management strategies. After the rape, Lucrece experiences a plethora of fracturing feelings,
including terror and trauma. But instead of allowing these feelings to dominate her mental space,
she uses Senecan delay to withstand their impact, engage her rational faculty, and formulate an
adequate solution. Delay helps Lucrece concoct a spectacle that relies on affective transmission
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to subsume her desire for a personal revenge into a politically-motivated, collective act of social
reform. And because she designs this plan to be executed by male proxies, she adheres to her
patriarchal society’s religious and political codes. These codes cause Lucrece to understand her
“body” and “soul” as property “kept for heaven and Collatine” (1163-65). She is therefore unable
or unwilling to transgress a male hegemony of power through direct interference in political or
judicial matters. Lucrece’s ruined chastity further complicates the ways in which she might
respond to Tarquin’s actions. Patriarchal standards of sexual purity and wifely loyalty prevent
the defiled Lucrece from properly fulfilling her conjugal duties, which she admits by
acknowledging that Collatine should not “know / The stained taste of violated troth” (1058-59).
But if she kills herself to release Collatine from their marital bond, then she robs him of her body
and commits unsanctioned theft of his property. Through Senecan delay and displacement,
Lucrece manages her affect and attains vengeance without violating these patriarchal demands.
Her competency in managing affect while maintaining femininity resists humoral theory’s
misogynistic understanding of women, given that humoral models stipulated that women were
more prone to lapses in reasoning and affective governance because their bodies were colder and
less vital.17 My analysis ultimately reads Lucrece as a competent and agentic governor of affect,
but it concurrently acknowledges that internalized patriarchy circumscribes the logic which
guides her actions.
Lucrece implements delay shortly after the rape, when she recognizes that giving
physical expression to her grief offers no real benefits. She declares: “In vain I rail at
Opportunity, / At Time, at Tarquin, and uncheerful Night . . . This helpless smoke of words doth
me no right” (Lucrece 1023-27). Instead of exhibiting the sorrow expected of a stereotypically
weak woman, Lucrece withstands the force of her trauma to formulate a plan that reflects
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Seneca’s nuanced definition of revenge. In De Ira, Seneca describes how revenge requires
mental acuity. He calls it a “complex” action performed though a progression of steps that
synthesize reason and anger: the subject “understand[s] something to have happened . . .
becomes indignant . . . condemns the deed . . . avenges it” (De Ira 45-46). Lucrece demonstrates
this process as she changes from delay to displacement, rejecting grief in order to build righteous
anger. She generates this anger through over two-hundred lines of rhetorical performance, in
which she rails at unjust Fortune, enumerates Tarquin’s crimes before the universe, and even
wishes for “some mischance” to “cross Tarquin in his flight . . . make him curse this cursed
crimeful night. / Let ghastly shadows his lewd eyes affright” (Lucrece 968-71). This
displacement shifts Lucrece’s affective charge away from her initial grief and towards feelings
conducive to planning revenge. Using imagery borrowed from the theatre, Lucrece then
emphasizes how she aspires to “let forth my foul defiled blood” in a suicide spectacle designed
to motivate Collatine to punish Tarquin (1029). She seems to understand how spectacle and
sensation can transmit an affective charge into the vulnerable eye, suffuse the body, and
influence the brain and heart to alter humor, particularly when she emphasizes sight in declaring
that “Collatine, shalt oversee this will; / How was I overseen that thou shalt see it!” (1205-06).
She prepares to stage her death as one would stage a popular play, using “paper, ink, and pen” to
craft a summons that assembles her audience (1289). This invitation gives Lucrece an
opportunity to perform “the act in the presence of other soldiers, besides the husband she has
summoned for that purpose” (Belsey 328). Lucrece’s careful planning helps illustrate Seneca’s
understanding of revenge as a collaboration between reason and indignation, a synthesis where
the avenger must process injustice and then use reason to determine a course of redress. This
reasoning reflects her internalization of patriarchy and her awareness of humoral ecology, as she
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plans to transmit her bodily ire to her husband and his lieutenants because they are socially
positioned to complete her revenge.
Lucrece’s revenge preparation also incorporates an ethical element, given that she
charges her affect with virtue through socio-religious arguments justifying revenge against a
tyrant. While planning ways to stage her death, Lucrece meditates on arguments discussing how
justice and society might benefit from Tarquin’s ouster. Her argument reflects a sixteenthcentury Protestant conviction that revenge could be socially and spiritually purifying if
performed under the right conditions, including instances where empowered, scrupulous
individuals justifiably revolt against an evil ruler18. Lucrece infuses her indignation with virtue
by invoking this logic, explaining that it is “Time’s glory . . . to calm contending kings / To
unmask falsehood, and bring truth to light . . . To wrong the wronger till he render right” (93942). These lines see Lucrece strike a careful balance between desire to accommodate her
society’s patriarchal gender roles and desire for revenge. She declares that the nebulous
personification “Time” will bring about Tarquin’s downfall, rather than any vengeful human
agent. This phrasing helps Lucrece perform subordinate femininity – or at least the appearance of
subordinate femininity – by obfuscating her level of agency in the revenge. But in her next lines,
Lucrece relies on notions of humoral ecology and affective transmission to clarify that she
indeed possesses a powerful capacity to take revenge: “My tongue shall utter all, mine eyes like
sluices, / As from a mountain spring that feeds a dale, / Shall gush pure streams to purge my
impure tale” (1076-78). Here, Lucrece disguises her personal desire for revenge by distributing
her agency to her dismembered and depersonalized sensory apparatuses: her tongue “utter[s] all”
and her eyes “gush pure streams.” Through this flurry of bodily activity, Lucrece will infect
Collatine and his men with feelings sourced from her affective “spring” of zealous, yet
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sanctified, anger. Once reconstituted in the men’s bodies, her anger will compel them to “chase
injustice with revengeful arms: / Knights, by their oaths, should right poor ladies’ harms” (169394). Lucrece here deploys an anti-tyrannical ethical vocabulary to suggest that she transmits
ennobled intent to her husband and his men, as her performance and death will sanctify violence
against Tarquin with personal and civic virtue. Collatine and his crew will not only achieve
redress for the violated Lucrece, but for a society besmirched by Tarquin’s evil.

Part 4: Brutus, Collatine, and the Male Script
Lucrece’s example helps demonstrate how active mental participation in humoral ecology
could counterbalance the body’s vulnerability to other sources of affect. She illustrates how an
intelligent subject – one aware of methods for generating and mobilizing affect – could summon
affect, project it outward, stimulate other humoral bodies, and ultimately encourage those bodies
to feel or act in a desired way. As the observers of Lucrece’s performance and recipients of her
affective charges, Brutus, Collatine, and Lucrece’s father Lucretius complete this illustration of
Senecan-inspired affect management rules. They present a clearer picture of the subject’s
vulnerable position in humoral ecology because they appear together. Unlike Tarquin and
Lucrece, who appear alone and thus manage their affective states without interference from other
humoral bodies, these characters are proximate to each other and therefore susceptible to each
other’s humoral and affective states. Brutus negotiates this proximity through his response to
Lucrece’s death, which afflicts Collatine and Lucretius with crippling sorrow. Specifically, he reinfects their melancholic bodies with Lucrece’s righteous anger by prompting them to perform a
behavioral regimen designed to supplant grief with ire. This regimen reflects an early modern
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understanding of anger and sorrow as natural opposites, each of which could be used to temper
the other. Seneca himself provides a foundation for this idea, explaining that those inclined to
“moisture, or dryness and stiffness” are not prone to anger but “cowardice, moroseness, despair,
and suspiciousness” (De Ira 20). Burton makes clear that this view persisted into the early
modern period. He notes that a melancholic physiology could be counterbalanced through
activities that “boil the blood about the heart” and engender a “warm temper of mind,” although
this warmth can “make men prone to anger, for fire is full of movement and vigor” (Burton
2.19.70). However, a disciplined individual might safely balance sanguine heat and melancholy
coolness by switching between “opposite modes of treatment, let us always attack that one of
them which is gaining mastery” (2.20.72). Brutus demonstrates these rules for displacement by
smartly leveraging anger against sorrow in order to control the affective environment.
Brutus models displacement after Collatine begins to emote frantic, unchecked sorrow.
According to the narrator, Collatine suffers a “deep vexation of his inward soul” that stirs the
humors and manifests through countenance and gesture (Lucrece 1779). First, Collatine
experiences “a dumb arrest upon his tongue” (1780) that makes him babble unintelligibly except
for anguished repetition of the name “Tarquin” (1786). This verbal tic quickly mutates into more
intense, highly visible indicators of sorrow. Collatine and Lucretius “weep with strife” and
produce a “windy tempest” where “rains, and busy winds give o’er” (1788-91). Collatine and
Lucretius seem wholly debilitated by grief, reflecting period explanations that proximity to
others can multiply affective charges across bodies. Wright maintains that a friend’s influence
can help one manage humor and feeling, explaining that “it is good . . . to have a wise and
discreet friend to admonish us of our Passions when we err from the path and plain way of Virtue
. . . another may judge our actions better than ourselves” (Wright 148). Burton offers a more
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specific assessment of melancholic sorrow, explaining that it can be “instantly removed” by a
friend’s “wisdom, persuasion, advice, his good means, which we could not otherwise apply unto
ourselves. A friend’s counsel is a charm, like mandrake wine” (Burton 2.2.107). These ideas
about commiseration explain how Brutus’s shift toward the sanguine passions change incites a
corresponding change in his friends. Because humoral bodies are vulnerable to affective
influences from the outside, Brutus can leverage his own feelings to manipulate those of his
companions. By presenting them with a new mood to emulate, Brutus can effectively alter the
environment’s emotional valence.
Before he can displace the sorrow afflicting Collatine and Lucretius, Brutus must first
work to master his own feelings. Since affective transmissions are most effective if one “first be
afflicted with the same passion,” Brutus initially changes his own affect from anguish to ardor
(Wright 211). The poem does not explore Brutus’s interiority with the same depth afforded to the
other characters, but nonetheless his actions present a clear picture of how early moderns sought
to replace unwanted passions by “doing something or other that shall be opposite unto them,
thinking of something else, persuading by reason, or however, to make a sudden alteration of
them” (Burton 2.2.204). The narrator reveals that Brutus responds to sorrow with a judicious
resolve, rejecting incitement to mourn in the same way that the sound Senecan sage rejects a prepassion. Brutus maintains enough mental acuity to pluck “the knife from Lucrece’s side”
(Lucrece 1807). He then looks at Collatine and Lucretius and becomes disconcerted at the
“emulation in their woe” (1808). To prevent these two from creating a feedback loop that
intensifies melancholy, Brutus works to maintain an affective state that counteracts their
excessive grief. The narrator states Brutus begins “to clothe his wit in state and pride, / Burying
in Lucrece’ wound his folly’s show” (1809-10). The active verbs in these lines – “clothe” and
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“burying” – suggest that Brutus deliberately performs like a competent, rational actor unbowed
by tragedy. Despite his reputation as a glib jokester who delights in “sportive words . . . utt’ring
foolish things,” Brutus discards the “shallow habit” of his normally cheery disposition and
summons “long-hid wits . . . To check the tears in Collatinus’ eyes” (1813-17). This language
suggests that Brutus resists two factors that could incite inappropriate feelings: his natural
joviality and his peers’ despair. By elevating his capacity for cogent thought over interior and
exterior affective influences, Brutus operates in a Senecan mode where mental deliberation
tightly governs what might otherwise be unruly feeling.
After adopting a hardened posture that displaces any room for sorrow, Brutus extends his
affective demeanor toward Collatine. He prepares Collatine for an affective shift by first
introducing logic against doleful lamentation19. He calls Collatine’s weeping “unmanly,”
commanding him to think of a course of action more becoming of a “Courageous Roman”
(1828). Such a pointed appeal incorporates strategies which, according to Wright, engender
hatred and ire. Wright’s discussion of ire lists several performative elements that Brutus might
use to stop Collatine’s weeping, including a “pronunciation sharp, often falling with pathetical
repetitions, iterated interrogations proving, confirming, and urging reason” (Wright 216). Brutus
specifically employs “iterated interrogations . . . urging reason” when he asks Collatine:
Why, Collatine, is woe the cure for woe?
Do wounds help wounds, or grief help grievous deeds?
Is it revenge to give thyself a blow
For his foul act by whom thy fair wife bleeds?
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Such childish humor from weak minds proceeds;
Thy wretched wife mistook the matter so,
To slay herself, that should have slain her foe (Lucrece 1821-27).
This passage sees Brutus employ a cultural paradigm that associated weeping with weakness, as
early modern “medical literature . . . unambiguously describes women, children, the elderly, and
the weak, as being, by their physical nature, prone to weeping” (Lange 3). Brutus puts Collatine
in this powerless group, accusing him of exhibiting a “childish humor” engendered of a “weak
mind.” Such language challenges Collatine to discard his enfeebling sorrow and collect himself.
By doing so, Collatine can distinguish himself from his “wretched wife,” who acted according to
a feminine script directing her to respond to Tarquin’s violence inwardly rather than outwardly.
If “tears divide the weeper from the community, isolating him or her (more usually her) in an
unhealthy way,” then Brutus’s provocation invites Collatine to rejoin a communion of politically
significant Roman men capable of responding to Tarquin’s villainy with force rather than
impotent weeping (3). By using masculine gender ideals to interrupt Collatine’s disconsolate
reverie, Brutus prepares his friend to expel the crushing misery caused by Lucrece’s death and
transition to more deliberate control of thought and action.
After disrupting Collatine’s melancholic outburst, Brutus finishes the displacement
process by performing an angry retribution ritual that motivates vengeance against Tarquin.
Brutus needs to bring Collatine to a lucid state that enables preparation and planning, given that
one “cannot . . . deal with revenge and punishment without the mind being cognizant of them
(De Ira 2.3). He achieves this end by enacting a retaliatory yet purposeful performance of ire that
displaces Collatine’s sorrow as “one nail drive[s] out the other” (Wright 151). According to
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Wright, a speaker can produce ire in a listener by asking them to focus on various details of the
wrong endured, such as the qualities of the injurer, the circumstance and methods involved in the
attack, and the pains of the injured party. He contends that through “exaggeration of the injury
received,” one’s wishes for “revenge may be revived, quickened, and increased” (Wright 287).
Brutus prefigures this understanding through his address emphasizing Tarquin’s villainy. He
urges the need to address Tarquin’s crime, focusing specifically on how injuries are greater when
“proceed[ing] from a public Magistrate or officer of justice whom it concerneth in equity to
procure that every man have right” (287). Brutus tells Collatine:
Courageous Roman, do not steep thy heart
In such relenting dew of lamentations,
But kneel with me and help to bear thy part,
To rouse our Roman gods with invocations,
That they will suffer these abominations
(Since Rome herself in them doth stand disgraced)
By our strong arms from forth her fair streets chased (Lucrece 1828-34).
First, Brutus directs Collatine to abandon the impotent “dew of lamentations,” and instead
actively “do thy part” in obtaining revenge for “the death of this true wife” (1841). He
specifically dwells on Tarquin’s “abominations,” calling out Lucrece’s “chaste blood so unjustly
stained” by Tarquin’s “wrongs” (1836-40). By highlighting Tarquin’s unpunished evil, Brutus
hopes to shift Collatine’s humoral disposition from a melancholic listlessness to the energy and
determination associated with sanguine types. Brutus lionizes these sanguine passions by
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claiming they benefit the entire state, as they can propel Collatine and other outraged Romans to
improve their government by deposing the tyrant Tarquin. Additionally, Brutus’s invocation to
the Roman pantheon seems to reflect the Protestant notion that in order to combat tyranny, “God
may raise up ‘open avengers from among his servants’” (Woodbridge 142). Invoking moral and
political righteousness implied through allegiance with “our Roman gods” allows Brutus to
further impress a sanguine set of affects – ire, vengeance, and audacity – upon the recentlyweeping Collatine. In this way, Brutus completes an affective displacement that begins within
the individual, spreads outward into other bodies, and then finds expression through group
action.
Collatine does not speak in response to Brutus’s address, but the text depicts an act of
imitation suggesting that he emulates Brutus’s affective shift from corybantic sorrow to solemn,
measured revenge. In addition to speech, performative acts helped the individual generate new
affect that could supplant undesired affect. Wright contends that “passions are moved by action”
(211), defining “action” as any “natural or artificial moderation, qualification, modification, or
composition of the voice, countenance, and gesture of the body, proceeding from some passion
and apt to stir up the like” (214). This understanding of activity’s influence over the passions
illustrates period ideas about actors, who were thought to generate genuine affect through
performance, as occurs when Hamlet jealously criticizes the First Player’s ability to “force his
soul so to his own conceit” for a fiction. (Hamlet 2.2.553). Wright explains that as good actors
work, they “stir up that affect in himself he intendeth to imprint in the hearts of his hearers”
(Wright 214). As if taking a cue from the theatre, Brutus invents a bit of stage business that
forces Collatine and the other Romans to act out righteous anger and vengeance rather than
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sorrow. At the poem’s conclusion, he asks his companions to swear a revenge oath punctuated
by verbal repetition and physical gestures:
[Brutus] strook his hand upon his breast,
And kissed the fatal knife to end his vow;
And to his protestation urg’d the rest,
Who, wond’ring at him, did his words allow.
Then jointly to the ground their knees they bow,
And that deep vow which Brutus made before,
He doth again repeat, and that they swore (1842-48).
Collatine and his allies change their emotional tenor by verbally and physically reenacting
Brutus’s grave revenge oath. The men communicate their assent to Brutus’s proposed affective
shift through physical activity, jointly bowing “to the ground their knees” and repeating “that
deep vow which Brutus made before.” Since Collatine and the others use “modification of the . .
. countenance and gesture of the body” in order to generate one passion that replaces another,
they illustrate how one might consciously manipulate affect through performative behaviors
(Wright 214). And because these behaviors project the mind’s hallowed understanding of the
revenge mission into bodily humor and outward physical expressions, this ritual also illustrates
how early moderns incorporated ethics into performative affect management.
The Rape of Lucrece, then, is ultimately a poem which reconciles humoral theory with
socio-cultural and religious ethics. It demonstrates, through case studies featuring its principal
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characters, how humoral physiology leaves significant room for conscious mental and behavioral
participation in the ecology of affect. This participation enables the subject to work to reject
unwanted feelings, perhaps those of the choleric or melancholy variety, despite the tangibly real,
material humors which incite these feelings in the body. Through this work, which consists of
Senecan-inspired meditations and performances that manipulate feelings through meditation,
rhetoric, or behavior, the subject can also imbue their feelings with an ethical charge that would
otherwise be absent in an exclusively humoral model of affect. This transformative power of the
mind balances the disadvantages of the malleable humoral body, which are its natural
fluctuations and its vulnerability to external sources of affect. A deliberate mind can think past
these influences and find ways to leverage body’s malleability so that it may reach a particular
affective state, which may then be imposed on the outside environment. The Rape of Lucrece
illustrates these concepts to clearly highlight the early modern subject’s capacity for radical selfdetermination, even in spite of a system perceived to destabilize identity through material and
external influences. However, the poem’s presentation of Lucrece also illustrates the problem
which will be fully explored in the next chapter. Although performative affect management
outlines the mental and physical tools that subjects could use to control their affective
dispositions, women like Lucrece were often oppressed by gendered and ideological constraints.
These constraints worked to limit or vilify the available, socially-acceptable affective responses
that could be wielded by revenging women. In the chapter that follows, I will explain the medical
and cultural factors that ensconced these constraints, their effects on female revengers, and
examine whether women could resist gendered pressures that tried to exclude them from the full
suite of performative affect management tools.
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Chapter 3: Both a Revenger and a Gentlewoman
I: Introduction
Early modern depictions of female revengers reflect epistemological prejudices based on
humoral theories and cultural depictions. These stereotypes positioned women as intellectually
weaker, less competent governors of affect than their male counterparts, and therefore less
capable than achieving an effective revenge. While humoral theories formed the most obvious
basis for this sexist stigma, they operated upon a classical foundation that represented angry or
vengeful women as unnatural and monstrous. Dramatists from antiquity, including Seneca, had
long associated femininity with histrionic rage through their depictions of the goddesses of
vendettas, the Furies. These figures personified the impulse to revenge, and would often appear
to stir up the hatred and grief necessary to incite a revenger to action. Since the femininegendered Furies encouraged individuals to act out on morally destructive emotional impulses,
they were sometimes presented as the antithesis of moral governance. This depiction of the
Furies exerts a shadow presence in humoral theory, as it undergirds the humoral representation
of women’s affect as chaotic and potentially self-harming. The pages that follow survey three
female revenge protagonists to investigate how they replicate or resist the images of the Furies
and the humoral stereotypes these images inspired. Of the three characters examined, Martha
from Henry Chettle’s Hoffman or a Revenge for a Father does the most to reject classical and
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humoral notions of feminine weakness. Because Martha uses displacement to limit her grief and
maintain her wits to plan an effective revenge, she suggests that Senecan affect management
strategies were powerful enough to elevate women above perceived barriers between genders.
Tamora, from Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, exemplifies the way that depictions of the
Furies negatively influenced the representation of female affect in the early modern period. The
play conflates Tamora’s mercilessly vengeful attitudes with those of the bloodthirsty Furies, who
were understood to typify feminine jealousy and spite. By associating Tamora with these
attitudes, the play trades in a period stigma that female judgments were often corrupted by
cruelty and vindictiveness. Furthermore, Tamora appears as humorally unhinged creature who
willfully courts destabilizing affective states, including grief, rage, and vengeance. Because it
broadly adheres to cultural stereotype and humoral consensus, Titus Andronicus fails to fully
highlight how women might be able to resist their physiological dynamics, change their affective
state, and achieve a desired outcome. Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy presents a more hospitable
view of feminine affect and agency, as it positions Bel-Imperia as a capable governor of affect
and a more effective driver of the revenge plot. Though Bel-Imperia wields grace and cunning,
she fails to fully reject the range of affects personified by the Furies. Her death during Soliman
and Perseda forecloses the possibility that she might overcome the physiological dynamics
intensifying her revenging disposition and thereby resist narratives of feminine vindictiveness.
Additionally, Bel-Imperia’s death in the context of the play-within-a-play denies her revenger’s
gratifying prerogative to reveal themselves as the author of their surprised victim’s suffering. She
instead leaves this responsibility to Hieronimo, which continues a patriarchal pattern where male
figures pontificate on the meaning of a less powerful woman’s circumstances or behavior. BelImperia does demonstrate agency by deviating from Hieronimo’s script and writing her own
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death to escape patriarchal constraints, but the ambivalence of her situation means a more
illustrative model of affective governance appears elsewhere.
Unlike these two aforementioned plays, Henry Chettle’s The Tragedy of Hoffman or a
Revenge for a Father features a woman who successfully tempers the destabilizing hunger for
revenge. Martha, mother of the slain Prince Otho, mollifies humoral impulses to anger and
rejects the injurious attitudes modeled by the Furies. She admirably succeeds in subduing excess
grief and anger by employing delay and displacement. Martha specifically uses displacement to
harden her heart against grief and instead maintain her wits as she seeks to eliminate her son’s
killer Hoffman. Her example suggests that despite the humoral system’s prejudicial
understanding of feminine weakness, early modern women could rise above the perceived
weaknesses of their sex to practice disciplined humoral governance and reach affective agency.
While the art of revenge tragedy generally purveys a patriarchal humoral epistemology, Hoffman
implies that women could actively determine their humoral states despite the assumed
disadvantages of their colder bodies. This play represents a huge challenge to the determinism
embedded in humoral theory, since Martha’s use of performative affect management undermines
the system’s fixedness. Hoffman further undermines humoral determinism through its titular
character Hoffman, who demonstrates an affective inconsistency more associated with women.
The dynamic between these two characters threatens to upend the way humoral theory protected
patriarchal structure, since men who behave like Hoffman and women who behave like Martha
might call into question the veracity of humoral stereotypes that supposed a weaker feminine
body.
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II: Cultural Representations of Feminine Anger: The Furies
Through they carried significant weight in the early modern period, humoral theories did
not contribute exclusively to the idea of female inconstancy. Negative stereotypes about a
woman’s ability to manage her feelings had infiltrated early modern culture through the classical
dramas which supported fifteenth-century pedagogical structures and artistic tropes. Because
these texts represented women as inconstant governors of affect, they both inspired and
reinforced humoral theories about feminine coldness. Drama from antiquity disseminated this
idea most explicitly through its representation of the Furies, also called the Erinyes. In Revenge
Tragedies of the Renaissance, Janet Clare defines the Furies as the “goddesses of vendettas” in
classical mythology and explains that:
An appeal to them was the instigation of revenge. The Furies were also seen as
personalized curses, since the curse was interpreted not as words alone, but as a potent
force in stirring up mysterious powers to action . . . The concept of ‘turning Fury,’ said of
a woman by a man, denigrates the female by signifying frenzied, uncontrolled emotion,
but it also underlies male anxiety at the power the female curse might unleash. The curse
represents a descriptive, imaginative death and as such was appropriated as a female
weapon (116).
Clare’s definition reflects the close association between the Furies and the feminine, but in their
original appearances in mythology, the Furies were less feminine and more “‘transgender.’ They
are predominantly female in outward appearance, although incapable of biological reproduction,
but capable of acting as surrogates, representatives and even vicarious embodiments of the
interests of wronged men” (Hall 41). These figures became tightly linked to vengeful femininity
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through “Greek tragedy’s representations of the Erinyes as snaky haired women” who exhibit
“chthonic, thantatological, and maternal associations” (Findlay 63). The Greeks depicted the
Erinyes as symbols of a “particular barren, aggressive, orally-fixated version of femininity” (Hall
50), thus guaranteeing that “it would be impossible to dislocate our thinking about revenge from
our negative cultural constructions of the female psyche” (34). These unflattering representations
of the Furies – and by extension, of femininity – were passed down to the early modern milieu
through sources inspired by Greek drama’s understanding of the Furies
Senecan drama, including the plays Medea and Hercules Furens, helped transmit Greek
depictions of Furies and their corresponding influence on gender conceptions into early modern
cultural consciousness. RJ Tarrant explains that Roman poets and playwrights often
demonstrated their awareness of their Greek predecessors through a “form of competitive
imitatio and aemulatio. Allusions to an eminent Greek forerunner can serve to demonstrate a
Roman writer’s doctrina and his place in a tradition of learned literary composition; they can
also make an implicit claim for equal status with an established Greek model” (217). Seneca’s
adaptation of Euripides’s Medea serves these multiple functions; it was chosen as an homage to
and engagement with the Greek canon, but also because “Euripidean material . . . gave greatest
scope for Seneca’s primary dramatic interest, exploring the pathology of the emotions” (220).
Seneca’s Medea exhibits the Greek gendering of the Furies through its titular female character, a
violent, spiteful, cursing avatar of vengeance who appears couched in the imagery of femininity
and motherhood. His version of the character elicits some sympathy because of the injustice
done to her, but such sympathy erodes as she displays behavior which prefigures the humoral
conceptions of feminine inconstancy and anger. Throughout the play, Medea actively works to
intensify the extremes of feeling to which she already seems predisposed. The course of the play
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sees her convey a variety of histrionic emotions, including vestiges of love for her divorcing
husband Jason and their children. However, these other feelings are subsumed by an inversely
proportionate anger that becomes Medea’s most animating feature. Not only does this frenzied
anger recall the wild vitriol of the Greek Furies, but it also helps set a precedent that reinforces
the humoral theories which depicted women as jealous and quick to anger. The play anticipates a
humoral trope that presents impassioned individuals through the imagery of unpredictable and
tempestuous weather, ultimately associating femininity with a dangerous affective temperament
that mixed extremity, volatility, and impetuousness to produce an especially chaotic mode of
anger.
Seneca links his Medea character directly to the Furies through an introductory soliloquy
suffused with rage, snakes, and vindictive cursing. The play’s first lines see the aggrieved and
frantic Medea immediately invoke the “vengeful Furies, punishers of sinners, / wild in your hair
with serpents running free” (1.13-14). She seeks their aid because she’s been torn from her
husband Jason, whom the king Creon commanded to divorce Medea and marry his daughter
Creusa instead. Medea asks the Furies to kill Jason’s “new wife, / kill her father, and all the royal
family. / What is worse than death? What can I ask for Jason? / That he may live – in poverty
and fear . . . hated and homeless . . . Let him want me as a wife” (1.13-23). In addition to
exhibiting the spiteful rhetorical bombast of a Fury, Medea also renders herself in maternal
imagery. She finishes cursing and declares that “it is born, my vengeance is delivered: / I
mothered it” (1.25-27). Yet Medea also demonstrates the original hybrid gendering of the Furies
by adopting some masculine attributes; she exhibits a violent potency reflecting the fact that
“vastly more men than women are convicted of vengeance-motivated murder” (Hall 51). Creon
comments on Medea’s power while rebuking her and demanding her exile. He believes that
82

Medea’s mix of feminine vindictiveness and masculine efficacy threatens the kingdom, calling
her “a scheming source of every criminal act / you have a woman’s wickedness; your daring /
shows masculine strength, ignoring what men say. / Go . . . and take with you / your deadly
drugs” (2.266-270). When the incredulous Creon remarks that Medea’s “daring” ignores “what
men say,” he betrays male anxiety over female suffering and the corresponding emotion it
engenders. He seems to recognize that if wronged women such as Medea could realize the
retributive promises embedded in their curses, they could upend and remake societies defined by
“what men say.”
As Medea ponders how to best turn Fury and execute her revenge against Creon and the
others, she experiences a tumult of extreme emotions rendered through the imagery of dangerous
and overpowering weather. The weather imagery used by those who watch Medea’s flaming
cheeks and frothing tears prefigures the way early modern writers also used similar natural
imagery to convey the effects of accumulating humoral passions. Thomas Wright illustrates this
pattern when comparing “the Soul without Passion to a calm Sea; with sweet, pleasant, and
crispling streams; but the Passionate, to the raging Gulf swelling with waves, surging, menacing
the stony rocks, and endeavoring to overthrow Mountains . . . never letting the Soul be in
quietness, but ever either flowing with pleasure or ebbing with pain” (134). Using language that
anticipates women’s humoral inconstancy, Medea’s nurse observes her mistress’s turmoil and
records it in elemental imagery. She explaining that Medea “runs to and fro, her movements
wild, / her face displays her crazy passion’s marks. / Her cheeks are flaming and she draws deep
breaths, / she shouts, her eyes are wet with tears” (3.385-88). Medea runs the gamut of selfdestructive emotions associated with impressionable women, exhibiting “the signs of every kind
of passion. Hesitant, aggressive, raging, bitter, full of grief . . . Her madness froths over” (3.38983

92). Such a chaotic depiction of Medea conveys a particular image of jealous and spiteful
femininity, as the Chorus later explains that “flame, wind’s turbulent buffet, javelins, / none of
these come down with a force so mighty, / none as fearful as when an ex-wife, rejected, / hates
with hot passion” (3.579-82). While the play offers some attention to the way patriarchal edicts
rob Medea of her family life, it more strongly emphasizes the melodramatic, sensational nature
of Medea’s angry feelings through its poetic imagery. This emphasis would help reinforce the
erroneous notion that women’s emotion was naturally and indubitably inclined toward the
ungovernable and destructive, and more specifically, that jilted women were most likely to
respond with spite and retribution rather than restraint.
Seneca’s play reinforces these ideas not only through its stylistic conventions, but also
through the character trajectory it charts for its titular female protagonist. The play’s exposition
identifies Medea’s mission as not to emulate the moral mandates of Stoic emotional philosophy
and work to reject anger, but to do the opposite and reject any other impulses that would temper
anger. Kathrin Winter suggests that Medea possesses a “meta-textual awareness” of her own
infamous wrath and heinous crimes, that “it is as if . . . Seneca’s Medea has read Euripides’
tragedy and knows the predetermined aspect of her identity and is self-consciously moving
towards a recognizable trajectory of character and plot” (97). Medea’s journey toward a more
formidable anger suggests the difference between competent masculine and chaotic feminine
scripts for affective governance: while a masculine response to dangerous affect entails
subordinating that affect and behaving with restraint, a feminine response means capitulating to
that affect and behaving without restraint. Parallel language in Medea’s exposition and
conclusion helps illustrate that Medea demonstrates this feminine response to abandon restraint.
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As described in her introductory soliloquy, Medea seeks to reject restraint by embracing negative
affects that can nurture epic misdeeds:
Evils to make heaven and earth shudder equally
Are what my mind revolves: wounding, murder, death
Creeping through the limbs. But all this is too slight;
I did those as a girl. Let a weightier rage swell up:
Now I have given birth, my crimes ought to increase.
Take on the armor of anger, prepare for destruction
Possessed by fury. The tale of your divorce
Must match your marriage (44-53).
Here, Medea declares that she can accumulate a greater enmity through her maternal powers,
thus associating feminine affect with an array of vindictive and violent feelings. She wants to
surpass the “wounding, murder, death” she executed “as a girl,” and expects to do so because
she has grown as a woman and a mother: “Now I have given birth, my crimes ought to increase.”
Motherhood makes Medea a more dangerous enemy because it can increase pathos, which gives
the mother a deeper reserve of empathetic feelings that can be turned to an inversely
proportionate anger when husbands or children are threatened or removed. Helkiah Crooke, royal
physician to James I, supports this idea in his anatomical text Mikrokosmographia, when he
argues that “among rauenous Creatures the Females are most fierce, we say the loue they beare
to their yong addeth spirits and courage vnto them” (277). Medea recognizes that maternal
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ferocity can propel her toward the infamous posterity she seeks; it can help her orchestrate a “tale
of divorce” that surpasses the sensational violence and copious amount of blood she wrought on
Jason’s behalf before their marriage.
After she establishes her desire to commit an ignominious and unprecedented revenge,
Medea sometimes struggles to fully abandon the restraint that prevents her attaining this level of
iniquity. If Medea indeed possesses the meta-textual knowledge that she’s expected to commit
notorious crimes, then the play establishes a conflict where she must reach this goal by
repudiating any inclination to self-discipline or composure. In order to reach her expectations
and those of readers across time periods, “Medea cannot understand restraint / for anger, or for
love” (866-67). Medea most explicitly feels the burden of restraint in the moments before killing
her children. As she wrestles with the terrible prospect of summoning them for the last time,
Medea declares that the thought “hits my heart, my body turns to ice, / My chest is heaving.
Anger has departed / the wife in me is gone. I am all mother again. / Is this me? Could I spill my
own children’s blood . . . No, no, what terrible madness!” (926-30). Here, Medea breaks from the
normal precedent in which women protect their children with superhuman resolve and power, as
her feminine identity is split between two roles: the guardian mother and the jealous wife. When
she declares that anger departs and “the wife in me is gone, I am all mother again,” Medea
acknowledges that her maternal love temporarily subordinates her jealous rage and demands that
she spare the children. She further details this internal battle between the two split halves of her
feminine identity:
Why, my soul, do you waver? Why are my cheeks blotched with tears,
Why am I led in two directions, now by anger,
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Now by love? My double inclination tears me apart.
As when the wild winds make their brutal wars
And on both sides the seas lift up the discordant waves,
And the unstable water boils: even so my heart
tosses and churns: love is chased out by rage
and rage by love. Resentment, yield to love (931-45).
Here, Medea uses the trope of turbulent weather imagery to convey her chaotic affective state.
Her body is the site of “wild winds” and “brutal wars” where “love is chased out by rage and
rage by love.” In order to complete her expected narrative trajectory, though, Medea must
disown this sudden outpouring of loving restraint and instead choose the path of anger. This
predetermined conclusion speaks to the way representations of angry and irrational female affect
remained pervasice across place and time, a misogynistic conception which Medea both relies on
and reinforces.
Medea overcomes maternal restraint shortly after this moment of doubt, killing her
children and further reinforcing depictions of unruly feminine affect. She defeats her motherly
devotion by reexamining her split identity and reprioritizing her resentment over her affection.
While hugging the children, Medea realizes that she’s already lost them because “I must go in
exile. / Any minute, they will be ripped from my arms, / weeping and wailing” (948-50). Since
she’s being stripped of her role as mother, Medea decides to similarly punish Jason by also
forcing their father to “lose their kisses” (951). Her epiphany causes her love to abate and anger
to reappear: “Again, my anger grows, / my hatred boils. My ancient Fury seeks my reluctant
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hands again – anger, I follow your lead” (951-53). By declaring her allegiance to anger, Medea
enters the frenetic state where restraint dissolves and passionate impulses determine behavior. As
if the completion of her introductory invocation, the Furies appear to sanction Medea’s desires.
She sees “this violent crowd of Furies” approaching her (958), and asks them to “fix deep your
torch in my eyes, / ravage me, burn me up, see, my whole breast is open for the Furies” (965-66).
Medea rightfully declares that the added power of the Furies will help her reach her revenge and
thus “prove to the people the things you can do” (977). Medea maintains her turn to Fury after
killing the children, declaring that her “bitter heart” enjoys “slow crime,” especially given that
she gets to watch Jason’s suffering (1016). Such gratuitousness illustrates a sensationalized
representation of female affect where volatility and vindictiveness dominant reason and restraint.
Seneca employs the same feminine affective script in his later play Hercules Furens. Like
Medea, this play opens with an angry female figure who declares her intention to abandon
restraint and reach a rarefied level of anger. The play begins as Zeus’s wife Juno lambastes
Hercules, her husband’s illegitimate son whose renowned feats of strength constantly remind her
of the disgrace and infidelity she suffers. Juno’s curse reflects a conscious level of affective
intent, as she deliberately sets her mind to thoughts which invoke fury. Her meditations broadly
exemplify how cursing “involves intensifying feelings of love for what is lost and of hate
towards [a] murderer” or offender (Clare 229). In this case, Juno reaches amplifies her ire by
lamenting the heavenly status that she’s lost and blaming Hercules for this misfortune. She
bemoans that she is “forsaken as wife . . . and left the lofty vaults of heaven . . . I’ve been driven
from heaven to make room for his whores, forced to live here, on earth. Whores possess the sky
now” (7). She identifies Hercules and his mother as the source of her downfall, declaring that the
earth “teems with irreverent mothers – how often it has made me a stepmother! Alcmena may
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triumph over me, ascend to heaven, take possession of my throne. Her son may obtain
immortality and the stars his father promised him” (7). Such thoughts spur Juno to declare that
“my hatred of him [Hercules] will never subside or abate: my anger will always live on, ever
fresh, ever violent . . . I will wage war upon him until the end of time” (8). Juno invokes the
Furies to sanctify her anger, embracing the feminine script of affective management by
abandoning self-governance and embracing her furious urges. While demanding that the “Furies
be roused from the deepest pits of Tartarus and summoned here” (9), she includes an explicit
request that they unhinge her reason. By owning her ambition to insanity, Juno sets up an
affective dichotomy that establishes the play’s conflict. This conflict places Hercules in a
situation where he must appropriately govern his anger; he will be tempted to emulate Juno and
demonstrate the feminine script by acting on anger, but he must overcome this temptation and
follow Stoic principles that direct one to mitigate destructive impulses.
The tenor and imagery of Juno’s plea to the Furies illuminates the highly gendered nature
of the play’s affective dichotomy. She invokes the Furies through an appeal that constructs a
feminine solidarity through madness, further associating femininity with affective extremity and
impetuousness:
Handmaidens of Dis, begin your destructive work, shake your burning pine torches . . .
On with it! Gain your revenge for his desecration of your Stygian realm. Inflame his
heart, stoke his mind with flames more violent than the fires that roil and churn within the
volcanic furnaces of Etna. Yet, before we can ensnare the mind of Hercules and torment
him into delirium, insanity, madness, I myself must first lose my own mind. Juno, why do
you remain sane? Sisters! You must unhinge my mind first and shake me from my wits,
if I am to execute a scheme worthy of a step-mother (10).
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Here, Juno hopes to achieve a “destructive” escalation of hysterical anger, achieved through
communion with “sisters” who “unhinge my mind and shake me from my wits.” Such deliberate
pursuit of irrationality allows Juno to “execute a scheme worthy of a step-mother.” References to
“sisters” and “step-mother” establish that feminine responses to emotion entail rejecting Stoic
edicts to govern dangerous feelings by delaying their impact or tempering them with an opposite
affect. Juno explicitly rejects these proper responses by repudiating self-governance, declaring
that “I myself must first lose my own mind.” Her commitment to anger conflates femininity with
inappropriate and flawed responses to affect, thus juxtaposing femininity against the proper
principles of Stoic affect management. In terms of the play, Juno’s capitulation to madness
represents a misguided course of action that Hercules must avoid. The play’s central conflict,
then, rests on a gendered dichotomy of affective governance where a masculine response
includes restraint and a female response abandons it.
Juno advances this conflict after she turns Fury, using supernatural powers to project her
affect onto Hercules. She wills him into a “delirium, insanity, madness” that addles his brain,
causing him to murder his wife Megara and their children under the erroneous impression that
they are a “flock of sacrificial victims” for the gods (41). After waking and observing the lurid
results of his hallucinatory frenzy, Hercules seems poised to emulate Juno’s example and
willfully give in to his anger at himself. He initially believes that suicide offers the only path to
redemption, declaring that “there is no reason why I should linger any longer in this hateful light
. . . No one on earth could purify my polluted soul. Death, death is the only cure for this crime!”
(49). But Hercules’s earthly father Amphitryon and his friend Theseus clarify that suicide
represents a true crime, unlike the murders of Megara and the children, which were not
sanctioned by Hercules’s free will. Their assertions reflect the Stoic understanding that true
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emotions, judgments, and conscious behaviors are constituted by mental assent. Amphitryon
illustrates this belief by trying to minimize the shame Hercules feels, asking him to consider
“who would call a mistake a crime?” (48). In their assertion, Hercules remains blameless for the
deaths of Megara and the children because he did not kill them of his own volition; it was Juno
who clouded his mind and guided his weapons. But when Hercules declares his intention to kill
himself, Amphitryon panics because his son is on the verge of “committing a crime willingly,
intentionally!” (50). In this moment, Hercules comes dangerously close to violating a Stoic
mandate where “suicide for emotional or passionate reasons is prohibited” (Evenepol 229).
According to Stoic principles, the individual must avoid a rash suicide that that prevents one
from facing the consequences of their actions, as to “flee into death (ad mortem confugere) is
just as reprehensible as fleeing from death” (221). To steer Hercules from this cowardly path,
Amphitryon and Thesus ask him to change his affective course; they “forbid Hercules from
giving in to his anger” (Hercules Furens 49). Prompted by his male companions, Hercules must
summon the strength to avoid the incorrect affective response modeled by Juno and instead
choose a more stereotypically masculine response that includes restraint.
Hercules resolves this conflict by subordinating his fury and refusing to assent to any
more violence. His decision contrasts with Juno’s gleeful and deliberate perniciousness, which
she owns most thoroughly when declaring that there is no reason to “entrust such hatred to
someone else” (9). As Juno’s foil, Hercules never takes similar ownership of violent desires
despite the pressures they exert on him. His internal struggle to reject these feelings illustrate
how, in Seneca’s understanding, one may feel involuntary affects or pre-passions that leave
impressions on the mind and body. Pre-passions may cause dangerous or destabilizing thoughts,
but true feelings occur only when one’s rational consciousness assents to the impulse they
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present. When rejecting a pre-passion, the wise individual “may indeed be affected in some way,
but that is merely the experience of being ‘bowed down’ under the assault [of the pre-passion]. It
must be regarded as a different kind of phenomenon from what we identify as emotion” (Graver
307). Hercules feels these pressures up to a certain point, showed by his description of his
internal agitation. Like Juno, the raging Hercules expresses intent to orchestrate an epic act of
destruction, declaring that he will “heave up this whole mass of earth, which sits at the centre of
the cosmos and separates heaven and hell, and bring it crashing down on my head” (Seneca 50).
But unlike Juno, Hercules never acts upon these urges. He instead finds solace after an
intervention by Amphitryon, who declares that he will follow suit if Hercules commits suicide.
“Decide as you like,” exclaims Amphitryon, “but be sure to remember . . . that your reputation is
at stake and depends on what you do now: either you live or you kill again . . . I will plunge this
sword deep into my decaying body. Here, they will say, lies the victim of sane Hercules” (50).
By describing himself as the “victim of sane Hercules,” Amphitryon establishes that Hercules
must face account for his choices now that his wits are regained and his actions are deliberate.
Amphitryon also alludes to the way men are expected to adhere to Stoic affect management
principles when he mentions that Hercules’s “reputation is at stake.” If Hercules gives in to his
anger, kills himself, and causes his father’s subsequent suicide, he will go down in posterity as
having capitulated to destructive affect in a feminine way. But because Hercules listens to his
father and rejects anger, he ultimately models the Senecan sage who rejects bad impulses despite
their effects on the body and mind. More broadly, his example associates masculinity with a
properly restrained and moderated Stoic response to emotion, which contrasts with Juno’s
stereotypically feminine lack of restraint.
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III: Humoral Theory and the Feminine Body
Ultimately, Seneca’s depictions of Medea and Juno presented early modern scholars and
artists with a negative stereotype of feminine affect, one which would further engrain the
patriarchal ontology of humoral theory. By linking these characters to the Furies, Seneca
reinforced a gendered conception of affect management that associated women with unrestrained
and histrionic emotiveness. These depictions would lend credence to humoral theories which
asserted that colder women were less capable of affective governance because of the natural
disadvantages incurred by their temperatures. Early modern religious and scientific authorities
held a vexed understanding of the female body. They assumed that even though women were
cold by default, physiological fluctuations exclusive to women could cause the female body to be
variously hot or cold. As a baseline, the authorities held that male bodies were warmer than
female bodies, thus placing females lower in a system that “ranked all species thermally,
distinguishing among the temperatures implied in their observable modes of reproduction”
(Paster 78). Given that warmer bodies possessed higher levels of energy and vitality, women
were assumed to be weaker than men in faculty and constitution. Though they concurred on the
enervation caused by feminine coolness, period authorities also needed to justify the
contradictory stigma positioning women as quick to anger and irascibility. Feminine anger
seemed incommensurate with passive feminine coolness, given that humoral theory positioned
anger as a product of increased bodily heat. To resolve this conflict, early modern physiologists
asserted that the cold female body was more malleable and unstable than the warmer male body
because it menstruated. Since women expelled and somehow replenished blood on a monthly
basis, authorities maintained that these anatomical hydraulics evinced that the feminine body
experienced corresponding temperamental fluctuations. They assumed that physiological
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changes or external influences could cause the normally cold female body to temporarily
produce the physiological prerequisite for anger: an excess of heated blood.
Helkiah Crooke, royal physician to James I, outlines the tension between the lassitude
associated with the cool feminine body and a woman’s perceived ability to quickly generate the
anger and malice characteristic of a warm, active heart. Crooke’s 1616 anatomical treatise
Mikrokosmographia grants that women do have warm hearts, but maintains that pulmonary
warmth and activity don’t offer women their normal benefits because female bodies are designed
for gestation. Crooke asserts “the heart of a woman is hotter than the heart of a man” because
“the pulses of women are more quick and frequent, of men more rare and slow, as Galen
teacheth . . . it is the property of colde to make the partes sluggish and dull in their motion”
(273). Though an active heart and hot blood should predispose one toward agency and boldness,
Crooke understands as menstruation as evidence that a woman’s body diverted blood for
procreative purposes. He explains that because of its perceived role in facilitating gestation,
“the liuer of a woman is hotter then a man . . . the Naturall Faculty which hath his residence in
the Liuer, and is diuided into the encreasing, nourishing and procreating vertues, is stronger in a
woman then in a man” (274). These encreasing, nourishing and procreating vertues” are enabled
by menstrual blood, as “women doth receiue & retaine a greater quantity of blood” in order to
create the conditions necessary for birth, particularly male birth (276). This blood in the liver
would be heated to produce a male fetus, which was “generated in a hotter place . . . on the right
side, females on the left. Now we know that the right side is hotter then the left by reason of the
Liuer . . . the Male being hotter spendeth more of the bloud gathered together in the wombe”
(274-75). Because authorities like Crooke contended that women used their blood for generative
purposes, it enabled misogynistic views that denied women the constancy which humoral theory
94

normally associated with copious warm blood. These hegemonic attitudes explained away
physiological attributes that could have fostered more equitable views towards women,
ultimately denying women potential benefits bestowed by their bodies.
Unfortunately, patriarchal interpretation of the female body did more than contravene a
woman’s physiological advantages; it invented new weaknesses to further entrench stereotypes
of general female inconstancy and affective inferiority. Male anatomists argued that a woman’s
excess blood, while necessary for procreative and generative purposes, became a liability that
often minimized a woman’s ability to deliberately govern feeling. Crooke articulates this
prevailing opinion by explaining that women’s bodies are predisposed to the “faculty . . . of the
heart which we called Irascibilis or the passion of Anger . . . many of vs know by woefull
experience to bee quicker and more vigorous in woemen . . . for they are easily heated and vpon
very slight causes” (273-74). When Crooke explains that women are “easily heated and vpon
very slight causes,” he references a stigma suggesting that women often entered unpredictable
and irrational bouts of anger brought on by a sudden heating of the blood. He references classical
sources to justify this stereotype, using Greek authorities to distinguish a woman’s volatile and
often impotent anger from a man’s purposeful anger:
In Hippocrates and Galen . . . Anger and Wrath are two distinct things. Anger is a disease
of a weake mind which cannot moderate it selfe but is easily inflamed, such are women,
childeren, and weake and cowardly men, and this we tearme fretfulnesse or pettishness:
but Wrath which is Ira permanes belongs to stout heartes, and therefore Homer calleth
Achilles Anger (275-76).
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Crooke’s definition helps clarify that male and female anger are differentiated by contrasting
levels of affective governance. Most males, possessed of a thermal advantage that enabled
stronger faculties, could better rebuff dangerous affects. They could mollify or manage anger,
subordinating it to resist its effects, or channeling it toward a deliberate action or purpose.
Crooke positions weak men and most women on an opposite extreme, specifically explaining
that women are “easily mooued of the hindges” because of their “cold Temper, and from the
impotencie and weaknes of their mind, because they are not able to lay a law vpon themselues”
(277). Crooke’s language reflects patriarchy’s contradictory understanding of feminine humor:
though a woman might be hot with anger, her “cold Temper” prevents her from “lay[ing] a law
vpon” herself and managing her feelings. Such an understanding of feminine humor led to an
idea that women would easily capitulate to rouge affects, especially anger, and quickly descend
to histrionics or debasement.
Crooke’s appraisal of feminine physiology and behavior reflects the broader early modern
consensus that the female body’s qualities predisposed women to irrationality and poor affective
governance. Because this “evidence” was rooted in physiology and therefore seemed empirical,
it allowed male authorities to quantify perceived female weaknesses and ensconce a patriarchal
hierarchy, a social organization based on the idea that “the coldness and sponginess of female
flesh” explained women’s “limited capacity for productive agency, individuality, and higher
reasoning” (Paster 79). Male authorities used a specific term to refer to women’s assumed
tendency to exhibit extreme or vacillating feelings: “inconstancy.” In Passions of the Mind in
General, Thomas Wright argues that lack of heat makes women susceptible to four common
vices including inconstancy, which he describes as making “change or alternation of that purpose
or resolution” which one “had prudently determined before” (131). He maintains that like unwise
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or immature men, cold women showed “lack of prudence and judgment in their determinations . .
. young men and women for the most part resolve rashly and perform rarely” (120). To the
medical and religious authorities of the period, female inconstancy was a deliberate component
of “a divinely created natural order in which . . . the structure and functions of the human body . .
. display the creator’s intentions for the natural and social world” (Mercer 186). In the
patriarchal structure of the early modern period, then, woman’s perceived coldness and the
weaknesses engendered of it substantiated Biblical depictions of female subordination, such as
when “Paul insists in the New Testament, “A woman must quietly receive instruction with entire
submissiveness . . . I do not allow a woman to teach or exercise authority over a man’ (Timothy
2:12)” (198). Because medical and religious discourses were constructed by men with an eye
toward maintaining a patriarchal hierarchy, they provided men with ways to justify female
subordination.
In these patriarchal discourses, women were thought to require extra effort and attention
to dissipate the problematic humoral extremes unique to their bodies. Period authorities
constructed whole medical categories for maladies caused by the physiological fluctuations of
the female body. Robert Burton discusses some of these illnesses in The Anatomy of Melancholy,
asserting that a woman’s “heart and brain” may be “offended with those vicious vapors which
come from menstruous blood” (1.414). Burton explains that women of all ages experience such
illnesses, as they can afflict young women whose hormones are just beginning to activate or
“widows . . . by reason of a sudden alteration of their accustomed course of life” (1.415). Burton
prescribes physical or sexual activity to aid women in alleviating humors that accumulate to
cause ill health. He maintains that they can be dissipated by hard labor, explaining that “seldom
should you see a hired servant, a poor handmaid . . . kept hard to her work and bodily labor, a
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coarse country wench, troubled in this kind” (1.417). In addition to work, sex also improved a
woman’s affective condition by facilitating a release that led to clarity of mind. He argues that
“the best and surest remedy” for female melancholy “is to see them [women]. . . married to good
husbands in due time” (1.417). The Anglican Burton highlights the importance of regular sex
through a liberal critique of Catholic celibacy, inveighing strenuously against the “odious and
abominable . . . superstitious and rash vows of popish monasteries, so to bind and enforce men
and women to vow virginity, to lead a single life, against the laws of nature, opposite to religion,
policy, and humanity, so to starve, to offer violence, to suppress the vigor of youth!” (1.418). His
language alludes to the erratic physical symptoms of a humoral malady, accusing Catholicism of
“impiously contemn[ing]” the “tears, sighs, groans, and grievous miseries of those poor souls
committed to their charge” (1.418). In Burton’s view, Catholic dogma guarantees physiological
chaos in their clergy because they forbid priests and nuns from performing “that to which by
their innate temperature they are so furiously inclined, urgently carried, and sometimes
precipitated, even irresistibly led” (1.418). By attaching such crucial importance to work and sex,
Burton illustrates how early modern authorities understood female bodies as overstimulated
vessels of humor requiring extra maintenance to function properly

IV: Titus Andronicus
Shakespeare’s Tamora most explicitly illustrates the synthesis between the archetype of
the Furies and the humoral understanding of volatile feminine affect. Tamora’s rhetoric and
behavior illustrate the unnatural and destructive anger embedded in each stereotype. She
exemplifies “the archetypical woman turned monstrous revenger,” the aggrieved woman who
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looks back to the example of the “ancient mothers” Medea and Juno (Findlay 76). Like her
female forbearers, Tamora shares characteristics attributed to the Furies: their unmitigated rage
and vindictive spite; a penchant for grotesque rhetorical bombast and unceasing, cacophonic
cursing; and a monomaniacal obsession with executing a triumphant, theatrical revenge. Tamora
takes on this association early in the play, when she obviates the audience’s sympathy for her
maternal loss by rededicating herself as a hateful figure who seeks the destruction of her
enemies, the Andronici. She will find “a day to massacre them all, / And raze their faction and
their family, / The cruel father and their traitorous sons” (1.1.450-52). Tamora’s rhetoric in her
next appearance crackles with the chaotic din of the Furies. She tells her sons that she has seen
an “abhorred pit . . . at the dead time of night” where “a thousand fiends, a thousand hissing
snakes, / Ten thousand swelling toads, as many urchins, / Would make such fearful and confused
cries, / As any mortal body hearing it / Should straight fall mad, or else die suddenly” (2.3.98104). In these lines, Tamora invokes all three thematic associations that Edith Hall locates within
the “emblematized” femininity of the Furies, which was “consolidated in ritual, mythopoeia,
literature, and philosophy by their chthonic, thantalogical, and maternal associations . . . and their
similarity and sometimes partial assimilation to other female figures including the Harpies” (50).
Tamora amalgamates the underground, deathly, and maternal hallmarks of the Furies through
this speech describing subterranean horrors and madness, which she delivers to urge her sons to
murder on her behalf, else “be ye not henceforth call’d my children” (2.3.113). These attributes
show that early modern writers who depicted female anger and madness were indebted to
classical representations of the Furies.
While Tamora emulates the stock attributes of the Furies, she also understands her
affective disposition through humoral notions which add more dynamic qualities to the more
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static Senecan model. In addition to acknowledging how material and environment factors might
induce affect, Tamora understands that her feelings can be easily transmitted thanks to the
porous and vulnerable nature of the humoral body. Tamora most explicitly amalgamates the
literary representation of the Furies with early modern Galenic medical tenets in the play’s final
act, when she costumes herself like the female personification of Revenge in order to confuse
Titus. She wears a “strange and sad habiliment” in order to appear as a Fury-esque entity (5.2.1),
taking on the Furies’ classic association with “murder and death” in dark, womb-like places such
as “a hollow cave or lurking-place” (5.2.34-35). Tamora performs this identity not for its own
sake, but because humoral theory stipulates that bodies can transmit affect to each other. By
embodying destabilizing affect and presenting it to her enemy, she hopes to intensify his
perceived insanity and weaken him. She intends to outwardly match what she perceives as “his
lunacy,” commanding her similarly costumed sons to emulate whatever “I forge to feed his
brain-sick humors, / Do you uphold and maintain in your speeches, / For now he firmly takes me
for Revenge” (5.2.70-72). Even though Tamora misjudges her opponent’s credulity “in this mad
thought” (5.2.76), her plan to “feed his brain-sick humors” relies on humoral notions of
transmissible affect and impressionable bodies. Through this understanding, Tamora illustrates
how early modern depictions of female affect often combine characteristics of the Furies with
Galenic medical conceits.
Because she appears associated with the Furies and deliberately attempts to transmit
madness, Tamora seems estranged from cultural notions of femininity. Her behavior contradicts
period gender ideologies prompting women to work diligently to reject bodily inclinations to
affective or behavioral extremes. These directives “cautioned against displays of passion . . .
Women should ‘allay or abate these passionate furies,’ ‘parley with reason,’ and ‘chastise all
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such innovating motions as disquiet the inward repose of the mind’” (Clare 227). Tamora’s
aberrant femininity explicitly appears when Lavinia begs Tamora to stop Chiron and Demetrius
from raping her. This exchange offers a contrast in which Lavinia represents proper femininity
through her insistence that Tamora restrain the destructive impulses motivating her and her
children, a course of action aligned with Senecan teaching. Conversely, Tamora represents a
feminine antithesis through her refusal to govern her vengeance and her children’s lust, appetites
which are rendered in humoral language. Lavina fruitlessly appeals to Tamora by invoking a
sense of feminine solidarity, imploring her to “show a woman’s pity” (2.3.147). But Tamora
refuses to restrain her anger at the Andronici because “I poured forth tears in vain / To save your
brother from the sacrifice, / But fierce Andronicus would not relent . . . use her as you will; / The
worse to her, the better lov’d of me” (2.3.163-67). Her desire for revenge unrestrained and
unabated, Tamora gleefully “let[s] my spleenful sons this trull deflow’r” (2.3.191). By
characterizing her sons as “spleenful,” Tamora suggests that she is poised to allow her sons to be
guided by their physiological desires rather than by moral precepts that encourage restraint and
governance. In contrast to the self-controlled ideal to which Lavinia appeals, Tamora and her
children emulate the example of a Medea or Juno by rejecting restraint and instead choosing to
amplify their base, destructive feelings.
Lavinia’s rhetoric makes it even clearer that Tamora’s affective response contradicts
cultural rules for idealized feminine conduct, which prohibited violence while encouraging
submissiveness and empathy. Lavinia’s response highlights a pervasive criticism that all female
revengers must negotiate. Because violence and revenge deviate from feminine codes of conduct,
women who take revenge are often subject to more scrutiny and judgment than their male
counterparts. In other words, association with the “feminine” Furies removes a woman from
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idealized femininity and instead positions her as an aberrant figure confirming negative humoral
stereotypes of feminine anger. Lavina’s language emphasizes the unfeminine nature of Tamora
and her affective disposition. She maintains some hope that social constructions of meek and
sympathetic womanhood might have some influence over Tamora, imploring her to act a
feminine part and be “a gentle queen / And with thine own hands kill me in this place!”
(2.3.168). But after being rebuffed by Tamora, Lavina’s rhetoric changes to reflect not the
possibility that Tamora might perform femininity, but the fact that Tamora’s identity is wholly
antithetical to it. She equates Tamora’s excessive brutality with unfeminine monstrosity,
declaring that her captor possesses not an ounce of “grace, no womanhood – ah, beastly creature,
/ The blot and enemy to our general name!” (2.3.182-83). No longer a woman because of her
refusal to disperse any modicum of restraint or mercy, Tamora becomes for Lavinia a “beastly
creature” who ruins the collective female reputation. Ultimately, while audiences might remain
rightfully appalled by Tamora, the language in this exchange reflects how women who engage
with angry or violent affects are judged against a gender ideal that does not exist for their male
counterparts.
Lavinia’s rape scene further confirms this double standard because it spends more time
interrogating the conduct of the rapists’ mother and commenting on her gender performance,
while neglecting to spend an equal amount of attention on the rapists themselves. Lavinia herself
makes some concession for Chiron and Demetrius by acknowledging that their ruthlessness
comes from their mother’s unnatural and unfeminine disposition, positioning her as the source of
their hard and merciless attitudes: “O, do not learn her wrath – she taught it thee; / The milk thou
suck’st from her did turn to marble, / Even at thy teat thou hadst thy tyranny” (2.3.143-45). By
focusing on the way that Chiron and Demetrius took milk from their mother, Lavinia de102

emphasizes their individual choices and instead positions Tamora as the principal agent of the
rape. Humoral theory posited that suckling infants could adopt a mother or nurse’s affective
disposition through breastfeeding, given that “breast milk was simply womb blood transformed
through the action of maternal love” (Johnson 139). An evil or unloving mother or nurse could
feed “treachery” to their infants, “whose appetites were formed first in the womb and then at the
breast—appetites that emerged again at adolescence and that (if they met with ‘unnatural food’)

would . . . ‘make a devil of a saint’” (139). Chiron demonstrates that he has physiologically
inherited his mother’s perverse disposition when Lavinia asks for his intercession, rejecting her
by retorting if “thou would have me prove myself a bastard?” (2.3.148). Here, Chiron equates
mercy and kindness with bastardry because they contradict the cruel affective register to which
he is predisposed, thanks to his consumption of his mother’s milk; loyalty to his mother means
deliberately maintaining this cruelty. Because she depicts Chiron and Demetrius as products of
their mother’s physiological material, Lavinia places a majority of the blame for her rape onto
Tamora. She delivers this blame alongside an interrogation and repudiation of Tamora’s gender
performance, but neglects to spend the same energy critiquing her rapists in a gendered way.
This imbalance shows many female figures who engage with vengeance and violence must deal
with gendered stereotypes that don’t exist for males.

V: The Spanish Tragedy
In Titus Andronicus, Tamora exhibits the classic tropes of grotesque female revenge that
early modernity imported from Greek and Roman sources, including Senecan drama. And in a
reflection of Galenic principles, she also iitllustrates how the vindictive attitudes of the Furies are
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especially dangerous in the early modern milieu because of the period’s stronger emphasis on
affective transmissibility. In terms of affect management, Tamora chooses to embrace and
intensify her initial anger, so she presents a negative example which fails to highlight how
women might be able to practice affective governance and resist the attitudes ascribed to them by
humoral theory. Unlike Tamora, The Spanish Tragedy’s Bel-Imperia offers a more sympathetic
depiction of the female avenger. Clare notes that Bel-Imperia’s beauty and intelligence makes
The Spanish Tragedy “one of the few plays to resist the image of the aberrant female revenger”
(119). In addition to the fact that Bel-Imperia rejects the ignoble image of the Furies, critics also
identify her as an agentic player in the text, a resistor of patriarchal structure, and ultimately a
powerful symbol of feminine autonomy. Christopher Crosbie explains that the canny BelImperia combats patriarchy because she “flouts the boundaries of class divisions” and “defies
expectations of female complaisance . . . Her downward selection of lovers remains an
expression of ambitious growth precisely because it is a selection” (20). Chloe Preedy locates
Bel-Imperia’s agency not only in the aristocratic status that enables her choices, but through her
intellectual competence and commitment to “learning and literary skills . . . women’s learning
becomes a weapon of revenge: the silenced tongue supplanted by the martial pen” (184). Some
critics even read powerful agency in Bel-Imperia’s unscripted suicide during her performance of
Soliman and Perseda, since it destabilizes a kingdom and inspires “wonder at her boldness”
(Brown 61). These scholars rightly point out that Bel-Imperia’s grace and competence elevate
her above other female revengers, ultimately distancing her from many of the Furies’ repulsive
attributes.
Bel-Imperia demonstrates laudable intelligence and agency throughout the play, but her
death represents a point of ambiguity that obscures whether or not she deliberately manages
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affect. Since humoral theory understood the cold female body as harder to govern and more
prone to irrational outbursts, Bel-Imperia’s death might be read to confirm these negative
stereotypes regardless of her intention. The male characters around Bel-Imperia indeed interpret
her death as a moment of weakness corroborating their negative conceptions about feminine
affect, including the belief that humoral imbalances could result in female self-harming. BelImperia partially allows this interpretation through her silence, as she dies in the context of the
play-within-a-play and thus neglects to voice her intentions in a way that would contradict
humoral expectations. This silence also means that Bel-Imperia does not fulfill the revenger’s
normal prerogative to reveal their orchestration of vengeance, to show their mastery by
rhetorically reveling in their opponent’s suffering. More importantly, because Bel-Imperia dies
without giving a final address identifying her feelings and choices, she leaves observers to
assume that she dies emoting the vengeful register she maintains throughout the play, which
appears when she chooses to develop a “second love” with Horatio in order to “spite the prince
that wrought his [Andrea’s] end” (1.4.66-8), and in her bloody writ instructing Hieronimo to
“revenge Horatio’s death, / And fare better than Bel-Imperia doth” (3.2.30-31). If this is the case,
Bel-Imperia might act as a good model illustrating how to delay the destabilizing effects of
intense feeling. However, she does not exemplify how one might reject and replace destructive
feelings for social or moral reasons. Because of the ambiguity surrounding her death, BelImperia occupies a middle ground between Tamora and Martha. She may demonstrate some
principles of performative affective management, but a better example remains elsewhere.
Bel-Imperia may be best viewed as an illustration of delay, given that she deliberately
delays acting on her anger until the proper moment. Instead of immediately attacking her brother
Lorenzo and the Portuguese prince Balthazar for murdering her second lover Horatio, she
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acknowledges the need to “constrain myself, / To patience, and apply me to the time, / Till
heaven . . . shall set me free” (3.9-12-14). Bel-Imperia emphasizes this impressive emotional
restraint in conversation with these two enemies, who have placed her in prison as punishment
for her reluctance to entertain a match with Balthazar. Lorenzo justifies the imprisonment by
relying on humoral stereotypes of destructive female affect, which prompted the male aristocrats
to quarantine Bel-Imperia for her and their own safety. He claims that her excess “melancholy”
at “your first favorite Don Andrea’s death” has displeased their father the king (3.10-70-71).
Proximity to his displeasure would, according to Lorenzo, “add more fuel to your fire, / Who
burnt like Etna for Andrea’s loss” (3.10.76-77). Because humoral theory held that women were
prone to dangerous emotional fluctuations, Lorenzo and Balthazar assume that they can exhibit
control over Bel-Imperia’s body both for her own safety and for the emotional health of the
court.
Bel-Imperia’s composed demeanor and clear arguments refute the stereotypes that allow
Lorenzo and Balthazar to justify their abduction of her. She chastises Lorenzo for treating her
like an enemy, isolating her for no reason. She asks why he has:
Used thy sister so.
First, to affright me with thy weapons drawn,
And with extremes abuse my company;
And then to hurry me like whirlwind’s rage,
Amidst a crew of confederates,
And clap me up where none might come at me,
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Nor I at any, to reveal my wrongs.
What maddening fury did possess thy wits?
Or wherein is’t that I offended thee? (3.10.27-36).
In this address, Bel-Imperia flips the script and rightly depicts her brother as the more
emotionally irrational body. She acknowledges that some type of misplaced feeling or judgment
has caused Lorenzo to torment her in inexplicable ways, from “affright[ing] me with weapons
drawn” to kidnapping her in a “whirlwind’s rage.” When she asks Lorenzo “what maddening
fury did possess thy wits,” Bel-Imperia correctly identifies that he emulates the distraught and
unreasonable example set by the Furies. Through this intellect and composure, Bel-Imperia
models delay to refute easy categorization as a stereotypically unhinged female avenger.
And yet, despite the fact that Bel-Imperia demonstrates laudable affective restraint for a
majority of the play, the final scene complicates our understanding of the way she governs affect.
Is she a competent and consistent governor of affect whose death occurs by choice, as an escape
from patriarchal structure? Or does she indeed kill herself in error after being swept away by
abundant passion, as Hieronimo suggests? Even critics who laud Bel-Imperia’s actions
acknowledge the complexity of this question, noting the difficulty of “explain[ing] the unsolved
mystery of Bel-Imperia’s suicide” (Brown 60). Preedy reads “independence” in Bel-Imperia’s
“alteration . . . to Hieronimo’s script: he intended her to feign suicide, but she continues along
her self-determined trajectory” (190). But even though Preedy appreciates Bel-Imperia’s
autonomy, she refuses to fully celebrate it because the suicide fits a pattern where “the active
involvement of women in the dramatic revenge action remains inseparable from physical
suffering, bodily weakness, and personal sacrifice” (195). And because it occurs without context,
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unaccompanied by a clear rationale positioning it as an act of resistance, Bel-Imperia’s suicide
fails to explicitly challenge these narratives undermining feminine physiology and agency. The
play’s conclusion ultimately reveals a gendered prejudice prioritizing the male revenger’s voice
over the female’s voice, given that the other characters spend a disproportionate amount of
energy demanding that Hieronimo “speak . . . bloody murderer speak! / For now I have thee I
will make the speak” (4.4.163-64). Though he lacks any special insight regarding Bel-Imperia’s
motivations or interior affective condition, Hieronimo nonetheless gets the final word on BelImperia’s death and its implications. Unfortunately, his commentary continues a pattern in which
early modern women’s assumed bodily weaknesses justified the way male figures were given
expert authority on matters of the female body or female behavior.
The male response to Bel-Imperia’s death reflects patriarchal investment in humoral
notions of feminine coolness and inconstancy. Bel-Imperia may be performing a significant act
of resistance against the male-dominated hegemonic structures which constrain her, but notions
of feminine bodily weakness allow the male onlookers to dismiss her death as a spontaneous but
tragic misjudgment. After Hieronimo suggests that Bel-Imperia mistakenly killed herself in a
moment of excessive passion, he and the play’s other characters accept this explanation and
move on without any extra wonder at or investigation of her final intentions. Hieronimo explains
that:
Poor Bel-Imperia missed her part in this,
For though the story saith she should have died,
Yet I of kindness and of care to her,
Did otherwise determine of her end:
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But love of him whom they did hate too much,
Did urge her resolution to be such (4.4.140-45).
Hieronimo describes Bel-Imperia’s feelings in a manner consistent with the way humoral theory
painted female affect as contradictory and ungovernable. In his assessment, Bel-Imperia deserves
pity because conflicting affective extremes – “love of him” and anger at those who hated and
killed him – urged her toward this misguided “resolution.” Not only does humoral theory prevent
the men from assuming that her death might hold purpose or significance, but it also prevents
them from giving Bel-Imperia full intellectual credit as Hieronimo’s co-conspirator. Though
Hieronimo has already eulogized Bel-Imperia and thus implicated her in the revenge plot, Castile
asks him “who where thy confederates in this?” (4.4.176) The Portuguese Viceroy responds by
clarifying the obvious fact that it was Bel-Imperia, that “by her hand my Balthazar was slain”
(4.4.178). However, the King and Castile seem unwilling to consider that Hieronimo could
orchestrate such a stunt with the help of just a single female partner. In a move suggesting that he
believes Hieronimo had other accomplices, the King calls for “the tortures. / Traitor as thou art,
I’ll make thee tell” (4.4.183-84). Because they mistakenly understand female affect and behavior
through the limiting and discriminatory lens of humoral theory, the men at the play’s conclusion
seem incapable of interpreting Bel-Imperia’s death in a way that provides any real insight.
Specific humoral theories about feminine affect and self-harm would have conditioned
these characters to respond to Bel-Imperia’s with callous disinterest, given that it conforms to
expected stereotypes. According to Passions of the Mind in General, thinking of a specific
emotional state could cause physiological shifts within the body. Wright maintains that
impressions from the imagination cause “purer spirits” to “flock from the brain by certain secret
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channels to the heart, where they pitch at the door, signifying what . . . was presented” (123).
Wrathful impressions increase the heart’s amount of “blood and choler” (123). Such alternations
in blood quantity or flow had long been thought to negatively impact female mental health.
Christina Mercer recounts from Hippocrates’s Diseases of Women to show humoral theory’s
insistence that women afflicted with excess blood may behave erratically or even commit selfharm, specifically providing his example of pubescent girls “bleeding ‘copiously,’ but the blood
will ‘have no means of egress’ so that it ‘leaps up . . . to the diaphragm.’ The result of this are
symptoms that include aggression and the tendency for girls to ‘leap around, to fall down into
wells and to hang themselves,’ and to ‘take on a desire for death . . . as if it were a good thing’”
(189-90). These ideas prompt The Spanish Tragedy to position Hieronimo as the stronger symbol
of resistance, even though humoral theory maintains that men are not immune to the fits of selfharm thought to be more common to women. According to Burton, men afflicted with excess
melancholic can suffer a “heavy heart, irksome thoughts crucify his soul, and in an instant he is
moped or weary of his life, he will kill himself” (1.406). But because Hieronimo’s suicide
contravenes a direct order from the King, he appears more as a deliberately defiant figure and
less an unruly body dominated by affect. Though Hieronimo and Bel-Imperia jointly perform
the same revenge and meet similar ends, prejudiced humoral theories cause the play’s characters
to respond to each revenger according to a gendered hierarchy.

VI: The Tragedy of Hoffman or a Revenge for a Father
Bel-Imperia presents a model of female affective governance that in some ways resists
and in some ways conforms to humoral expectations. She contradicts the lurid representations of
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the Furies, while illustrating some restraint by practicing Senecan delay. However, because her
ambiguous death fails to explicitly counteract the default humoral explanation for her suicide,
Bel-Imperia remains burdened by sexist conceits of feminine weakness. More importantly,
because she delays rather than displaces her initial desire for revenge, Bel-Imperia neglects to
demonstrate early modernity’s most powerful affect management strategy, which was to replace
an unwanted affect by performing an opposite one. However, Martha, mother of the slain Prince
Otho from Chettle’s Hoffman, does illustrates this strategy through successful negotiation of
vengeful affect. Martha not only demonstrates Senecan delay by waiting until the right moment
to avenge, but her planning adds an extra layer: she ensures that her role in a communal revenge
plot adheres to feminine standards that discourage direct violence. This accommodation requires
Martha to counteract anger and grief using Senecan-inspired methods, but it achieves significant
results. She ultimately plays a crucial role in revenging her son’s murder while retaining
sympathy from the audience.
By successfully negotiating the tension between revenge and patriarchal standards,
Martha occupies the dual positions of revenger and gentlewoman. Meeting these contradictory
sets of demands means that Martha performs with more affective and intellectual competency
than any male revenge counterpart. Her commendable affective discipline contrasts with the
failures of her antagonist, the eponymous villain Clois Hoffman. Martha and Hoffman both vow
to determine their affective states, but in a reversal of paradigms of feminine weakness, only
Martha succeeds. Martha’s clear judgment and exemplary self-governance, coupled with
Hoffman’s failures, suggests that performative affect management tools were seen as powerful
enough to counteract the humoral theories which so vigorously insisted on women’s weakness.
Though early modern authorities maintained that male and female bodies operated under wildly
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different affective conditions, the character comparison at Hoffman’s center suggests that a
strong mind could compensate for a particular body’s weaknesses and nullify perceived humoral
disadvantages.
Hoffman’s titular character introduces the theme of affective governance in the play’s
very first lines. In his introductory soliloquy, Hoffman takes stock of his emotional state and
vows to maintain a vengeful affect in order to avenge his father, a naval commander who was
spuriously and unfairly convicted of piracy and then summarily executed by the Duke of
Luningberg. He repudiates “clouds of melancholy! / I’ll no longer be subject to your schisms”
(1.1.1-2). And in place of melancholy, Hoffman instead courts a bold and bloody humor: “But
thou dear soul, whose nerves and arteries / In dead resoundings summon up revenge, / And thou
shalt ha’t; but be appeased . . . With a heart as air, swift as thought / I’ll execute justly in such a
cause. Where truth leadeth, what coward would not fight?” (1.1.3-10). Here, Hoffman suggests
that his mind dominates the material components which inform his affective state. He locates
both agency and feeling in his “dear soul,” which seems to own his “nerves and arteries.” And by
describing his heart as “swift as thought,” Hoffman insinuates that his body’s physiological
apparatuses will immediately recognize and process his intentions. This perceived ability to
manage feeling reflects the high level of affective agency that humoral theory afforded to men,
who were “hotter . . . his minde should be bee stout and inuincible to vndergoe dangers . . . the
onely hearing whereof will driue a woman as wee say out of her little wits” (Crooke 275).
Seemingly armed with the ability to control superhuman levels of wrath and ire, Hoffman swears
revenge on Luningberg “or any man that is allied; / Has but one ounce of blood, of which he’s
part” (1.1.68-69). He later makes good on this vow by tricking and murdering Prince Otho,
Martha’s shipwrecked son and heir to the seat of Luningberg. Hoffman’s attitude at this early
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juncture seems to reflect powerful affective agency, but his later mistakes combined with
Martha’s discipline will challenge humoral notions of physiological makeup and gendered
affective competency.
Hoffman maintains his affective competency for the first three acts of the play, balancing
his anger with clear judgment to rack up a high body count. Having stolen Otho’s identity,
traveled to Luningberg’s court, and eliminated rival claimants to power, Hoffman seems poised
to usurp the Duke’s authority. His accomplice Lorrique correctly identifies that only one person
can stop their plans, and that this individual must be eliminated. Lorrique speaks of “beauteous
Martha” (4.1.43), who is on her way to court and will surely recognize that the recently returned
“Prince Otho” is actually a pretender who has stolen her son’s royal identity. Hoffman and
Lorrique create an opportunity to murder a sleeping Martha, but after recognizing Martha’s
beauty, Hoffman experiences the affective changeability that humoral theory associated with
female bodies. As he observes Martha’s sleeping figure, Hoffman experiences an awakening of
sexual desire that mitigates his bloodlust and prevents him from fatally striking. He illustrates
Wright’s definition of inconstancy through his inability to follow through with his murderous
intentions, refusing to stab Martha because “weapons draw blood, bloodshed will plainly prove /
The worthy duchess . . . was murdered” (4.2.65-67). He then fails to smother her because “circles
of purple blood will change the hue / Of this white porphyry; and the red lines . . . will tell the
world / She died by violence” (4.2.78-81). When Hoffman similarly refuses to murder Martha
using a small box of poison powder, Lorrique correctly identifies that Hoffman is smitten by
desire and has become irrational. He demands of Hoffman, “Will you confound yourself by
dotage? Speak” (4.2.91). When Martha awakens and demands Hoffman’s identity, he addresses
her using weather imagery suggesting that his affective state has changed significantly. Hoffman
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offers Martha his real identity, asking to her remember that she cried at his father’s execution;
her tears were like “mercies poured on him and me / That like cool rain somewhat allayed the
heat / Of our sad torment, and red sufferings” (4.2.142-44). Hoffman’s affective shift certainly
includes the sexual desire that prompts him to blazon Martha instead of killing her, but it also
includes another component. In a reflection of early modern ideas of affective transmission, the
pity that Martha once showed Hoffman reappears in his mind and helps dissipate his anger like
the cool rain.
Once alone onstage, Hoffman delivers a soliloquy explaining his alteration from vengeful
to libidinous. This soliloquy firmly establishes that Hoffman models a stereotypically feminine
response to affect, one where the mind is unable to counteract the body’s humoral impulses. He
explains that:
Another fire
Burns in this liver: lust and hot desire
Which you [Martha] must quench. Must? Ay, and shall: I know
Women will like however they say no;
And since my heart is knit unto her eyes
If she, being sanctimonious, hate my suit
In love, this course I’ll take: if she deny,
Force her. True, so si non blanditus, vi (4.2.218-25).
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When Hoffman declares that another fire of “lust and hot desire” has ignited “in this liver,” he
unmistakably points to an affective shift that replaces anger with desire. Emphasizing his liver
would have clearly sent this signal to early modern spectators, who were all too familiar with the
liver as the source of choleric humors that determined sexual appetite. His sudden rejection of
the sanguine mode propelling his revenge reflects a tired stereotype of female bodies and
sexualities, namely that cold women were more lascivious because they lacked the wherewithal
to govern desire. Crooke declares that “Females are more wanton and petulant than Males . . .
because of the impotencie of their minds; for the imaginations of lustfull women are like the
imaginations of bruite beastes which have no repugnancie or contradiction of reason to restrain
them” (277). Hoffman refutes this humoral prejudice by projecting this same destabilizing and
unrestrained lust. The rest of the soliloquy betrays Hoffman’s ironic lack of self-awareness, since
he erroneously assumes that he can seduce Martha because she – and other women – naturally
exhibit the affective malleability that he himself displays in his shift from revenge to desire. He
believes that because “women will like however they say no,” he can impress his liver’s “lust
and hot desire” onto her. This blind understanding of impressionable women rests on the
humoral theory that “cold temperature tamps down individuality by preventing the free flow of
bodily humors necessary for its real expression,” producing a “changeability inimical to . . . selfidentity” (Paster 80). Since women like Martha were thought to be blank affective canvases,
Hoffman thinks he can induce Martha to desire simply by presenting an example for her to
emulate, by brandishing “my heart . . . unto her eyes.” Hoffman’s inconstancy and misjudgment
will contrast with Martha’s discipline, providing an example which resists stereotypes elevating
male affective governance over female governance.
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If Hoffman exhibits an affective shift characteristic of a woman or a weak man, then
Martha offers an example of consistency normally associated with a stout-hearted man or a
remarkable woman. She thus forcefully resists early modern assumptions that women were
emotionally malleable. Her emotional equilibrium may come partly from her status as an older
widow, as a woman who has passed the period where virginal or youthful aliments were more
common. But even though her passions have likely mellowed with age, Martha’s equilibrium
most prominently stems from a sense of mental acuity strong enough to enable mastery over
affect. She implements the Senecan strategies for affect management that I discuss in the
introduction to this dissertation, specifically using delay and opposite affects to maintain her wits
and plot a revenge course that accommodates her femininity to the demands of blood repayment.
Martha’s clarity of mind allows her room to maintain the bearing of aristocratic femininity and
fulfill demands of revenge, specifically by forming a revenge coalition with other characters and
playing a central but non-violent role within this group. Because of this arrangement, the
humoral and cultural stereotypes associated with female revenge never imperil Martha’s image.
Her example reflects real-life patterns where “men have always carried out more acts of the
violent reprisal which the Erinyes symbolize than women” (Hall 35). By leaving the violence to
the men, Martha never allows the revenger’s bloodlust to supersede her grieving, sympathetic
maternal ethos or the graceful decorum befitting a lofty Duchess. At the same time, though, her
direct and crucial participation in the revenge plot fully satisfies the demands of blood reprisal
and cements her as an avenger.
Before realizing that Hoffman has lied about trying to save Otho, Martha exhibits a level
of fracturing sorrow associated with the ostensibly more malleable female body. She seems
resigned to the doleful inactivity of mourning her son; she asks Hoffman to take her to Otho’s
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body, where she will “build me a cell, / Made like a tomb; till death therein I’ll dwell” (4.2.19798). But after learning that Hoffman murdered Otho, Martha uses delay to stave off destabilizing
grief. She then works to force a full confession from Lorrique. “I charge thee,” she demands of
Lorrique, “setting by all circumstance, / Thou utter what thou knowest: my heart is steel, / Nor
can it suffer more than it doth feel” (5.1.177-79). In declaring her heart “steel,” Martha vows to
delay grief and withstand its effects on reason, so that she may come to better understand and
better retaliate against Hoffman’s villainy. She then orders Lorrique to continue recalling the
sickening details of Otho’s murder: “Go on, I am confident to hear all cruelty; / And I am
resolved to act some, if no hand / Will attempt the murderer’s end but mine” (5.1.200-02). In
these lines, Martha specifically repudiates Crooke’s contention that simply hearing misfortune
could “driue a woman . . . out of her little wits” (Crooke 275). She then suggests that her
newfound mental clarity actually comes from the desire for revenge: “I that never knew
revenge’s power, / Have entertained her newly in my breast” (5.1.246-47). Here, Martha behaves
less like a stereotypical woman prone to fall apart at the slightest emotional turmoil. Instead, she
demonstrates a masculine affective competency by subordinating grief to “revenge’s power” and
maintaining enough rationality to plan an effective revenge. In this case, Martha makes the same
vow that Hoffman offers at the play’s introduction, but she will end up performing revenge with
more disipline and consistency.
Martha’s revenge incorporates both feminine gender ideals and fulfills the avenger’s
duty. Her beauty and feminine charms initiate the revenge, and then she helps complete it
through essential but non-violent action. Specifically, Martha serves as the sexual bait that leads
Hoffman to his demise, and then she acts prudently to safeguard her assembled allies from his
wrath. After Hoffman propositions her for a tryst, Martha feigns agreement and requests that
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they enter a cave where her companions await. Stage directions clarify that she takes his sword
during the walk to the cave. After entering the cave, Martha calls out to her hidden conspirators,
letting them know that they can safely confront the villain. “Thy weapon’s sure,” she exclaims
while holding Hoffman’s sword, “the prize is ours. / Come forth dear friends, murder is in our
powers” (5.3.120-22). At her command, the co-conspirators appear from the shadows and an
unnamed Lord makes to execute Hoffman in the same way that Hoffman killed Otho, by placing
on his head a “crown made flaming hot with fire” (5.3.142). Martha responds to Hoffman’s
execution without excess of violence or even malice, imploring him to reconcile with God: “Call
upon heaven, base wretch, think on thy soul” (5.3.163). Having completed her role as an avenger
who engineers the villain’s death in a deliberate way, Martha returns to playing a non-violent,
feminine role. Janet Clare argues that in English revenge tragedies, female bodies are almost
never allowed to be both the sympathetic “lamenting mother and figure of pathos” and the
“revenger armed with ferocious energy” (224). But Hoffman’s final scene sees Martha occupy
both positions, albeit it with a slight concession or moderation of each. This combination
demonstrates a fundamental complexity about female revenge, which is differentiated from male
revenge because the “gender ideology inherent in . . . proper female conduct precludes any
recognition of what we might view as heroic female action” (Clare 227). Thanks to the difficulty
of reconciling patriarchy’s limiting behavioral prescriptions with revenge’s violent expectations,
successful, sympathetic female revengers who survive beyond the play’s final act are a rarity on
the early modern stage. The tension between revenge and idealized femininity has profound
implications on affective politics, as it forces women who seek revenge to practice affective
governance at its most rarefied and challenging level. They must resist anger to the point that
they reject the example of a Medea or of Juno, while still retaining enough anger to use as
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propulsion toward vengeance. Martha completes this balancing act gracefully, and in the process
rejects humoral conceits that negatively circumscribed female physiology and affect.
Like The Spanish Tragedy, Hoffman ends by giving its principal male character the final
word at the drama’s conclusion. But in a contrast to The Spanish Tragedy, Hoffman’s last speech
destabilize rather than reinforce the humoral theories thought to significantly determine male and
female affective conditions and capabilities. Hoffman dies cursing his enemies, as might be
expected given his intense hostility, but he directs the more significant portion of his vitriolic
energy onto himself. While the crown sears his forehead, Hoffman chastises himself for the
affective inconstancy that led to him being “fallen by a woman’s hand” (5.3.125). In a perverse
blazon, Hoffman fulminates against individual body parts which he sees as having rebelled
against his intent to “be revenged on Austria, Saxony, / Prussia, Luningberg, and all their heirs”
(5.3.149). He first rails against his “wretched” eyes that have “betrayed my heart: be you
accursed, / And as the melting drops run from my brows, / So fall they on the strings that guide
your heart, / Whereby their oily heat may crack them first” (5.3.151-55). Hoffman curses his
eyes first because they were assumed to be one of the porous humoral body’s most vulnerable
points of entry; the eyes were understood as transmitting arresting images and impulses to the
brain, which could produce corresponding humor, and subsequently thwart reason or intent.
Because he was first infected and then bewildered by the image of Martha’s beauty, Hoffman
declares that his eyes have “betrayed” his heart. By referring to the eyes as “strings that guide”
the heart, Hoffman degrades himself for allowing illogical affective impulses to alter his intent.
In the next part of the blazon, he further bemoans his failure to govern affect with the discipline
and restraint expected of a man:
Boil on, thou foolish idle brain,
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For giving entertainment to love’s thoughts
A man resolved in blood, bound by a vow
For no less vengeance than his father’s death
Yet become amorous of his foe’s wife!
Oh sin against all conceit! Worthy this shame
And all the tortures this world can name (5.3.156-62).
When Hoffman names the “sin against all conceit” that justifies his torturous execution, he refers
to his own inability to behave in a way befitting “a man resolved in blood, bound by a vow.” In a
direct contrast of humoral conceits which assumed that men could effectively govern affect,
Hoffman fails to restrain his libidinous impulses, gives “entertainment to love’s thoughts,”
becomes “amorous of his foe’s wife,” and subsequently fails in his revenge quest and pays the
ultimate price. The play gives Hoffman extra emphasis because he delivers its final lines, but his
failures position Martha as the play’s preeminent governor of affect.
In significant part due to humoral theories, the early modern period entertained harshly
unflattering notions of feminine physiology and affect. Tamora encapsulates many of these
negative attributes in one female figure, as she reflects literary traditions and cultural conceptions
which seemed to reflect and reinforce a humoral ontology. Humoral theories even work to
negatively skew the perception of early modern characters who exude more charisma,
intelligence, and agency than the grotesque Tamora. Though Bel-Imperia exhibits these sterling
attributes, her death’s ambiguity may be read to confirm humoral prejudices against women.
Martha offers an important contrast to these more common conceptions of women illustrated by
Tamora and Bel-Imperia. Her example suggests that even despite the early modern period’s
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misogynist physiological conceits, a powerful enough mind could discipline any body and allow
a human subject – regardless of gender – to maintain mastery over their affective condition.

Conclusion: Martha and a Regiment of Not so Monstrous Women
Why does Martha deviate from the unflattering depiction of other female figures in
revenge plays? Hoffman’s date of composition may help explain why Martha appears as a more
competent affective governor than her female revenge predecessors. During and after the first
decade of the seventeenth century, many plays including Hoffman began to include strong,
graceful, admirable female characters in homage to Queen Elizabeth I. These characters signified
a national appreciation of and nostalgia for Elizabeth, who died in 1603 but had become a
symbol of sexual and moral purity during her reign. Shakespeare and his successor John Fletcher
participate in this eulogizing trend in their co-written history play Henry VIII, which appeared in
approximately 1612 and depicts the baby Elizabeth being blessed by Archbishop Thomas
Cranmer. Cranmer predicts that “the royal infant” (5.4.17) will be an inspiration to rulers
everywhere through the “princely graces / That mould up such a mighty piece as this is . . . all
the virtues that attend the good, / Shall be doubled on her” (5.4.25-28). Yet Cranmer also betrays
the national obsession with Elizabeth as a symbol of pure conduct when he foretells her death:
She shall be, to the happiness of England,
An aged princess; many days shall see her,
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And yet no day a deed to crown it.
Would I had known no more! But she must die,
She must, the saints must have her; yet a virgin,
A most unspotted lily shall she pass
To th’ ground, and all the world shall mourn her (5.4.56-62).
Cranmer’s augury that Elizabeth will pass “a most unspotted lily” literally refers to the legends
of the Queen’s virginity, but it also captures public admiration for her image as a sanctified
figure of personal governance and a stabilizer of the nation. Not only is Elizabeth unspotted in
her sexuality, but she refutes the weakness and inconsistency that, according to humoral theory,
afflicted women by default. Her royal performance complicates the Galenic view of women’s
bodies and constitution as mainly fit for maternal purposes. Scott Newstok presents an example
of this type of Galenic theory in his reading of John Knox’s The First Blast of the Trumpet
Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women. This text maintains that “women were
constitutionally unfit to rule, for Kings ‘oght to be constant [and] stable. Women . . . ‘had vertues
. . . not common with men . . . [woman is] a tendre creature, flexible, soft, and pitifull; whiche
nature, God hath geuen unto her, that she may be apt to nourishe children’” (180). But
Elizabeth’s political prowess and personal reputation “echoes this masculine constancy and
stability, and rejects flexibility, softness, and the nourishment of children” (180). Elizabeth’s life,
then, likely worked to counteract humoral discourses that depicted women as exclusively
inconstant, maternal bodies.
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Because of its 1602 composition date, Hoffman appears at the vanguard of a group of
texts that feature strong, agentic females who admirably govern their feelings. In addition to
Chettle’s Martha, Webster’s titular Duchess from The Duchess of Malfi, which is dated between
1612 and 1614, exhibits affective constancy, upstanding morality, and a level of courage
typically expected of men. Strong women even appeared in comedy, particularly in Middleton
and Dekker’s 1611 city comedy The Roaring Girl. The titular female character of this play, the
audacious Moll Cutpurse, rebuffs males who catcall her based on appearance and then disabuses
other men of their understanding that women were mainly objects of beauty and sex. These new
representations of women, made possible in part by Elizabeth’s royal performance,
counterbalance humoral discourse’s negative view of female physiology and emotion. Such
examples coincided with other emergent scientific discourses that would eventually shift medical
knowledge away from the Galenic views consolidated in a text like Mikrokosmographia,
including Paracelsus’s early contributions to germ theory and William Harvey’s research on
blood flow. Combined with such advancements in medical science, the female characters
mentioned here mark the beginning of a change in the understanding of and representation of
female physiology and behavior. This shift acknowledges that women’s bodies and behaviors are
not determined by the limitations ascribed by humoral theory. Instead of being a Fury, women in
drama could be a Martha, a Duchess, a Roaring Girl, or even an Elizabeth. These emergent
modes of representation for women worked to point out the falsity of humoral determinism.
Additionally, because they control their emotions through Senecan-inspired principles, these
female figures indicate the ambivalent effects that Senecan affective philosophy exerted on
humoral theory. While they contributed to humoral theory’s vogue, Senecan philosophies also
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undermined humoral theory’s core deterministic tenets and thus enabled an epistemic shift
towards biological knowledge later corroborated by advancements in the medical profession.

124

Works Cited
Antonucci, Barbara. “Blood in Language: The Galenic Paradigm of Humors in The Rape of
Lucrece and Titus Andronicus.” Questioning Bodies in Shakespeare’s Rome. Edited by
Maria Del Sapo Garbero et al. V&R Unipress, 2010, pp. 149-160.
Baraz, Daniel. “Seneca, Ethics, and the Body: The Treatment of Cruelty in Medieval Thought.”
Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 195-215.
Belling, Catherine. “Infectious Rape, Therapeutic Revenge: Bloodletting and the Health of
Rome’s Body.” Disease, Diagnosis, and Cure on the Early Modern Stage, edited by
Stephanie Moss and Kaara Peterson, Routledge, 2004, pp. 113-132.
Belsey, Catherine. “Tarquin Dispossessed: Expropriation and Consent in The Rape of Lucrece.”
Shakespeare Quarterly. vol. 52, no. 3, 2001, pp. 315-335.
Brown, Pamela. “Anatomy of an Actress: Bel-Imperia as Tragic Diva.” Shakespeare Bulletin,
vol. 33, no. 1, 2015, pp. 49-65.
Burton, Robert. The Anatomy of Melancholy, edited by Holbrook Jackson, New York Review of
Books, 2001.
Burrow, Colin. Shakespeare and Classical Antiquity. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Chettle, Henry. The Tragedy of Hoffman or a Revenge for a Father. Five Revenge Tragedies:
Kyd, Shakespeare, Marston, Chettle, Middleton. Edited by Emma Smith, Penguin, 2012,
pp. 242-324.
Clare, Janet. Revenge Tragedies of the Renaissance. Northcote, 2003.
125

-------. “‘She’s Turned Fury’: Women Transmogrified in Revenge Plays.” Revenge and Gender
in Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance Literature. Edited by Lesel Dawson and Fiona
McCarthy, Edinburgh University Press, 2018, pp. 221-38.
Constantinidou, Natasha. “On Patronage, Fama and Court: Early Modern Political Culture.”
Renaissance Studies¸ vol. 24, no.4, 2010, pp. 597-610.
Craik, Katherine and Tanya Pollard. “Imagining Audiences.” Shakespearean Sensations:
Experiencing Literature in Early Modern England. Edited by Katherine Craik and Tanya
Pollard. Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 1-25.
Crooke, Helkiah. Mikrokosmographia a description of the body of man. London: William
Jaggard, 1615. Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership.
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A19628.0001.001/1:7.14.2?rgn=div3;view=toc
Crosbie, Christopher. “‘Oeconomia’ and the Vegetative Soul: Rethinking Revenge in The
Spanish Tragedy.” English Literary Renaissance, vol. 38, No. 1, 2008, pp. 3-33.
Dawson, Lesel. “Introduction: Feminine Fury and the Masculine Spirit of Revenge.” Revenge
and Gender in Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance Literature. Edited by. Lesel
Dawson and Fiona McHardy, Edinburgh University Press, 2018, 1-29.
Dubrow, Heather. Captive Victors: Shakespeare’s Narrative Poems and Sonnets. Cornell
University Press, 1987.
Evenepoel, Willy. “The Philosopher Seneca on Suicide.” Ancient Society, vol. 34, 2004, pp 21743.
126

Findlay, Allison. “Re-marking Revenge in Early Modern Drama.” Revenge and Gender in
Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance Literature. Edited by Lesel Dawson and Fiona
McCarthy, Edinburgh University Press, 2018, pp. 58-84.
Friedman, JB. “Another Look at Chaucer and the Physiognomists.” Studies in Philology, vol. 78,
no. 2, 1981, pp. 138-52.
Galen. “The Art of Medicine.” Galen: Selected Works. Translated by P.N. Singer, Oxford
World’s Classics, 1997, pp. 345-396.
-----. “Best Constitution of Our Bodies.” Galen: Selected Works. Translated by P.N. Singer,
Oxford World’s Classics, 1997, pp. 292-298.
Garber, Marjorie. Shakespeare and Modern Culture. Anchor Books, 2008.
Graver, Margaret. “Philo of Alexandria and the Origin of the Stoic Προπάθειαι.” Phronesis. vol.
44, no. 4, 1999, pp. 300-325.
Greenwood, Davyyd. “Humoral/Environmental Theories and the Chain of Being.” The Taming
of Evolution: The Persistence of Non-Evolutionary Views in the Study of Humans.
Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 27-43.
Hall, Edith. “Why are the Erinyes Female? or, What is so Feminine about Revenge?” Revenge
and Gender in Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance Literature. Edited by Lesel Dawson
and Fiona McCarthy, Edinburgh University Press, 2018, pp. 33-57.
Johnson, Bonnie. “Blood, Milk, Poison: Romeo and Juliet’s Tragedy of ‘Green’ Desire
Corrupted Blood.” Blood Matters: Studies in European Literature and Thought, 1400-

127

1700. Edited by Bonnie Johnson and Eleanor Decamp, University of Pennsylvania Press,
2018, pp. 134-148.
Kastan, David Scott. Shakespeare and the Book. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Kerrigan, John. Revenge Tragedy: Aeschylus to Armageddon. Oxford University Press, 1996.
Kyd, Thomas. The Spanish Tragedy. Edited by J.R. Mulryne, Meuthen Drama, 2009.
Lange, Marjory. Telling Tears in the English Renaissance. EJ Brill, 1996.
Meek, Richard and Erin Sullivan Introduction. The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding
Affect in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries. Edited by Meek and Sullivan, Manchester
University Press, 2015.
Mercer, Christina. “The Philosophical Roots of Western Misogyny.” Philosophical Topics, vol.
46, no. 2, 2018, pp. 183-208.
Muir, Edward. Mad Blood Stirring: Vendetta in Renaissance Italy. Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1998.
Newstok, Scott. “‘Turn Thy Throne Into a Tomb’: Elizabeth I’s Death Rehearsal.” Goddesses
and Queens: The Iconography of Elizabeth I. Edited by Annaliese Connolly and Lisa
Hopkins, Manchester University Press, 2007, pp. 169-90.
Paster, Gail. Humoring the Body: Emotions on the Shakespearian Stage. University of
Chicago Press, 2004.
Paster, Gail, et al. Introduction. Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the

128

Cultural History of Emotion, Edited by Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson.
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, 1-20.
Parvini, Neema. Shakespeare’s Moral Compass. University of Edinburgh Press, 2018.
Perry, Curtis. “Seneca and the Modernity of Hamlet.” Illinois Classical Studies. vol. 40, no. 2,
2015, pp. 407-429.
Preedy, Chloe Kathleen. “‘Women’s Weapons’: Education and Revenge on the Early Modern
Stage.” Revenge and Gender in Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance Literature. Edited
by Lesel Dawson and Fiona McCarthy, Edinburgh University Press, 2018, pp. 181-202.
Rosenmeyer, Thomas. Senecan Drama and Stoic Cosmology. University of California Press,
1989.
Schoenfeldt, Michael. Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness
in Spencer, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Seneca. De Ira, translated by Aubrey Stewert, Coppell, Texas: Independent Publisher, 2020.
--. Thyestes. Seneca: Phaedra and other Plays. Translated by Scott Smith, Penguin, 2011, pp.
197-238.
--. Hercules Furens. Seneca: Phaedra and other Plays. Translated by Scott Smith, Penguin,
2011, pp. 3-51.
--. Medea. Seneca: Six Tragedies. Translated by Emily Wilson, Oxford World’s Classics,
2010, pp. 71-101
Shakespeare, William. Hamlet. The Riverside Shakespeare. Edited by G.B. Evans, Houghton,

129

1997, pp. 1183-245.
--. The Famous History of the Life of King Henry VIII. The Riverside Shakespeare. Edited by G.
Blakemore Evans et al., 2nd ed, Houghton, 1997, pp. 1026- 1063.
--. The Rape of Lucrece. The Riverside Shakespeare. Edited by G. Blakemore Evans et al., 2nd
ed, Houghton, 1997, pp. 1814-38.
--. Titus Andronicus. The Riverside Shakespeare. Edited by G. Blakemore Evans et al., 2nd ed,
Houghton, 1997, pp. 1069-1100.
Shephard, Robert. “Court Factions in Early Modern England.” The Journal of Modern History,
vol. 64, no. 4, 1992, pp. 721-745.
Spinrad, Phoebe. “The Fall of the Sparrow and the Map of Hamlet’s Mind.” Modern Philology.
vol. 102, no. 4, 2005, pp. 453-77.
Strier, Richard. “Happy Hamlet.” Positive Emotions in Early Modern Literature and Culture.
Edited by Cora Fox, Bradley J. Irish, and Cassie M. Mlura. Manchester University Press,
2021, pp. 21-43.
Tarrant, R.J. “Greek and Roman in Seneca’s Tragedies.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology,
vol. 97, 1995, pp. 215-230.
Tourner, Cyril. The Atheist’s Tragedy. Oxford World’s Classics: Four Revenge Tragedies.
Edited by Katherine Maus, Oxford Classics, pp. 249-330.
Tribble, Evelyn. “Affective Contagion on the Early Modern Stage.” Affect Theory and Early
Modern Texts: Poltics, Ecologies, and Form. Edited by Amanda Bailey and Mario

130

DiGangi, Palgrave MacMillian, 2017, pp. 195-212.
Wells, Susan. Robert Burton’s Rhetoric: An Anatomy of Early Modern Knowledge. Pennsylvania
State University Press, 2019.
Winston, Jessica. “Senecan Tragedy in Early Elizabethan England.” Lawyers at Play: Literature,
Law, and Politics at the Early Modern Inns of Court. Oxford University Press, 2016.
Winter, Karin. “‘Now I am Medea’: Gender, Identity, and the Birth of Revenge in Seneca’s
Medea.” Revenge and Gender in Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance Literature. Edited
by Lesel Dawson and Fiona McCarthy, Edinburgh University Press, 2018, pp. 97-110.
Wright, Thomas. The Passions of the Mind in General, Edited by William Webster Newbold.
Garland, 1986.
Wu, Tianyue. “Are First Movements Venial Sins? Augustinian Doctrine and Aquinas’s
Reinterpretation.” Fate, Providence, and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval, and
Early Modern Thought: Studies in Honor of Carlos Steel. Edited by Pieter d’Hoine and
Gerd Van Riel, Leuven University Press, 2014, 475-494.

131

1

This dissertation uses the terms “affect,” “feeling,” and “emotion” according to the nuanced
definitions preferred by affect theorists. “Affect” refers to an unconscious and prepersonal
inclination toward particular feelings. “Feelings” are the internal and authentic sensations that
arise from one’s affective state. “Emotions” are external displays of feelings, which can be either
authentic or misleading.
2

Schoenfeldt acknowledges that although humoral theory “appears at once deeply materialist
and incorrigibly determinist, in actual practice it was possible to manipulate the humoral fluids
and their concomitant behaviors through diet and evacuation” (2).
3

In Shakespeare and Modern Culture, Marjorie Garber lists notable analyses of Hamlet by
historical figures to argue that the play “holds up the mirror to nature and finds the critic
reflected there. Readers, scholars, and actors have over the years consistently identified with the
character of Hamlet, finding in his gifts and foibles an image of themselves” (201). Many of the
observations she presents emphasize Hamlet’s brooding: “Goethe’s Hamlet lacks ‘the strength of
nerve which forms a hero,’ while Coleridge’s Hamlet ‘procrastinates from thought, and loses the
power of action in the energy of resolve’” (202). These types of historical judgments have
contributed to a casual understanding of Hamlet as sad, melancholy, or indecisive.
4

In “Seneca, Ethics, and the Body: The Treatment of Cruelty in Medieval Thought,” Daniel
Baraz draws direct connections between Senecan moral treatises and Aquinas’s Summa
Theologiae. He states that Summa Theologiae’s “section on temperance” is based “almost
exclusively on classical sources, primarily on Seneca’s De Clementia” (196). Baraz highlights
the consistency between Seneca’s philosophy of cruelty in the moral treatises, explaining that De
Ira contains a “view of cruelty . . . similar to that expressed in the first book of De Clementia”
(199). Aquinas also read and quoted Seneca’s De Beneficiis, as Mary Keys notes in Aquinas and
Aristotelian Magnanimity.
5

Tianyue Wu elaborates on Aquinas’s opinion of the prepassions in “Are First Movements
Venial Sins?: Augustinian Doctrine and Aquinas’s Reintrepretation.” She contends that Aquinas
believed that the individual was morally culpable for “the first movement [toward passion] in
terms of preventative control” (494). In his view, “we are held responsible for the first
movements of sensuality because the will still reserves the power to do otherwise than passively
waiting for the attack of a dangerous thought . . . It follows that the occurrence of such thought is
an indirect result of the will” (490).
6

Seneca describes his own pre-emptive meditation in Book 3 of De Ira. He argues that “it is best
to prepare obstacles beforehand for vices which are known, and above all things tranquilize our
mind that it may bear the most sudden and violent shocks either without feeling anger, or, if
anger be provoked by the extent of some unexpected wrong, that it may bury it deep, and not
betray its wound” (3.13). Seneca then offers readers some anti-anger arguments, so that they
may be more inclined to withstand certain anger in certain situations. For example, he reminds
readers no sane individual “returns kicks to a mule or bites to a dog” because these creatures
lack the capacity to know they do wrong. He maintains that one should behave in the same
manner to unintelligent humans: “If animals are protected from your anger by their want of
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reason, you ought to treat all foolish men in the like manner: for if a man has that mental
darkness which excuses all the wrongdoings of dumb animals, what difference does it make if in
other respects he be unlike a dumb animal?” (3.27). Seneca also hopes to steel his readers against
anger by explaining how it becomes habit and degrades spirit: “If you are angry, you will quarrel
first with this man, and then with that: first with slaves, then with freedmen . . . your frenzy will
drag you from one place to another . . . your madness will constantly meet with newly occurring
irritants, and will never depart from you. Tell me, miserable man, what time you will have for
loving? O, what good time you are wasting on an evil thing!” (3.28). By presenting his reader
with these importations against anger before an incitement to anger arises, Seneca hopes to
condition his reader against negative affects. Robert Burton utilizes the same tactic against anger
in The Anatomy of Melancholy. He also preemptively equips readers with arguments against
anger because he similarly believes that the best way ward off negative “passions and affections”
is to “furnish ourselves with philosophical and divine precepts, other men’s examples . . . to
balance our hearts with love” (2.3.186).
7

The Passions of the Mind immediately reveals debts to Seneca and Aquinas’s investment in
self-shaping, as it explicitly lays out the individual Christian’s high level of moral responsibility
for their feelings and behaviors. The book’s introduction pits the Christian subject’s active moral
conscience against voluntary and involuntary influences on affect, describing the Christian life as
a “a “warfare on Earth,” a battlefield where one must continually be “rooting out vice and
planting . . . virtue” so one be “ruled by reason and not tyrannized by preposterous affection”
(91). The introduction makes clear that involuntary movements of the body may potentially
thwart the Christian’s moral mission, since “an operation that lodgeth in the soul can alter the
body and move the humors from one place to another” (91). However, once successful in
subduing unruly passions, the “mortified” Christian gains “great quietness of mind, and enableth
himself better to the service of God (92).
8

In Robert Burton’s Rhetoric: An Anatomy of Early Modern Knowledge, Susan Wells explains
that Seneca’s influence in Burton’s reflects a cross-section of the “sixteenth century arts
tradition, with its prescribed lectures and readings in grammar, rhetoric, and logic, and with the
orientation of Oxford to producing civil servants as well as well-trained divines. The books that
Burton owned and cited in the Anatomy are deeply rooted in this tradition. . . Burton quoted
extensively from Seneca, Virgil, Horace, Juvenal, Pliny, and Cicero, as we might expect from a
university scholar with humanistic training” (15).
9

Winston explains that the Inns of Court, where Seneca was translated, ‘primarily provided legal
training for the sons of the aristocracy and gentry” (32), ultimately serving as a finishing school
“where ambitious men came to gain useful legal training while acquiring a cosmopolitan
sophistication that would allow them to function at court and in other exclusive social circles”
(33). The trainees at the Inns would move on to “positions in the Elizabethan court and
government as secretaries, ambassadors, members of Parliament, and sometimes as counselors to
the monarch herself” (34). The most successful of these men carried Seneca with them all the
way to Queen Elizabeth’s ear. Jasper Heywood, who translated the Senecan plays Troas,
Thyestes, and Hercules Furens at the Inns in the late 1550s and early 60s, made contact with
Elizabeth by offering her a personalized translation of Troas in 1559 as a “New Year’s gift” (45).
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10

Burton had read or at least knew of Wright’s work, as he namedrops him in The Anatomy of
Melancholy. In Part 1, Section 2, Burton surveys previous literature on passions in order to
review how passions “‘produce a habit of melancholy . . . which, having gotten the mastery of
our souls, may well be called diseases’” (1.2.252). His review acknowledges two Elizabethan
sources alongside a litany of classical ones. These are Timothy Bright’s 1586 treatise on
melancholy and “Wright the Jesuit, in his book the Passions of the Mind” (1.2.252).
11

Paster finds an example of this type of trauma in Othello, when she closely reads Othello’s
cistern speech in Act 4. She argues that, in this speech, Othello articulates terror and despair after
realizing how “physical changes within himself” have caused alterations in his character and
temperament (69). Poisoned and degraded by “the death of his passion” (71), Othello
experiences “the great uncertainty” of a physiological process that wreaks its effects on the
physical and psychological self (74). In her words, “it is Othello’s tragedy to experience and
describe this awful, life-destroying darkness directly, within himself. He imagines . . . inner
bodily decay and death as . . . toads multiplying the dark and fetid fluids of his own damaged
viscera” (76).
12

Close intertextualities between Antonio’s Revenge and Hamlet further support the assertion
that Shakespeare would have known Senecan moral treatises. Perry notes that Antonio’s Revenge
and Hamlet “are roughly contemporaneous” and “share the same basic plot” because the two
plays are participants in a “complex intertextual conversation” (416). He acknowledges other
scholarship on theatrical competition and collaboration to remind readers that “Shakespeare and
Marston were friendly rivals at this time . . . ‘the plays were written . . . with each man regularly
looking over the other’s shoulder’” (416). Given the close connection between Shakespeare,
Marston, and their works, it is likely that the two playwrights shared the same body of
knowledge.
13

Heather Dubrow identifies close links between The Rape of Lucrece and Senecan tragedy in
her book Captive Victors: Shakespeare’s Narrative Poems and Sonnets. She argues that like a
Senecan tragedy, The Rape of Lucrece conveys extremity of emotion through monologue or
soliloquy infused with bombastic or hyperbolic exclamations, longwinded allusions or
metaphors, and appeals to the supernatural. She notes that some readers may find that this style
makes the poem’s depiction of rape seem estranged from “psychological reality or even common
sense.” But Dubrow reminds readers that in composing the poem, Shakespeare was “adhering to
elaborate literary conventions . . . By the time he wrote The Rape of Lucrece, the lineaments of a
certain type of set speech were well established . . . these speeches typically included such
rhetorical devices as the apostrophe and the rhetorical question and such formulas as the appeal
to the destines and the curse . . . Seneca is often credited – and even more often blamed – for
shaping this literary type” (102-03).

14

There has been much attention paid to Lucrece’s gendered and moral quandary since the
1980s. Margaret Rice Vasileiou explains that during this period, critics including “Nancy J.
Vickers, Heather Dubrow, Katharine Eisaman Maus, and Joel Fineman” refuted a longstanding
“critical consensus that trivialized Shakespeare’s Lucrece as a precious exercise in rhetorical
excess” (47). Thanks significantly in part to their efforts, we now understand the poem’s rhetoric
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and metaphor as reflecting the “sexual violence and verbal self-dispossessions suffered by a
woman living in the midst of patriarchy” (48).
15

Tarquin makes an attempt at ethical affective management by telling his “unhallowed
thoughts” to “die . . . before you blot / With your uncleanness that which is divine” (192-93). He
lists several reasons to reject rape, including: its abhorrence to human virtue (195-96); that it will
bring shameful dishonor to his royal name and progeny (197-210); the temporary pleasure of sex
with Lucrece is too fleeting to be worthwhile (211-17); and that he violates Collatine’s
camaraderie by abusing Lucrece (232-38).
16

In early modern amatory verses, love-stricken male speakers often depict themselves as
passive objects unable to resist the force of depersonalized feminine attributes. Tarquin’s lines
reflect this pattern because they give grammatical agency to Lucrece’s “beauty,” which
“pleadeth” and render him “dumb.” The lines seem to suggest that Tarquin has decreased
autonomy. However, they should be balanced with awareness of Tarquin’s agency in deliberately
constructing an image of himself; he is a male orator who chooses to recite poetic love conceits
to control his humor and induce himself to an even more desirous state.
17

Paster’s research explains how early modern notions of humoral physiology led to the
assumption that women, because of their cold bodies, held “limited capacity for productive
agency, individuality, and higher reasoning” (79). The humoral understanding of women’s
bodies will be fully explored in the next chapter.
18

In English Revenge Drama, Linda Woodbridge notes that “after 1530, Luther and
Melanchthon suddenly held that ‘any ruler who becomes a tyrant may be lawfully and forcefully
opposed’ (Skinner II: 74). The twenty-ninth homily of Calvin’s Homilies on the First Book of
Samuel . . . conclude[s] that magistrates ordained by God may ‘constrain the prince’ (Skinner
II:214)” (141).
19

Wright notes that logic indeed possesses the capacity to “stir up or suppress the affectations of
man” (219). Although “not every kind of reason hath force to stir up a passion” (219), an urgent
reason with “great perspicuity and apertness in delivery” can make an effect on the humors
(225).
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